Author Archives: Martin van Creveld

But It Is All We Have

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In theory, wars should end when the defeated have no one left to fight and the victors can do whatever they likes. In practice, many if not most wars do not end in this way. As the end approaches and few doubts remain concerning the outcome, the loser will try and get the best terms he can; whereas the victor may be tempted to spare himself further effort, treasure and blood. Another possibility is for stalemate to prevail; causing both sides to have second thoughts about whether their goals can in fact be achieved and start to look for a way out.

In almost every case, the opening of negotiations will be marked by some kind of ceremony, great or small. Once they get under way they may be either direct or indirect. Direct negotiations mean a meeting, or more likely a series of meetings, between the representatives of both sides; indirect ones, meetings in which intermediaries play a prominent, sometimes decisive, role. During the Middle Ages conducting them was normally the task of the Church; shuttle diplomacy, made famous in 1973-74 by U.S Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as he flew between Jerusalem, Cairo and Damascus, is by no means a modern invention. A similar role is likely to be played by some neutral party or else by the United Nations. Negotiations may be limited to the actual belligerents, or else they may involve other parties as well. As happened, for example, during the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, which was attended by delegations from almost every European state, and also during the Conference of Versailles in 1919-20.

Contrary to what many people think, peace-negotiations and fighting are by no means exclusive. Instead, very often they take place simultaneously. An excellent example was the so-called Hundred Years War. Starting in 1337 and ending in 1453, in reality it consisted of a whole series of wars, some simultaneous, some consecutive, with pauses in between. Throughout the hundred-and sixteen years it lasted there was probably not one in which peace negotiations did not go on; if not between the principals, i.e the kings of both countries, then between some of their subordinates who, under the prevailing decentralized feudal system, often enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom to do as they saw fit. One issue on which agreement was sometimes sought was an exchange of prisoners—just as it is today following the fall of Kherson.

The peace-negotiations surrounding the Thirty Years War started in 1635 but only ended in 1648 (not counting the closely related war between France and Spain, which went on until 1657). Attempts to end the Vietnam War got under way in 1969 but took four years to complete; just deciding on the shape of the conference table in such a way as to satisfy all the participants (the U.S, South Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and North Vietnam) required months.

Applying the above generalities to the current conflict in Ukraine, what can we reasonably expect?  Point number one: most likely, negotiations will be indirect at first but direct later on. At present Zelensky is determined not to sit down with Putin’s representatives, let alone the man himself. But not sitting down with Putin does not necessarily mean that any kind of negotiation between Ukraine and Russia must be ruled out. Some kind of intermediary, most likely the UN or else a country, such as India, currently not involved in the conflict may be called in to provide its good services. Another possibility is that Putin will be remeoved by his own people and that his successors will prove more amenable to negotiations than he has been.

Point number two: very probably, given how numerous the NATO countries are and the fact that Putin has very few close allies, he will reject a peace congress and insist on one-on-one negotiations. Formally at any rate other countries will be excluded, though they may try to position themselves on the sidelines so as to gather what crumbs they can.

Point number three: almost certainly, the negotiations will take a long time to complete. At least months, more likely years. As they go on, the shooting may stop—or else it will continue, albeit intermittently and on a reduced scale. See, by way of an example of the way the two things can mix, the Vietnam War.

Point number four: seen from Moscow, victory—whatever that may mean—seems far away, perhaps even further than it did on the day its armies first launched their invasion nine months ago. On the Ukrainian side, even taking into account Zelensky’s recent victories, it does not look as if his proclaimed aim of ejecting the Russians from all of the territory they have taken since 2014 is at all realistic. It being impossible to settle the issue by force of arms, it is very likely that, in the end, some kind of compromise will be struck. One that, while granting Ukraine much of what it wants, will at any rate enable Putin to claim victory; for example, by means of a NATO declaration that Ukraine will not be allowed to join that organization.

Finally: this short article is based on nothing else but history. Often in the past history has proved itself a poor guide to the future. But it is all we have

Everyman

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Ph. Roth, Everyman (New York, Vintage, 2007 reprint).

Not everyone considers this book an unqualified success. Female critics in particular tend to look at the hero, whose name we never learn, as a philanderer with nothing but cunt in mind. One whose sole wish in life is to objectify women, fuck them, and finally dispose of them like so much soiled wastepaper. I, however have read it many times and am still reading parts of it practically every night.

Why? Not because of what it has to say about life in America, a problem to which I’ve devoted an entire book (which, however, being politically incorrect, only found a publisher in Russia). And not because it tells me much more about the nature of Jewish-American life than I’ve learnt from my Jewish-American friends over the last four decades or so. True, the hero is Jewish. So were his parents. Very decent, very supportive, New Jersey folks, buried in a Jewish cemetery where the hero himself will be buried soon enough. At one point in the book, hospitalized after an operation, he leaves the rubric “religion” on a form he is given empty. The reason? He does not want to attract the attention of some rabbi who, unasked, will visit him in his bed and talk “the way rabbis talk.” And the representatives of other religions too, I suppose. But because, as the book’s title tells us, it presents the reader with the story of everyman. Including myself, of course. It is my life over the last decade or so—I am seventy-six, only slightly order than Roth when he wrote this—that I am reading about.

The harsh sound of the sod covering one’s deceased parents’ wooden coffins. The tendency to forget any problems you may have had with them and remember only the good things. The slowly vanishing impression of most of the people, including the women, one has met during one’s life and used to associate with in one capacity or another. The slowly, but oh so painfully, evaporating illusions about one’s children from one’s first marriage whose love, once so strong as to encompass the entire universe, one has been unable to retain.

The slowly vanishing memories of times, long gone, when one was careless and free. In Roth’s case the apex of that freedom came at the age of ten when he was being carried towards the beach by the waves of the Atlantic. In mine, aged twenty or so, of running, barefoot and wearing only swimming trunks, for miles over the beaches north of Tel Aviv. A true miracle that: feeling, or perhaps ceasing to feel, one’s body function. Like God, or at any rate like some perfect machine operating in automatic mode. Without constraints, without any kind of aches, even without feeling tired. By now I am no longer capable of anything of the kind. Much worse, the beaches themselves, having been taken over by developers, have all but disappeared. What miserable stretches remain are too short and too crowded to allow for any serious running at all.

