Author Archives: Martin van Creveld

Chat GPT

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Years ago when I was still at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, I used to teach a course named Early Modern Political Thought. Judging by the feedback mechanism’s results, it was the most successful course I ever gave—it regularly got 19 out of 20 possible point. So I repeated it many times. Focusing on original sources, we read parts of the works of Desiderius Erasmus, Nicolò Machiavelli, Emperor Charles V (the 1543 testament), Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, Robert Filmer, John Locke, and, when there were still some meetings left, Charles de Montesquieu.

Like most freshmen in most countries the students, most of them 21-22 years old and fresh out of the military, did not know anything about anything. To help them along while at the same time avoiding a waste of time, I made them do two things. First, prior to each meeting they were to read the assigned chapters. Second, each time we finished with one author and moved to the next one they were to present me with a short essay—about 1,000 words—explaining who he was, what he had written, and so on. I did not ask them for footnotes, but I did ask that they list the books or articles they had consulted. It worked; week by week, I would collect their essays, read them quite carefully, and annotate them; week by week, I saw their work improving.  They in turn were very grateful, even to the point of telling me that my course was the best of the lot.

Since then much has changed. Probably the most important change has been the rise of political correctness, a monster if ever one there was which has made teaching literature, history and social science almost impossible. That, however, is not the development I want to talk about here. What I do want to talk about is the following text. It was composed, not by a human being but by an AI mechanism and available at ChatGPT. Having duly checked in, I asked it to provide me with a short essay about Machiavelli’s life and work. Soon it came up with the following text:

Niccolò Machiavelli is considered one of the most influential political philosophers in history, with his ideas and theories influencing political leaders for centuries. Born in Florence, Italy in 1469, Machiavelli was a diplomat, political philosopher, and writer during the Renaissance period.

One of Machiavelli’s most well-known works is “The Prince”, a political treatise that explores the concept of power and how leaders can maintain it. In this work, Machiavelli argues that rulers should be willing to do whatever is necessary to maintain their power, even if it means acting in ways that are considered immoral or unethical. This idea became known as “the ends justify the means”, and it has been widely debated and discussed by political philosophers and leaders throughout history.

One of the key themes in “The Prince” is the idea of “raison d’etat”, or the belief that the needs and interests of the state should always come before the needs and interests of the individual. According to Machiavelli, a leader should prioritize the well-being and stability of the state above all else, even if it means disregarding the rights and freedoms of the citizens. This idea is reflected in Machiavelli’s famous quote, “The first rule of a prince is to be able to be not good, if that is required to maintain his rule.”

Another key concept in “The Prince” is the idea of “fortuna”, or the role that luck and chance play in the success of a leader. According to Machiavelli, a leader should be aware of the role that luck and chance play in their success, and should be prepared to adapt to changing circumstances. However, he also believed that a leader could influence their own luck by being proactive and making decisive actions.

In addition to “The Prince”, Machiavelli also wrote a number of other influential works, including “The Art of War” and “The Discourses”. In these works, he explored themes such as the importance of military strategy and the role of citizenship in a republic.

One of the main criticisms of Machiavelli’s ideas is that they promote immoral and unethical behavior. Some have argued that his emphasis on the needs of the state and the willingness to use any means necessary to achieve power can justify authoritarianism and the suppression of individual rights. Others have argued that his ideas are necessary in order to maintain stability and protect the state.

Despite these criticisms, Machiavelli’s ideas continue to be widely studied and debated by political philosophers and leaders today. His work has had a significant influence on the development of modern political thought and continues to be a major influence on political leaders around the world.

In conclusion, Niccolò Machiavelli was a political philosopher whose ideas continue to be widely studied and debated today. His most famous work, “The Prince”, explores the concept of power and how leaders can maintain it, and his ideas have had a significant influence on the development of modern political thought. While some have criticized his ideas for promoting unethical and immoral behavior, others argue that his ideas are necessary in order to maintain stability and protect the state. Regardless of one’s perspective, it is clear that Machiavelli’s work has had a lasting impact on political thought and leadership.