A topic on which Roth, master of brevity that he is, only spends one sentence: The gradual, often not so gradual, destruction of memory itself. Mainly, but not only, the kind known as short term. It is a strange process. One searches for something one knows is present in one’s head, but one cannot dig it out. A few minutes, or seconds, later one cannot even remember what it was that one wanted to remember. Suddenly it pops up again, often at the most unexpected moments and when it is no longer of any use. Or it does not. Each time, it is as if a part of oneself has gone missing.

The longing for the time before one’s biography became identical with one’s medical record (as Roth so aptly puts it). The decline of health, as reflected by the growing frequency of one’s visits to one’s doctor. As is also the case in Everyman, my doctor, as well as most of the other medical personnel one goes to, is friendly, generous with his time, and does his best; but when everything is said and done his powers are rather limited. The better he is, the readier he is to admit that fact.

The fairly constant humiliation of having to ask for help. In moving anything that is a bit heavy, as when my car blew a tire the other day. In working one’s computer, as I am doing right now (I could not run this blog without the assistance of my stepson, Jonathan Lewy). In finding one’s way. I particularly remember one rainy evening when, driving around in Tel Aviv, my glasses (I am near sighted) became clouded over. With them I could not see the street signs; without them I could not see the signs either.

The curious feeling that everything that matters happened long ago; in that sense, one is already dead. The fear, and the knowledge, that life is a one-way street that leads to—what?

Not-being, of course. Turning into a smelly mess with no memory and no consciousness. Most of these things, and many others beside, may be found in Roth’s slim masterpiece. May the critics say whatever they like: I on my part am going to read it again. And again. And again.

Except that having written this, I feel enough may finally be enough. Time to move on? But where to?

West or East

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For a number of years now, I have been receiving regular emails from an outfit calling itself Russia Beyond. An offshoot of the government owned and run Russian news agency TV-Novosty, it specializes in what one could call “soft” propaganda—short, often quite amusing, stories about what life inside the world’s largest country is supposedly. One which, for good or ill, also happens to be one of the politically, militarily, economically, and culturally most important among them. Each issue is accompanied by the following warning:

Dear readers,

Our website and social media accounts are under threat of being restricted or banned, due to the current circumstances.

So far, I am very happy to say, this has not happened. This week the most important headline reads, “Is Russia Europe or Asia?” The text provides five short—a couple of hundred words each—vignettes of the lives and works of prominent Russian people who, each in his own time and his own way, have busied themselves with this question.

I quote.

1. Vasily Tatishchev (1686-1750) – Russia belongs to Europe.

This 18th century Russian historian and author of the first “Russian History” book was one of the first to argue that the hypothetical border between Europe and Asia should go through the Ural Mountains. Until then, it had been proposed that the River Yenisei or the River Ob should be the dividing line (and authors of antiquity even suggested that such a border should run along the River Don and through the Black Sea to Constantinople). Tatishchev, however, presented various arguments based on natural history to support his ideas – for example, beyond the Urals, even the nature of river flow patterns is different (and there are different fish species), while many trees that grow in Europe are not to be found beyond the Ural Mountains.

As far as Tatishchev was concerned, Russia was undoubtedly a European country, “just like the Kingdom of Poland, Prussia or Finland”. Describing the history of ancient Russia – before victory over the Khanate of Kazan and the conquest of Siberia – Tatishchev comes to the conclusion that, “on the grounds of natural circumstances”, Russia belongs “without a doubt to Europe”.

2. Historian Nikolay Karamzin (1766-1826) – Russia has almost caught up with Europe.

This historian, whose work spanned the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, is regarded as the author of the concept of the “Russian European”. Karamzin considers Peter the Great’s turn towards Europe as an unmistakable blessing for the country, given that Russia had succeeded in making use of the achievements of the European mind – primarily in the sciences, arts and military science and in terms of state structure.

“The Germans, the French and the English were ahead of the Russians for at least six centuries; Peter propelled us with his powerful hand and, in a few years, we almost caught up with them. All pathetic jeremiads about a change in the Russian character, about a loss of Russian moral physiognomy, are either nothing but a joke or come from a lack of thorough reflection. We are not like our bearded ancestors: So much the better!” wrote Karamzin as he traveled around Europe.

3. Writer Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881) – a mistake to think that we are only Europeans.

After many years, when public opinion was preoccupied exclusively with Europe, Dostoevsky proposed that Russia’s view of Asia be “revitalized”. “The whole of our Russian Asia, including Siberia, still exists as a kind of appendage, as it were, in which our European Russia seems reluctant to take any interest,” laments the author.

“We need to dispel our servile fear that in Europe we will be called Oriental barbarians and described as being even more Asian than European. This shame that Europe will regard us as Asian has been dogging us for close to two centuries.” Dostoevsky calls this shame mistaken, just as mistaken as it is for Russians to consider themselves exclusively European and not Asian – “something that we never stopped being”. Dostoevsky was also irritated by the fact that Russia was “imposing itself” on European affairs and bending over backwards to get Europe to see us as one of their own “and not as Tatars”. Dostoevsky reaches the conclusion that it is perhaps in Asia that Russia needs to seek a path to a bright future for itself.

4. Historian Vasily Klyuchevsky (1841-1911) – Russia as a bridge between Europe and Asia.

Russia’s complex geographical situation determined its historical and cultural destiny, according to 19th century professor and historian Vasily Klyuchevsky. Russia had always experienced foreign influences – but these had invariably been reshaped and redefined on Russian soil. First, it had been Byzantium and the Christianity it brought to Rus’ and then, Western Europe, with its sciences and also the common political space which Russia only finally joined after Peter the Great. It was in the 19th century, according to Klyuchevsky, that Russia had started wondering about belonging to Europe, while forgetting its Eastern bearings. And the idea of Russia’s European character had become firmly established when a German by birth – Catherine the Great – had reigned for decades.

“Historically, Russia is not of course Asia, but geographically it is not Europe either. It is a transitional country, an intermediary between two worlds. Its culture has inseparably tied it to Europe; but nature has imposed peculiarities and influences on it that have always drawn it towards Asia or drawn Asia into Russia,” Klyuchevsky wrote in his ‘Course of Russian History’.