Not half bad, don’t you agree? A bit pompous, yes. A bit bland. As if someone had decided to leave out anything a little bit interesting, let alone provocative or innovative; which, judging by what has been published about the way the program was created, is just what “someone” had done. But presumably good enough to pass the Turing test. Logically put together, without many of the things I used to warn my student against for years on end; such as leaps of thought, repetitions, or obvious semantic and grammatical errors. Better stuff than many students can produce on their own. Certainly not without having devoted some thought to what to put in (and in what order), what to leave out, why, and how; and so on, and so on.

Which, after all, is precisely what the exercise I made them do was all about and why they enjoyed doing it as much as they did.

How Much is Enough?

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How Much is Enough was the title of a 1971 volume published by the RAND (Research and Development) Corporation, an American think-tank with close ties to the United States Air Force which provided the funding. The authors, A. C. Enthoven and K. V. Smith, were both veterans of the Pentagon where they had worked for President Johnson’s Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. Both were experts on systems analysis. At that time it was a fairly new and exciting discipline that sought to subject as many problems as possible to mathematical analysis; including not just military problems but such as comprised health services, education, transportation and the like..

Some of the most important problems, taking up a considerable part of the book, concerned what people called the nuclear strategic balance between the US and the USSR. What, precisely were the objectives of building up America’s nuclear arsenal? How many nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles would be needed to deter the USSR from launching an attack? Supposing deterrence failed and nuclear war broke out, what did victory mean and how to ensure it went to America? Should there be one kind of missile/bomber aircraft or a mix of several different ones? If the latter, then how many of each kind? How to best use them, and against what targets? How many, if any, should be kept in reserve? What was the best way to render them invulnerable to a Soviet attack? And so on and so on.

Today in NATO’s capitals—Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, and to some extent less important ones too—somewhat similar questions are being asked. With this difference that, as far as the public record is concerned, the issue is not nuclear weapons but how many conventional ones, specifically tanks, to send to Ukraine’s aid. Where and how to employ them, and so forth. It goes without saying that the discussions are highly classified. Still it is possible to draw up a list of some of the most important questions that, in one combination or another, will have to be resolved before a decision is make.

  1. The nature of the mission. Is it to be defensive—just enabling Zelensky and his men to hold out until something gives—or offensive—liberating the Donbas and the Crimea? Suppose the latter is the case and these objectives are attained but the Russians still keep on fighting—as they did in 1812 and, in different ways, both in 1917-18 and 1941—what then? Note that, as a general rule, fighting on the defensive is easier and requires fewer forces than going on the offensive does.
  2. Losses. How many tanks are the various NATO countries prepared to lose, and in what time frame?
  3. Availability and production. Not only are at least some tanks going to be lost, but they are expensive beasts. A brand-new Leopard II costs about 15 million Euro. As a result, no country has an unlimited supply of the most modern tanks in particular. How many tanks can the NATO countries send into the field without putting their own security at too great a risk? How many can be sent now? How many in the future? How long will producing and fielding new ones take?
  4. Substitution. Suppose NATO country A sends some tanks to fight in Ukraine. Will the rest make up for the deficit?
  5. As the Russian invaders have discovered to their cost, and contrary to their image as kings of the battlefield, tanks are vulnerable. To other tanks. To certain kinds of anti-tank weapons. To drones, especially such as are used to attack them from above rather than from the front where tanks carry their thickest armor. Such being the case, tanks rarely operate on their own but are regularly escorted by other forces, primarily artillery, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft defenses, and engineers. How many of those can be sent now? How many in the future? How long will producing and fielding them take? How long will training Ukrainian troops in operating the tanks take?
  6. How many tanks can be supported and kept supplied? Bear in mind that tanks and their supporting forces require huge amounts of supplies. Depending on the terrain as well as the kind of operation, a modern battle tank such as the Leopard II will easily consume 3.4 L/km on road and 5.3 L/km off it. Plus ammunition, plus spare parts. Plus, in case they fight on the defense, various engineering materials. Plus all kinds of other supplies (food, water, medical supplies) which, though small in weight, are must arrive at the right place at the right time. To aggravate the problem, tanks rarely remain at the same place for long, forcing the logistic tails to follow them.
  7. What are the Russians likely to do in response? Open a new front by dragging Belarus into the war? Start at least some operations in NATO territory? Mobilize even more troops? Resort to tactical nuclear weapons?
  8. Finally, politics. Building a model of what a nuclear exchange might be like, Enthoven and Smith all but ignored politics. Indeed their tacit (but far from unreasonable) assumption was that, in that case, there would be no politics. However, the war in Ukraine is not a one-time spasm. If only for that reason, NATO planners cannot ignore them. How much political capital are the various countries, both leaders and populations, prepared to spend in assisting Ukraine? For how long?