5. Lev Gumilev (1912-1992) – Russian Eurasians will overtake Europe.

The prominent historian and ethnologist Lev Gumilev (son of famous early 20th century poets Anna Akhmatova and Nikolay Gumilev) is famous for having coined the term “super ethnos” to denote a group that has emerged from a mosaic of ethnic groups within a single region. The Western European Christian world and the Muslim world were super ethnoses of this kind. The Russian people, too, which, until the 18th century, had encompassed other ethnoses with the progressive conquest of Siberia and Central Asia, had emerged as a super ethnos in the course of its historical development. The Russian ethnos was much younger than its Western European counterpart and thus found itself on a slightly lower rung of development – but, according to Gumilev, it was destined soon to experience an upsurge.

Gumilev was an exponent of “Eurasianism” – in other words, he believed that Western European culture was in crisis and that the East would take over its dominant position. The Russian super ethnos, combining European Slavs and the non-Slavic peoples of Asia, would become one of the standard-bearers of the culture of Eurasianism.

Lev Gumilev studied Asia for many years and was enchanted by its culture. “A banal Eurocentrism is sufficient for a layman’s comprehension, but it is unfit for a scientific understanding of the diversity of observable phenomena. After all, to the Chinese or Arabs, Western Europeans appear inadequate,” Gumilev wrote in his book ‘Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of Earth’.

To which list I, Martin van Creveld (1946-), retired historian writing from Jerusalem, Israel, would like to add:

6. Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin (1883-1954) – Russia is different.

 Russia and the West do not mix. On one hand, the country is too large and heterogeneous—in its current configuration, it comprises a hundred and five different nationalities, no less—to be democratically governed the way the West is or claims to be. On the other, it is the carrier of a civilization with differs from that of the West on many essential points. One that, seventy years of Communism notwithstanding, often sees itself as is religiously-minded rather than secular. Greek-Orthodox rather than Catholic or Protestant. Authoritarian rather than democratic. Community-minded rather than individualistic. Pristine and honest rather than hypocritical, oversophisticated and effete. To paraphrase a phrase which, a century and a half ago, some Germans used to apply to themselves: the Russian spirit will prevail—and, as it does so, cleanse the rest of the world of its numerous self-inflicted evils.

7. Finally: Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (1952-present). Only a strong government with strong native roots can save Russia from losing its identity to the West.

If ever Ilyin had a follower it was Putin—who even paid for moving the great man’s bones from Switzerland, where he died, for reburial in Moscow. Based on several biographies of his I’ve read, the way Putin sees it Russia has long lagged behind the West which, in its turn, has looked down on Russia as a barbarous country hardly deserving to be called, civilized. Repeatedly, Russia saved the West from its own internal demons. So in 1814-15 when Tsar Alexander I headed the coalition whose armies entered Paris and did away with the remnants of the French Revolution. So in 1914-15 when German militarism almost succeeded in taking over Paris and, with it, the continent. And so again in 1941-45 when Hitler launched the greatest challenge of all and came within a hair not only of occupying the Kremlin but of putting an end to the West as we know it.

The immediate cause of the current war was formed by NATO’s efforts to incorporate Ukraine. Seen from a historical point of view, though, the war is but another phase in this great and holy struggle. One which, on pain of ceasing to exist, Russia must and will win—even if it takes decades, as Peter the Great’s struggle with the Swedes did.

War in Ukraine, Again

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Reader, Please note: This interview was originally done in German for a paper called, Junge Freiheit (Young Freedom). But much of what it has to say also applies to NATO as a whole.

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JF: What do you think about Russia’s supply system? Some Western media have been claiming that inside the Kremlin, there are hot debates concerning the desirability and necessity of general mobilization.

MvC: You must realize that practically everything you, I, and most Westerners—who know no Russian and have no access to the original sources in the original language–learn about the conflict must pass through a series of lenses first. They are, 1. Ukraine’s own intelligence services and propaganda apparatus; 2. The West’s intelligence services; and 3. The West’s news agencies. Personally I would not consider any of these as particularly reliable; in any war, the first casualty is always the truth.

JF: Seen from a German point of view, how important is this war?

MvC: Should Russia win this war and be left in possession of Ukraine, Putin and his eventual successors will pose a vital danger to the West. As, to use an analogy, Hitler did after his defeat of Poland in 1939. That is why I am all in favor of Germany delivering weapons to Ukraine. However, there are several conditions that must be met first. Number one, Germany’s own defenses must not be significantly weakened; no point in holding the extremities if the center folds.  Number two, to maximize cost-effectiveness and prevent duplication the deliveries should be coordinated with the rest of NATO. Third, it is a question, not just of delivering weapons but of sending those that Ukraine needs most.

JF: Considering what we are told about the war, which systems would be most useful for Kiev?

MvC: Basically they are of three kinds. First, anti-aircraft defenses. Second, those that will enable the Ukrainians to identify and locate Russian targets, especially supply convoys, depots, etc., way behind the front. Third, those that will enable those targets to be hit and destroyed from a distance.

JF: The Americans and the Brits are sending many weapons to Ukraine. What has been the impact of those weapons so far?

MvC: Clearly they are very important indeed. Had it not been for them, the only strategy left to the Ukrainians would have been to allow the Russians to overrun their county as they themselves resorted to guerrilla and terrorism. Presumably the outcome would have been Russian reprisals and even greater death and destruction than is actually the case.

JF: People often speak of the drones Turkey has been providing Ukraine with. How important are they, really? Are we talking about an effective system, or is it just a question of reinforcing Ukrainian morale by delivering a blow here, a blow there?

MvC: It seems to be a very good system with many advanced capabilities. That is why, according to the media, the chief of Ukraine’s air force Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk, has called it “life-giving”. The popularity of the drone in Ukraine led to a song, “Bayraktar” being written about the drone while throwing insults at the Russian army and the invasion. Yet none of this means that it is some kind of silver bullet that will quickly win the war—several have been shot down.

JF: Recently we have seen the Ukrainians using very simple technologies such as pickup-mounted rockets. Operated by crews of four or five, they seem to be causing the Russians lots of trouble. Obviously war is assuming new faces. What else can we expect?

MvC: Almost any war, provided only it lasts long enough, will lead to one of two outcomes (or both). On one hand, it will accelerate the development and deployment of new weapons and weapon systems. On the other, it will cause old systems to be dragged out of the magazines, refurbished, and re-employed. Think of 1940. As the very time when the British, to combat the German submarines, were developing the world’s first shortwave radar they also leased fifty World War I-vintage destroyers from the U.S.

JF: It seems that the most recent Russian weapons, such as hypersonic cruise missiles and the T-14 tank are not going on active operations. Why is that?

MvC: The hyper fast weapon has been tested several times and seems to work.  Possibly the reason why it has not been used more often is because its range, about 2,000 kilometers, is way beyond that is needed in this particular conflict.

The T-14 appears to have experienced some technical problems which delayed its deployment. Serial production only began around the time the war broke out.

JF: Do you think Kiev will able to go on the offensive again? As by reconquering occupied territory and holding it against the Russians?

MvC: War is a dynamic business. Even during the years of stalemate in 1915-18 both sides on the Western Front—not to mention the Eastern one–were occasionally able to make limited gains. But will the Ukrainians retake all or most of the land they have lost? I doubt it.

JF: During our last interview, held early in the war, you warned against underestimating the Russians. Are you still of this opinion? In your view, how far is the Kremlin prepared to go?

MvC: In any war, underestimating the enemy is the greatest error of all. History is full of the cadavers of those who did so.

JF: Will they go all the way to the Crimea??

MvC: What do you mean? The Russians already occupy both the peninsula itself and the corridor leading to it. Albeit that their control of the latter is somewhat shaky.

What I Want of Joe Biden Revisited

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Shortly after Mr. Biden took office, I posted a short piece—No. 367, to be precise—on “What I Want of Joe Biden.” Now that the Congressional elections are just weeks away, I want to try and see the extent to which my

 January 2020 wishlist has been realized. So here it is, each wish followed by a short comment (in bold letters).

Domestic Policy

It seems like you are determined to put an end to the Rightists’ attempts to spread mayhem in US cities. Good. But do not forget to do the same with the Leftists who have been doing the same. Only more often.

Comment: Thank goodness, there has been no repetition of 6 January 2021. However, under the surface the pot goes on boiling. Both Right and Left are becoming more extreme, crushing the center between them. Partly in preparation for the next explosion, partly because of the efforts to ban or at least limit the acquisition of firearms, Americans of all persuasions now own more of the latter than ever before. And the number of mass shootings is increasing.

Strive to end the policies which, starting half a century ago, have discriminated against men. Especially such as are white, young, relatively poor, and without a college education. These men are not only frustrated. They have guns, and, some of them being former military or police, knew all too well how to use them. Nor will they necessarily give them up if called upon to do so. Should their grievances not be addressed the results will be incalculable. Quite possibly, worse than those of the Civil War in which 600,000 Americans—about six percent of the entire US population, as it then was—perished. Want a more up to date idea of what it will look like? Lebanon 1975-1990, provides a good model. As does Syria from 2011 on.

Comment: From what I read and hear it appears that discrimination against men, especially such as are white, young, relatively poor, without a college education and, for good measure, heterosexual has gotten worse rather than better. Barring radical change, an explosion of some kind is inevitable.

Immigration is a sticky subject. Some want more of it, some, less. Whatever you do about it, make sure the US regains control of it. A state that does not know who does and does not live within its territory is, in a very real sense, not a state at all.

Comment: As of 2016, the number of unauthorized immigrants was estimated at 10.7 million, representing 3.3% of the total U.S. population. Though perhaps making fewer headlines, the problem remains as sticky as it has ever been. Entire communities are collapsing under the burden. To repeat, a state that does not know who does and does not live within its territory is, in a very real sense, not a state at all.

Another sticky subject is abortion. Personally I hate it. But it seems to me that forcing a baby to be born against its parents will is even worse.

Comment: This is another field in which things have become worse rather than better. The Supreme Court’s decision to cancel Americans’ right to have an abortion and allow each state to go its own way in this respect has been a blow to the chin, especially that of the Democrats. While the fight is by no means over yet, in this field as in so many others extremism reigns.

Stop throwing vast sums away by lining the pockets of those out of work owing to the corona epidemic. Instead, set up work-creation programs. Just as your illustrious predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt, did during the New Deal. For nonacademic youth, set up apprenticeship systems like those of Germany and Switzerland. If college students are assisted in all kinds of ways, why not others? After all, the proverbial plumber, along with the electrician and auto-mechanic and carpenter and builder, is just as necessary to society as his (or her) academically-trained white collar colleague is. Nothing like a sense of purpose and $$$ in a boy’s pocket to turn him from a dangerous vandal into a law-abiding citizen.

Comment: Corona no longer makes many headlines. But it does remain a danger to be carefully considered before it breaks out again.

Foreign Policy

Coming to power, Trump promised to mend relations with Russia. Instead, his bluster has only made things worse. A strategy meant to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing by favoring one over the other would make better sense. The way Nixon did it back in 1972-74. Don’t call it divide et impera, of course. But do use the method.

Comment: Largely as a result of the war in Ukraine, relations with Russia have become much worse than they were in early 2021. Whatever attempt has been made to drive a wedge between Russia and China, moreover, it has not succeeded. In fact the unspoken alliance between the two countries is one major reason why the Russian economy has been holding on as well as it does.

Coming to power, Trump promised to mend relations with China. Again it has not happened, and now something very like the Cold War is rapidly escalating. Make up your mind, Joe, which of the two threats to the US, the Russian or the Chinese, is the more serious one. And act accordingly.

Comment: See the above two comments.

Mend relations with the EU. Trump’s attitude to Europe had been to treat it with contempt. As, for example, when the US tried to make it more difficult to complete Nord Stream, the pipe-system that will provide its allies with Russian natural gas while bypassing the Ukraine. As a result, the US is now at odds with all three of the world’s remaining greatest remaining powers. With all respect, Joe, this is too much. It reminds me of the time around 1890 when the Brits, then the world’s strongest power, spoke of “splendid isolation.” Also, of 1945 when Japan was waging war on the US, and Britain, and China, and finally the Soviet Union, simultaneously.

Comment: Judging by appearances, Biden does not dislike the Europeans as much as Trump did. Furthermore, the outbreak of the Ukrainian war has changed everything. Coming face to face with Russia, the US and Europe need each other more than ever, with the result that, so far, their alliance has held up fairly well. But whether, especially in the face of Russian-imposed sanctions in the energy sector, it can continue to do so remains to be seen.

Israel and the Middle East. Though an Israeli, I am no admirer of Netanyahu and would like to see a two-state solution implemented. However, the one thing Israelis and Palestinians have in common is their decades-long determination to reject any deal the other side would accept. On the other hand, in bringing together Israelis and a number of Arab/Moslem countries your predecessor, and especially his son in law Kushnir, has performed admirably. This is one part of your predecessor’s policy that you can adopt without hesitation.