In the long run it is this question that is likely to be the most important of all.

There Once Was a Lady of Riga

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There is an Israeli named Benjamin Netanyahu. Born in 1949, American-educated (MIT) and an excellent showman, he attracted the attention of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, served 1983–1984 and 1986–1992) who appointed him head of the Israeli mission to the United Nations in New York. Joining Likud, the right-wing, rather hawkish, movement that, at that time, was contesting election after election with the more left wing, slightly less hawkish, Labor Party, subsequently he held all kinds of portfolios the most important of which was that of minister of finance. In 1996 he became prime minister for the first time. Since then he has been in that office on and off, clocking a total of fifteen years. More than any of his predecessors in Israel, and more than the vast majority of his peers in other democratic countries.

The latest elections were held on 1 November 2022. They gave him and his potential partners a clear majority in parliament and enabled him to set up a government, the sixth if I am not mistaken. But only in combination with a number of much smaller parties, some religious-orthodox, others right-wing extremist. The religious parties demanded, and to a considerable extent obtained, their long-standing demands. Including legal changes that will make it much harder for some classes of diaspora Jews to gain recognition as such, come to Israel, and become citizens. Other changes recognize the Torah Pentateuch) as a fundamental pillar of Israeli life; provide heavy subsidies for yeshive students, some 175,000 of whom are now receiving stipends that enable them to live (well, more or less) without working; put an end to any further improvements in the status of gay, lesbian and trans people;; and enacting all kinds of restrictive laws concerning kosher food, public transport on the Sabbath, education, and more. The most extreme measure—one which, thankfully, has not been implemented yet—is a law that will enable parliament to overrule any court decision by a simple majority of 61. Not good for democracy and the rule of law, many people say.

But why, the reader who is not an Israeli might ask, should he/she/they/whatever concern themselves with these things? After all, Israel is a sovereign state. Like all other states it has the right to institute its own set of laws, however quirky they may be. If those Jews want to exempt certain classes of their citizens from military service, or pay them for not working, or make all males cover their heads at all times, or prevent non-kosher food from being sold throughout the country, or welcome convicted criminals into the cabinet, then who are the gentiles to complain?

The trouble is that things do not end there. One change that has been agreed upon, more or less, is to take responsibility for securing the land bordering on Jerusalem towards the north, east and south away from the army and entrust it to the police instead. The police itself will be under the control of a ministry headed by Mr. Itamar Ben Gvir, an extreme right-winger. His appointment as “minister of national security” will certainly do nothing to improve relationships between Jews and Palestinians. Worse still, it may one day have terrifying implications for the rule of law as applied to Israel’s own population, both Arab and Jewish.