Comment: Bringing together Israelis and Palestinians is a hopeless task. Not so bringing about a lasting peace between Israel and some Arab countries, especially those of the Gulf. True, under the surface things have not always been as polite and as friendly as one might hope them to be. Still the improvement that has taken place is very great. Well done, Joe.

In case you are thinking of it, don’t send troops to Libya; let them kill each other to their heart’s contents. Ditto Syria. But renew and, above all, extend Obama’s nuclear agreement with Iran. As long as it stayed in force it was good for the US, for Iran, and for the rest of the Middle East.

If ever there was a wise decision it ws to refrain from sending troops to Libya where they were sure to come under two fires and, in the end, condemned to humiliation and defeat. As to Iran, in the face of all the difficulties facing you, you deserve praise for trying to reach agreement. So stay the course.

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Both at home and abroad, adopt a style that is less inflammatory less divisive, more balanced, than the one your predecessor used. See the pic at the head of this post.

Comment: After Trump, anyone would appear less inflammatory, less divisive, and more balanced. So, once again, stay the course. And congrats on what you have achieved so far. It makes me wish you were some years younger.

On Escalation

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To most people, whether or not a ruler or country “uses” nuclear weapons is a simple choice between either dropping them on the enemy or not doing so. For “experts,” though, things are much more complicated (after all making them so, or making them appear to be so, is the way they earn their daily bread). So today I am going to assume the mantle of an expert and explain some of the things “using” such a weapons might mean.

  1. Making verbal threats. Almost eight decades have passed since the first nuclear weapon was dropped on Hiroshima (without any kind of warning, nota bene). Since then there have been plenty of occasions when countries, statesmen and politicians threatened to use the nukes at their disposal: Eisenhower in 1953 in connection with the Koran War, Khrushchev in 1956 in connection with the Suez Crisis, Kennedy in 1962 in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis, Nixon in 1973 in connection with the Arab-Israeli War of that year, India and Pakistan in 1998 in connection with the Kargil War, and so on right down to Putin today. Some of the threats have been overt and rather brutal, others more or less veiled. Some were delivered directly, others with the help of a third party.
  2. To put some muscle behind the threat, weapons may be moved out of storage and put on display. Normally everything pertaining to nukes is kept highly secret. Here and there, though, countries have allowed their nuclear warheads, or replicas of them, to be shown, photographed, and celebrated for what they might do to opponents. In particular Russia, China and North Korea like to parade their intercontinental ballistic missiles. True monsters they are, any one of which can demolish almost any city on earth within, say, less than an hour of the order being given. Some such displays are accompanied by verbal threats, others not. At times the sequence is reversed in the sense that display precedes threats rather than the other way around.
  3. Raising the state of alarm. Again contrary to what most people think, putting nuclear weapons to use, in other words commanding and controlling them, is by no means simply a matter of pushing the proverbial button. First, those in charge of the weapons must make sure they are always ready to be launched at a moment’s notice. Second, they must make sure the weapons are not launched by accident, or by unauthorized personnel, or by an authorized person either deliberately disobeying orders or going out of his or her mind. The two requirements, speed (lest the weapons are targeted and destroyed before they can be launched) and reliability contradict each other; making the problem of nuclear command and control as difficult as any we humans have to face. Raising the state of alarm will cut through some parts of the problem—though just how, and to what extent, is rightly kept one of the most guarded secrets of all.
  4. Going a step further, weapons and delivery vehicles may be tested. Pace any number of computer models and exercises, ultimately the only way to make sure one’s nuclear weapons will work is to test them. Such tests, of course, may also be used in an attempt to influence the enemy’s behavior—as was notoriously the case when India and Pakistan both tested a number of weapons back in 1998. Some tests may be conducted in or over some outlying part of one’s own country as American, Soviet, British, French, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani and North Korea ones all were. Others may take place over some part of the vast no-man’s world that constitutes the earth’s oceans; for example, the Israeli-South African bomb said to have been detonated over the Indian Ocean back in 1979. It is also possible to send some of one’s missiles hurtling over enemy country, as North Korea has often done in respect to Japan.

Each of the above mentioned methods represents a different way of (hopefully) “using” one’s nuclear weapons in order to influence the enemy’s behavior without bringing about Armageddon. Historically all have been implemented quite often, some even as a matter of routine. The problem is that, since no country or leader has ever admitted giving way to a nuclear threat, it is hard to say how effective such threats were.

There are, however, additional ways states might put their nuclear weapons to use.

  1. Launching a limited nuclear strike at some less important enemy target such as outlying, more or less unpopulated, spaces or else a ship at sea. All in the hope of scaring the opponents to the point where he’ll give way to one’s demand, but without risking a nuclear response.
  2. Launching a limited nuclear strike at the enemy’s nuclear or, in case he does not have them, conventional forces. Targets might consist of early warning installations, anti-aircraft and missile defenses, troop-concentrations, communication centers, depots, etc.
  3. Launching a limited nuclear strike at the enemy’s industrial infrastructure.
  4. Launching a nuclear strike at all of the targets mentioned in bullets 5 to 7.
  5. Launching a full scale nuclear strike at the enemy’s main demographic centers.

One well known nuclear strategist, Herman Kahn, in his 1962 book distinguished among no fewer than forty different stages on the “escalation ladder.” In practice, there are two reasons why the ladder is largely theoretical. First, the various stages are likely to be hard to keep apart. Second, even if the side using the weapons does keep them apart in his own mind, the other is highly unlikely to share his views. In particular, a strike that one side sees as relatively harmless may very well be perceived by the other as a mortal blow or something close to it, thus bringing about the very retaliation he seeks to avoid.

As far as publicly available sources allow the rest of us to judge, up to the present Putin has limited himself to the first of these nine stages. That is less–considerably less–than some others have done before him. Still day by day his chances of winning” this war seem to dwindle. So the question is, will he stop there?

Who Done It?

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Right from the day when mysterious leaks appeared in Nord Stream 2, the pipeline that enables Russian gas to reach consumers in Western Europe, the question “who done it?” has been very much in the air.

It could be Putin. After all, he is well known to be a bad, bad man; with the result that when anything unpleasant happens people are likely to blame it on him. However, as these lines are being written on 28 September there appears to be not the slightest proof that he had a spoon (or a fork, for that matter) in the broth. Not a hint.