Other measures include putting the (very few), settlements that, following a decision by Israel’s Supreme Court, had to be evacuated in the past back on the map. Rebuilding them, re-populating them, and using any opportunity for expanding them. As well as unfreezing the ban on building new settlements in the northern part of the West Bank, one originally put in place by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (2006-9) in the hope of perhaps facilitating peace with the Palestinians. Each of these measures separately is fairly minor and will make little difference to “reality on the ground” as Israelis like to say. Together, though, they mean putting more obstacles in front of any hope, however vague and however remote, of one day reconciling Israelis and Palestinians or at least preventing hostilities between them from escalating.

Perhaps more than at any other time in the past, Netanyahu himself seems to be aware of these problems and worried lest they alienate not just some of Israel’s supporters abroad but some of Likud’s voters as well. Presumably that is why starting almost immediately after the elections, he has been working furiously to postpone their implementation as much as he can; and anyone who knows Netanyahu knows that, with him as with any other number of politicians in any number of countries, postponement is often equivalent to rejection.

Both abroad and at home, many people dislike Netanyahu. If not for his policies then for his arrogance, his penchant for living it up at the expense of others, his tendency to make promises without any intention of keeping them, and his meddlesome wife who, at time, gives the impression of being half demented. Still at the moment he seems to be the only one who can hold Israel’s extremists at bay, more or less. Should he fail—and he is not getting any younger—then the following verses may very well apply:

There once was a lady of Riga

Who went for a ride on a tiger.

They came back from the ride

With the lady inside

And a smile on the face of the tiger.

Guest Article: The Greatest Danger

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By

William S. Lind*

An article in the December 9, 2022 Wall Street Journal brought some rare good strategic news about the war in Ukraine.  It seems that a few of Ukraine’s allies understand that a complete Russian defeat could bring about the dissolution of the Russian state, and that this represents the worst possible outcome.

The Journal article, “Ukraine Minister Urges Bold Support from Western Allies,” reports that:

Ukraine’s foreign minister called on the country’s allies not to fear a possible breakup of the Russian state as a consequence of the war. . .

Though Kyiv’s Western allies are united over the goal of preventing a Ukrainian defeat, not all embrace the objective of a full-blown Ukrainian military victory. . . 

Some of these allies worry that such an outcome could destabilize the nuclear-armed Russian state, potentially leading to its fragmentation and wide-scale unrest, with unpredictable global consequences.

The Journal article does not identify the states that are expressing this concern, but hurrah for them.  They are daring to inject a note of realism into a policy world dominated by Washington’s neo-Wilsonianism, which has already led to the destruction of several states, including Iraq, Syria, and Libya.  These (undoubtedly European) governments expressing their concern about a potential Russian break-up seem to have grasped the central fact of the 21st century strategy, namely that a state collapse is a greater danger than state bad behavior.  Europe would be facing fewer problems today if Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya were all functioning states ruled by tyrants.

As I have written many times, state collapse is the greatest danger we face and it is spreading.  We may be witnessing it in Iran.  I too would be happy to see the fall of Iran’s Islamic theocracy and the return of the young Shah, who’s father it might be remembered, was overthrown because he tried to modernize his country. But if the result of the ayatollah’s demise is a collapse of the Iranian state, which is a fairly fragile state because much of the population is non-Persian, then we are better off with the theocrats.

China, too, is facing unprecedented disorder, largely because of misgovernment by Xi Jinping.  He botched the coronavirus problem (which probably started in a military lab in Wuhan that was tasked with developing biological weapons), collapsed the Chinese real estate market which is where most middle-class Chinese stashed their savings, and then rewarded himself with an unconstitutional third term.  A more effective assault of the legitimacy of Communist Party rule is difficult to imagine.  But as Washington delights in China’s problems, it forgets that China’s history is one of internal disunion, civil wars, and prolonged periods of warring states.  Mix that with nuclear weapons and, as with Russia, it should be clear that stabilizing the Chinese state is a primary strategic objective.  Of course, all the Wilsonians do is bleat more pathetically about “democracy” and “human rights.”

That is unrealism Washington may pay for heavily.  If Russia or China break up into stateless regions, the world economy will tank the way it did in the 1930s, or worse.  America will not escape a second Great Depression.  If Washington’s folly results in nuclear weapons hitting American cities, the Blob (the foreign policy establishment) will find itself out of work if not hanging from lampposts.  

America is deeply riven over irreconcilable cultural differences, to the point where all that holds it together is a seeming prosperity – seeming because it is built on ever-increasing levels of private and public debt.  When the inevitable debt/financial crisis hits, that alone may endanger the American union.  Add a weakening or vanishing of states around the globe and the 21st century could end up a repeat of the 14th century.  

Let us hope those European states worrying about the potential break-up of the Russian Federation don’t lose their nerve.

Addendum:  The recent “coup attempt” in Germany will go down in history as the “Clown Putsch.”  Not only did the idiots behind it think a couple dozen men could overthrow the German state, they imagined they could put Prince Henry of Reuss on the Imperial German Throne.  Every legitimist, monarchist and Reichsburger knows that the throne belongs to the head of the House of Hohenzollern and no one else.  When Germany again becomes a monarchy, it will be through constitutional means and it will reflect a broad consensus among the German people that they want a Kaiser.

*   This article has been posted on 22 December 2022 at TraditionalRight

Between Scylla and Charybdis

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Almost a year after Putin launched his so-called special military operation against Ukraine, the war in that country has clearly turned into a struggle of attrition. Historically speaking, such struggles are by no means rare. Clausewitz, indeed, argued that any offensive that fails to break the enemy’s will and reach its objective within a reasonable time will end up as a war of attrition. In particular, two struggles are worth mentioning in this context. One was waged by Germany, Britain and France on the Western Front and lasted from late 1914 to the end of 1918. The other was waged by Iran and Iraq and lasted from September 1980 to August 1988.  With these and some other armed conflicts in mind, let us examine the courses Putin still has open to him.

First, he may simply allow the war to go on just as it has over the last few months. True, the ongoing hostilities as well as Western-imposed sanctions have not been without some, perhaps considerable, negative effect on the Russian economy. On the other hand, those in the West who hoped to use economic pressure to win the war relatively quickly and painlessly have been proved wrong. In part, this is due to Russia’s own enormous resources, especially energy, raw materials, and, as the Germans learnt in World War II, its sheer size; “don’t’ march on Moscow,” a maxim attributed to British Field-Marshal Bernhard Montgomery, is as relevant today as it was in the days of Sweden’s Karl XII and Napoleon. Putin may well hope that, simply by allowing the war to continue for as long as it may take, he will end by breaking Ukraine’s will and/or split up the coalition that is currently arrayed against him.

Second, he may mobilize additional forces, equip them with whatever weapons he still has in reserve or is able to produce, train them, and use them to launch more battlefield offensives. This is what both the Allies in World War I and the Iranians during their war against Iraq did.  In the first case it worked, though only after four years of ferocious struggle and only at a horrendous cost that left both France and Britain drained of manpower and treasure. In the second it did not work at all; masses of young Iranians, many of them wearing Korean-manufactured golden plastic keys to expedite them on their journey to paradise, proved no match for the firepower, provided by both East and West, the Iraqis were able to deploy.

Third, he may switch from trying to defeat his opponents’ armed forces in the field to attacking their rear. “To make a dessert and call it peace,” as the historian Tacitus, referring to Rome’s conquest of Britain, put it twenty centuries ago. At the moment this seems to be Putin’s preferred option. Compliments of Iran, his drones have been attacking Ukrainian cities and more may very well be on the way. On the other hand, whether such attracts can really be carried to the point where the Ukrainians’ will to fight begins to crack is doubtful. Starting in 1963 and ending in 1973, three times as many bombs (by weight) were dropped on Vietnam as on Germany and Japan combined during World War II. Yet when the smoke cleared it was the US which withdrew and North Vietnam and the Viet-Cong which triumphed.