As Putin’s Ukrainian adventure proves, he is as liable to error as the rest of us. Still, given that he is already in full control both of the wells where the gas is being pumped out of the ground and the upstream valves through which it passes, I find it difficult to imagine any benefit he could draw from disrupting those lines. Perhaps to the contrary; should he or any of his successors one day wish to reopen the lines, which after all constitute an important source of revenue for Russia, they will find that doing so will be considerably more difficult, expensive, and time consuming.

It could be some terrorist organization. Long before the Ukrainian War broke out, the benefits of Nord Stream 2 were hotly debated in Western Europe, Germany in particular. People denounced Nord Stream for the same reason as they do so many other things; the impact on the environment, the need to leave some resources for the next generation, and so on. The difficulty with this interpretation is, first, that there is no proof for it. Second, that it would require very considerable technical expertise and preparation; and third that, had it been correct, the responsible organization would almost certainly have been more than ready to claim credit. After all, the lives of such organizations, their very existence, depends on the publicity they can get. Yet so far not one of them has tried to do so.

For much of the rest of the world—Africa, Asia, Australia, Latin America—the issue is marginal. They have more important things to worry about than whether or not many, often elderly, Germans will spend the coming winter freezing in their homes. This leaves North America and, specifically, the US. For a number of years now the US, which starting in 1948 became a net importer of energy, has switched positions and started exporting it. Most of the exports consist of natural gas, a commodity of which the US is the world’s second largest supplier after Russia.

In dealing with its NATO allies, the US has never hidden its distaste for a pipeline that would fill Putin’s pocket while at the same time increasing those allies’ dependence on Moscow and thus make them more vulnerable to the Russian dictator’s demands. Such being the case, is it possible to imagine that its secret services, specifically the CIA, have something to do with the leak? While there is no proof of any kind, there have been two incidents that raised eyebrows. Or should have.

The first came from Victoria Nuland, Biden’s undersecretary of state for political affairs and thus a key player at Foggy Bottom. On 27 January 2022, i.e well before the beginning of the Russian invasion, she said that “If Russia invades Ukraine, one way or another, Nord Stream 2 will not move forward.” At the time, most people took the statement as a prediction of events to come. Looking back it may well have implied a threat, however veiled.

The second came from President Biden himself and was much more explicit. Speaking at a White House press conference with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, held on 7 February, he said: “If Russia invades…then there will be no longer a Nord Stream 2. We will bring an end to it.” Reporter: “But how will you do that, exactly, since…the project is in Germany’s control?” Biden: “I promise you, we will be able to do that.”

Enough said.

* Thanks to my good friend, Larry Kummer, for inspiring this post.

Nuclear Games

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Fission and fusion. Warheads and delivery vehicles. First strikes and second strikes. Counterforce and countervalue. Shots across the blow and mutually assured destruction. For decades on end these and any number of similarly mysterious terms have been circling the planet, reflecting the efforts of statesmen, politicians, defense officials, soldiers, academics and journalists to understand what nuclear weapons are all about, by whom and how they might be used, and what the consequences of their use might be. Some of the discussions are public, a great many others classified. Some are committed to paper, but a great many others take the form of wargames in which teams of highly qualified analysts, supported by as much computing power as it takes, try to answer these and similar question for their superiors’ benefit—superiors who, judging by the little that has been published on their reactions, may not even be aware that the wargames are taking place, let alone taken an interest in them.

Still at bottom the issues are very simple. Seven months after their failure to subdue Ukraine by means of a short and decisive coup de main, Putin and his staff seem to be running out of options. They can try and occupy the enemy’s most important cities, i.e Kiev, Kharkov, and perhaps Odessa. However, judging by what happened in the Donbas such an attempt will almost certainly involve them in prolonged, brutal and very bloody urban warfare for which their troops seem to be unprepared and in which victory is by no means assured. They can subject these and other cities to an even more intensive bombardment than has been the case so far, but such a move is unlikely to bring about a quick surrender on the enemy’s part. They can take the offensive in other parts of Ukraine, but given that country’s size and the sparsity of its population many if not most of those efforts are likely to hit little but empty air. Finally, following a strategic switch that has been under way since May, they can renounce the offense in favor of the defense and, by so doing, give up any thought of victory at all.

Even assuming Russia can successfully overcome its current shortage of military manpower, none of the options appear very attractive.  This is a fact of which Putin must be aware and which, at some point, may drive him to despair. Enter nuclear weapons. Here the all-important, indeed decisive, factor is that Ukraine does not have them. Perhaps the more the pity; judging by everything that has happened and not happened since 1945, in that case there is an excellent possibility that the war would never have broken out in the first place.

Next, suppose Putin wants to use his nuclear weapons. However, in that case it is not at all clear what he would do with them. The Ukrainian armed forces, made wise by the invasion, are fighting in too dispersed and mobile a manner to present attractive targets. For the Russians to ignore that fact will only lead to the Ukrainians switching to guerrilla and terrorism, a process that is already well under way. Destroying Ukraine’s vital infrastructure—dams, power plants, airports, and the like—will only make the burden of one day occupying and administering the country all the greater; besides, as evens in the Donbas show, such destruction can be achieved almost equally well by conventional means. Admittedly bombing cities out of existence, as Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, is an option. However, exercising it will end up by creating similar and even greater problems for the Russians to deal with. The more so because of the radioactivity that will surely result. So I consider Putin’s words on the topic idle threats. They are relevant only in case Zelensky and NATO mount a large-scale military offensive, complete with intensive air bombardment, into Russian territory—something that is unlikely to happen.

On the other hand, now that the US and NATO seems to be winning the war, they have no interest in nuclear weapons either. The noises they are making, some overt, others covert, are meant primarily if not exclusively to remind Putin of the terrible consequences that will follow if he goes too far. What “too far” might mean, and what the response might be, is deliberately being left obscure. Precisely how NATOs warnings link up with the factors mentioned in the previous paragraph is also not clear.

The conclusion from this is that no one wants, or should want, to see nuclear weapons used in action. That does not, repeat not, mean that the world is safe and that the weapons in question, complete with their PALs (positive action links, mechanisms explicitly designed to prevent any but authorized personnel, normally heads of state), will always remain in the places they are stored. The situation in Ukraine is unstable and constantly changing. Most of us cannot even imagine the stress to which the most important actors are subject. Under such circumstances words, especially words deliberately used to conceal the exact circumstances under which the weapons may be used, are easily misunderstood. War being a tit-for-tat business, the greatest danger is that of escalation. Meaning the likelihood that, once a single weapon is set off, all will be.