Fourth, bring in Belarus. Right from the beginning of armed conflict, belligerents of all times and places have always done their best to gain allies. Right from the beginning of the present war, Putin’s most important objective in this respect has been to get Belarussian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to assist him as much as possible. As a look at the map will confirm, such intervention may open a third, northern front against Ukraine in addition to the two, one in the east and one in the south, that already exist. Putin’s recent meeting with Belarussian dictator Lukashenko may be a big step in that direction. On the other hand, it may be a case of Lukashenko doing his best to stay out of the war without provoking Putin too much. He has been playing a dangerous game—so far, as far as anyone can see, with considerable success.

In one form or another, all four of these strategies are as old as history and may be employed both separately and together. What comes next, though, takes us into a really different world. To the best of my knowledge, no one has ever defined “tactical” nuclear weapons as opposed to “strategic” ones. The former are said to be small and suitable for “battlefield” use, military bases and airfields presumably included. The latter are sufficiently powerful for use against cities and their civilian populations. In truth, the distinctions are almost meaningless. Depending on geography, terrain, the extent to which the enemy’s forces are concentrated or dispersed, and many other factors “battlefield use” may mean anything between no casualties and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of them. What one side sees as a limited strike intended mainly to shock and impress the other may perceive as a deadly one that threatens his very existence. Even if retaliation in any specific war may be avoided, a country that uses nuclear weapons can expect them to be used against it; if not sooner, then certainly later when necessity compels and opportunity presents itself.

Next, the use of strategic nuclear weapons. From conventional weapons to tactical nuclear ones it is a huge step; from tactical nuclear to strategic nuclear, a much smaller one. Though no longer as large as they used to be when the Cold War ended thirty years ago, nuclear arsenals in the hands of both the US and Russia (soon to be followed by China in this respect) are sufficiently powerful to easily destroy the world several times over. That is why Putin, as long as he stays sane amidst the pressures to which he is subjected, will almost certainly decide not to use either them or the smaller tactical ones that lead to them.

Finally, conclude peace. Almost from the beginning of the war, Putin has had the option of halting his offensive, withdrawing his forces, and making peace. Such a move, indeed anything resembling it, would certainly bring about his fall as well as that of his clique. With only a slightly smaller degree of certainty it would also cause his country to fall to pieces—with consequences for Eurasia that are beyond his author’s imagination. That is why, at the moment, it seems the least likely possibility of all.

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis, Putin is.

Back to Basics

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The war between Russia and Ukraine has now been going on for ten months. With neither side close to victory or defeat, there is a good chance—mark my words—that it will go on for another ten, perhaps even more. Even if serious negotiations get under way, they will not necessarily end the shooting all at once. Such being the case, instead of adopting the usual method of listing all the changes that the war has brought, I want to try and put together a list of the things that it did not and almost certainly will not change.

Suggestions, welcome.

General

Contrary to the expectations of some, notably the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his 1989 essay, “The End of History,” war remains, and will remain, as important a part of global history as it has ever been.

There is no sign that the causes of war, be they divine anger with one or more of the belligerents (Isaiah), or the nature of man (Genesis) , or economic (envy and greed), or the absence of a legal system that can rule over sovereign entities, or simply the personal ambitions of certain rulers, have changed one iota.

War is a social phenomenon rooted in the societies that wage it. As a result, each society wages it in its own way. As society changes, so does war. To win a war, the first thing you need is to gain an understanding of what kind of war it is and what is all about (Prussian general and military critic Carl von Clausewitz).

The nature of war, namely a violent duel between two or more belligerents in which each side is largely free to do as he pleases to the other, has not changed one bit.

War remains what it has always been, the province of deprivation, suffering, pain and death. Also, and perhaps worst of all, bereavement; also of friction, confusion, and uncertainty. Often the more robust side, the one psychologically and physiologically better able to engage with these factors and keep going, will win.

In war everything is simple, but the simplest things are complex (Clausewitz).

Victory means breaking the enemy’s will (Clausewitz); defeat, to have one’s will broken.

All war is based on deception (the ancient, perhaps legendary, Chinese commander and sage Sun Tzu). The first casualty is always the truth.

“It is good war is so terrible, or else we would like it too much” (Confederate general Robert E. Lee; seconded, in 1914, by then First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill). War is the greatest fun a man can have with his pants on (anonymous).

“War is sweet for those who are not familiar with it” (Erasmus of Rotterdam).

“No one has ever benefitted from a long war” (Sun Tzu).

Preparation and Training

The best school of war is war.

“By learning to obey, he learnt to command” (Plutarch on Roman military commander Titus Quintus Flaminius).

 “Their maneuvers are bloodless battles, their battles bloody maneuvers” (Jewish historian Josephus Flavius on the Roman legions).

“I notice that the enemy always has three courses open to him, and that he usually chooses the fourth” (Helmut Moltke to his staff).

Strategic-Operational

As the belligerents exchange blow for blow in an attempt to knock out the enemy, war has an inherent tendency to escalate and run out of control.

God tends to be on the side of the larger battalions (Napoleon, who for German readers does not need an introduction). But not always.

“The best way to run a conflict is by negotiation. If you are too dumb to negotiate, use dirty tricks. If you cannot use dirty tricks, resort to maneuver; if you cannot maneuver, fight a battle; if you cannot fight a battle, lay siege” (Sun Tzu).

An army marches on its stomach (Napoleon).

The greater the distance between front and rear, the harder and more expensive it is to keep the army supplied (Sun Tzu).

War is an imitative activity that makes the belligerents resemble each other. The longer the war, the more alike they become.

Everything else equal, the defense is superior to the offense. First, because it does not face constantly extending lines of communication; second, because anything that does not happen favors it. The longer the war lasts, the more likely it is that the attack will turn into a defense.

Morale and Organization

“War is a physical and mental contest by means of the former” (Clausewitz).

In war the moral is to the physical as three to one (Napoleon).

It is with colored ribbons that men are led (Napoleon).

On organization: One Mameluke was a match for three Frenchmen. A hundred Frenchmen were a match for three hundred Mamelukes (Napoleon).

“Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four men who are less brave but trust each other will attack resolutely“ (19-century French military writer Ardant du Picq),

One bad commander is better than two good ones.

Technology and War

Depending on the way they are used, most distinctions between “offensive” and “defensive” weapons are meaningless.

Starting with the club and ending with the Internet, technology has done many things to war. However, it has done almost nothing to reduce, let alone eliminate, the distinctions between land, sea and air (and space) warfare. Nor between theory and practice, offense and defense, concentration and dispersal, a knock-out blow and attrition. And so on.

“Weapons, if only the right ones can be found, make up 90 percent of victory” (British General and military author J. F. C Fuller). Not true. Weapons can make a huge contribution to victory. However, their effects can be offset by superior doctrine, superior organization, superior command, superior training, and, above all, superior morale.

The longer a war lasts, the less important technological superiority tends to be.

Information and data are useful, in fact absolutely essential. But they are not enough. What is needed is lead and explosives. As well as, from time to time, cold steel to terrify the enemy.

On Nukes

War, even large scale war, between belligerents one of which is armed with nukes, remains quite possible. Whether the same applies to a situation when both sides has them remains to be seen. My guess? Probably not.

In so far as there is no defense, nuclear war is not war. It is mass murder.

“No one will ever dare use the damn things” (Field Marshal Bernhard Montgomery of Alamein on nukes).

The nice thing about nukes: If they are not used, no reason to worry. If they are used, no need to worry either.

Guerrilla and Terrorism

“The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we harass” (Mao Zedong).