As Clausewtiz says, most barriers only exist in men’s minds. That is why, once they are breached, rebuilding them may be difficult if not impossible.

Guest Article: Playing with Nuclear War

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by

Bill Lind

As of this writing (September 12), Ukraine’s counter offensives appear to be succeeding.  The widely telegraphed offensive in the south is making some progress.  But it looks as if its primary role was deception, where it has already succeeded because Russia responded by drawing down its forces in eastern Ukraine, opening the door for the main Ukrainian counteroffensive.  That is moving forward at Blitzkrieg pace, to the point where Russian units are disintegrating.  All this is, of course, wonderful news for Ukraine and for anyone who wants to see David beat Goliath.

But interests must be matters of cold calculation, not warm emotions.  Foreign policy is more than consulting Sant’s list of who is naughty or nice.  Yes, the Russians have been beasts and their invasion of Ukraine has been criminal.  But Ukraine’s victories are not good news for America’s most vital interest.

What is that most vital interest?  Avoiding nuclear war.

Throughout the Cold War, everyone in Washington understood this.  Party did not matter, liberal or conservative was of no consequence.  The whole foreign and defense policy establishment knew we and the Soviets were walking on eggs.  The slightest mis-step could mean nuclear catastrophe.  We came close on occasion; the closest was probably during the Cuban missile crisis, when the skipper of a Soviet submarine was about to fire a nuclear torpedo at an American destroyer.  His politruk stopped him.  As the representative of the Party, he knew Moscow did not want nuclear war any more than Washington did.

But it seems all the adults in the room died and a bunch of drunk teenagers now have their fingers on the button.  Russia has hinted from the outset of its invasion of Ukraine that the nuclear option is available.  If the Russian army is beginning to disintegrate, I suspect that option is or soon will be on the table.

What would it mean?  My guess is one or more nuclear strikes in western Ukraine, aimed at the supply lines bringing in American and European weapons.  Initially, I don’t think they would attack NATO territory.  But the winds blow east to west in Europe, and the fallout could be considered a weapon on its own.

This is, of course, madness in Moscow.  President Putin regrets the break-up of the Soviet Union; some old Party hands should remind him that no Soviet leader would ever have started a nuclear war.  Had one moved to do so, he would immediately have been recognized as a Trotskyite and toppled.

Unfortunately, the situation in Washington is as bad or worse.  Some circles there are planning to respond with American nuclear strikes if Russia uses nukes in Ukraine.  But what could our targets be?  If we target Russian-held regions of Ukraine such as Donbas, we create the bizarre situation where Moscow and Washington are both nuking Ukraine.  The latter will find out what it was like to be Germany during the Thirty Years War, the place where everyone from Swedes to Spaniards fought it out.  Some German towns still have not recovered.

It does not stop there.  These same circles (hint: there’s a “neo” in their name) know this, plan to hit targets on Russian territory and are calmly discussing the fact that we might lose some east coast cities.  The U.S. military has reportedly been directed to develop contingency plans for such a situation.

Playing with nuclear war goes beyond folly.  It is insanity, plain and simple, straight out of Dr. Strangelove.

If there are any adults left in Moscow or Washington, they need to kick the teenagers out of the room, consider their interests rationally and sit down and talk.  Let us imagine the man we need, old Bismark, returns as the Ghost of Crises past (I think Turkish President Erdogan might serve as his avatar).  Here’s a draft agreement:

Russia has a legitimate interest in Ukraine, namely that it does not constitute a threat to Russia.  That means Ukraine will not be allowed to join NATO, although it may join the EU.  If Ukraine succeeds in retaking Donbas, it returns to Ukraine, but as a special autonomous region with some degree of self-government and a general amnesty.  If Russia can hold it, it stays Russian.

Russia keeps Crimea, because it has historically been Russian.  Like the Donbas, the Russian corridor connecting Russia proper to Crimea stays with whoever holds it when the fighting stops.

In return for Russia getting Crimea, Ukraine gets East Prussia (now called the “Kaliningrad Oblast”) and a new, broad-gauge, heavy-haul railway connecting Konigsberg to Ukraine, giving Ukraine two seas through which it can export its agricultural products.

Finally, Russia joins an international consortium to rebuild Ukraine, with Russia allowed to concentrate its efforts in towns and cities where the population is heavily Russian.

In all this, there is one point Washington must keep in mind above all others: the United States has no vital interests at stake in Ukraine.  That is why it is insanity for us to be contemplating nuclear war.  For what?  How do we benefit?

The thought that, having avoided nuclear war with the Soviet Union for all those years, we are now planning for a nuclear war with a non-Communist Russia is beyond rational comprehension.

 

The Curious Life of Violette Morris

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Like most people these days, I sometimes feel the urge to spend an idle hour roaming the Net. Either because I have nothing better to do or out of curiosity. Doing so the other day, I came across a post I considered so curious that I decided to share it with you. Text taken from Wikipedia with a few very minor changes meant to make things shorter and clearer. Comments, welcome.

Violette Morris (18 April 1893 – 26 April 1944) was a French athlete and Nazi collaborator who won two gold and one silver medal at the Women’s World Games in 1921–1922. She was later banned from competing for violating “moral standards”. She was invited to the 1936 Summer Olympics by Adolf Hitler and was an honored guest. During World War II, she collaborated with Nazis and the Vichy France regime. She became known as “the Hyena of the Gestapo” and was killed by the French Resistance.

Early Life.

Violette Morris was born to Baron Pierre Jacques Morris, a retired French Army cavalry captain, and Élisabeth Marie Antoinette Sakakini, of Palestinian Arab origin. Morris spent her adolescence in a convent, L’Assomption de Huy. She married Cyprien Edouard Joseph Gouraud on 22 August 1914 in the 8th arrondissement of Paris. They divorced in May 1923. Morris learned how to drive during World War I and during the war she drove ambulances and worked as a courier including at the Battle of the Somme and the Battle of Verdun.

Athletic Career.

Morris played for Fémina Sports from 1917 until 1919, and for Olympique de Paris from 1920 to 1926. She also played on the France women’s national team. She won gold medals at the 1921 and 1922 Women’s Olympiads.

In addition to her football career, she was an active participant in many other sports. She was selected for the French national water polo team even though there was no women’s team at the time. She was an avid boxer, often fighting against, and defeating, men. Among the other sports she participated in were road bicycle racing, motorcycle racing, car racing, airplane racing, horseback riding, tennis, archery, diving, swimming, weightlifting, and Greco-Roman wrestling. Her most brilliant athletic years were considered to be from 1921 to 1924, when her slogan was “Ce qu’un homme fait, Violette peut le faire!” (English: “Anything a man can do, Violette can do!”). In 1924 she participated at the 1924 Women’s Olympiad again taking the gold medal in discus and shot put.

Motor Racing.

Morris had her breasts removed by a mastectomy, which she claimed was in order to fit into racing cars more easily. She mainly competed in cyclecar endurance races and utilized a Benjamin cyclecar. She competed in the Tour de France Automobile in 1923; Bol d’Or 1922, 1923, 1926-8; Paris~Pyrenees 1922, 1923; Paris~Nice 1923, 1927; GP San Sebastian 1926; Dolomites 1934.[10] She won the 1927 Bol d’Or 24 hour car race at the wheel of a B.N.C.

Lifestyle.

Morris’ lifestyle in the 1920s was quite different from the traditional role of women. In addition to her wide-ranging athletic activities, Morris deviated from traditional behaviors of the time in several other ways. She was homosexual, dressed in men’s attire, was a heavy smoker and swore often.

In 1928, the Fédération Féminine Sportive de France (FFSF) (French Women’s Sports Federation) refused to renew her license amid complaints about her lifestyle and she was therefore barred from participating in the 1928 Summer Olympics. The agency cited her lack of morals, in particular, Morris’ penchant for wearing men’s clothing. She had also punched a football referee and had been accused of giving amphetamines to other players. After 1928, her auto racing license was revoked on similar moral grounds and Morris started a car-parts store in Paris, and, along with her employees, built racing cars. The business went bankrupt.

In 1930, Morris unsuccessfully sued the FFSF, claiming damages, as she could no longer earn wages competing as an athlete. During the trial, an obscure ordinance from 1800 forbidding women to wear trousers was used against her. Historian Marie-Jo Bonnet claimed that if Morris’ homosexuality was not directly targeted in the trial, it was made an issue throughout. Ironically, one of the lawyers acting for the FFSF was the noted campaigner for French women’s rights, Yvonne Netter. A quote was attributed to Morris after the trial, but was censored:

We live in a country made rotten by money and scandals, ruled by speechifiers, schemers and cowards. This country of little people is not worthy of its elders, not worthy of survival. Someday its decay will bring it to the level of a slave, but if I’m still here, I won’t be one of the slaves. Believe me, it’s not in my temperament.

 

During her athletic career in the 1920s, Morris became friends and associates with many of France’s artists and intellectuals. She had longstanding friendships with American-born entertainer Josephine Baker, actor Jean Marais, and poet, author, and filmmaker Jean Cocteau. In 1939, Morris, along with her partner, actress Yvonne de Bray, invited Cocteau to stay with them at their houseboat docked at Pont de Neuilly where he wrote the three-act play Les Monstres Sacrés.

Arrest and Acquittal for Homicide.

In January 1933 Morris moved into a houseboat, La Mouette, with her partner, Yvonne de Bray, which was moored on the Seine at Pont de Neuilly in northwest Paris near the Bois de Boulogne. Living off inheritance annuities, she took up lyrical singing and was successful enough in the hobby to be broadcast performing on the wireless.

On Christmas Eve 1937, while having dinner with friends and neighbors Robert and Simone de Trobriand at a restaurant in Neuilly, the trio encountered a drunk and aggressive young man named Joseph Le Cam. The unemployed ex-Legionnaire became embroiled in a heated argument with Simone de Trobriand. Morris was able to calm the man after some time. The following evening, after more drinking in Montmartre, Le Cam arrived at Morris’ houseboat and another argument took place, this time between Morris and Le Cam. Le Cam left the houseboat, but soon returned after seeing Simone de Trobriand, with whom he had been arguing the night before, boarding La Mouette. Le Cam then rushed back to the houseboat, brandishing a knife and threatened both Morris and de Trobriand. Morris pushed Le Cam several times before he lunged at her and she produced a 7.65mm revolver. Morris fired four shots, the first two into the air, the following two at Le Cam. He would later die in hospital. Morris was arrested and charged with homicide and incarcerated for four days at the La Petite Roquette prison in the 11th arrondissement of Paris. She was tried in the cour d’assises in March 1938, but was acquitted when the court accepted her plea of self-defense.

Nazi Collaboration and Assassination.

Morris was invited to attend the 1936 Summer Olympics by Adolf Hitler and historian Anne Sebba stated that Morris was an honored guest.

During World War II and the German occupation of France, Morris served as a collaborationist for the Nazis and Vichy France. The nature of her accused collaboration varies, with some, such as writer Raymond Ruffin, claiming one of her main responsibilities during the war was to foil the operation of the Special Operations Executive, a British-run organization that helped the Resistance. He also suggested that, as well as being a spy for the Nazis, she would have been involved in the torture of suspects, and for all of these activities, she was sentenced to death in absentia. Although Morris sourced black-market petrol for the Nazis, ran a garage for the Luftwaffe, and drove for the Nazi and Vichy hierarchy, others state that this appears to be the limit of her collaboration – and was in any case what she did before the fall of France – and that no evidence exists to support Ruffin’s claim that she was involved either in spying or torturing, but perhaps that she was a suitable scapegoat, especially considering her comments before the war. Whether or not it is accurate, her reputation for involvement in torture and enjoying it led her to become known popularly as the “hyena of the Gestapo.”

On 26 April 1944, while driving in her Citroën Traction Avant on a country road from Lieurey to Épaignes in Normandy with the Bailleul family, who were favorably positioned with the Nazi regime in France, Morris’ car sputtered and came to a halt. Earlier in the day, the engine had been tampered with by maquisards of the French Resistance Maquis Surcouf group. Resistance members then emerged from a hiding spot and opened fire on the car. The three adults and two children in the car were killed. Ruffin claimed that Morris was the target, but Bonnet states this is not clear, given the influence of the Bailleul family with the Nazis. Her body, riddled with bullets, was taken to a morgue, where it remained for months, unclaimed. She was buried in an unmarked communal grave.