The “forces of order,” as long as they do not win, lose; the guerrillas, as long as they do not lose, win.

Gender and War

“But for war, the world would sink into a swamp of feminism” Georg W. F. Hegel).

In war, women act mainly in two roles. First, as assistants and cheerleaders. Second, as targets and victims. Everything else is secondary. It would hardly be wrong to say that, without women in these roles, there would have been no war.

Finally –

No principles or doctrines, however good in themselves, well understood, and well applied, can win a war on their own. However, by freeing warriors from the need to think out everything afresh each time, they can provide a lot of help on the way to doing so.

Which Will It Be?

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The immediate threat to Ukraine having been lifted and with the war going on and on, history shows that one out of two opposed things are likely to happen.

First, the two sides may agree, either explicitly or tacitly, on a certain set of rules to govern their behavior. As by not employing certain weapons, notably in the West, poison. As by not combating certain classes of people (known, in the middle ages, as “innocents,”) and more or less leaving them alone. As by recognizing protected areas (often such as are considered holy, such as churches) where those innocents may find refuge. As by exchanging prisoners (often one of the first things they agree on). And as by recognizing the value of long-term assets (known, today, as “infrastructure”) such as fruit trees, cattle, canals, bridges, and the like.

Let me be clear: very few of these and other cases resulted from sheer goodness of heart on the part of the belligerents. In this as in other respects, what counts is calculation concerning each side’s interests. One of the most instructive instances of the way things worked occurred during the Dutch Revolt, alias the Dutch War of Independence, which started in 1568 and lasted, with one major interruption between 1609 and 1612, until 1648. Right at the beginning captured Dutch leaders, specifically two well-known noblemen (Egmont and Horne) were treated as rebels and executed by the Spanish commander in chief, the fearsome Duke of Alba. In 1576 the sack of Antwerp, known as the Spanish Fury, may have caused the death of no fewer than 17,000 of the city’s inhabitants. By 1625, things had got to the point where one of Alba’s successors, Ambrosio Spinola, not only accepted the surrender with honor of the important city of Breda but treated the defeated Dutch city commander, Justin Nassau, with extraordinary respect and dignity. Later the act of surrender was painted by one of the greatest artists of the age, Diego Velazaquez. Far from being an isolated case, it was based on a similar one by Rubens. Both contemporaries and subsequent critics agreed that it was fairly accurate. As one of them wrote, Velazquez’s masterpiece “demonstrates the glimpses of humanity that can be exposed as a result of the war and commends Spinola’s consideration for Nassau and the Dutch army.”  

Not by accident did the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius write his de Jure Belli ac Pacis, the most famous treatise ever on the topic, during the same year. There is, however, another possibility. Entering a war the troops, especially fresh ones with no experience of how frightful it really is, may be quite innocent. Innocent, they may find it hard to change their ordinary civilian behavior in favor of ruthlessly killing and destroying. For me personally, the nature of the problem was brought home by a conversation I had years ago with an Israeli battalion commander who took a critical part in the ferocious battles that kept the Golan Heights for Israel back in 1973. At first, he said, my men, most of them 20-21 years old and inexperienced, were so careful that they did not dare drive their tanks over the irrigation pipes that dotted the terrain. Very soon, though, all such considerations were flung aside. They did what had to be done and, at times, what did not need to be done. Including some things he, the battalion commander, did not want to talk about but which, many years later, still made him shudder.

To generalize on this, war is the province of intense, often maniacal, excitement. Not to mention hatred, suffering, pain, death, and mourning. Often the longer it lasts the more powerful these emotions; making the fighting harder and harder to control and carrying the danger turning it into an orgy of violence in which men no longer know what they are doing. The abovementioned Spanish Fury is one notable example of this. But there are plenty of others; just think of the terrible scene in book XXI of the Iliad where Achilles, having suffered the loss of his friend Patroclus, goes on a killing spree unequalled in the whole of literature. Such as, in the end, causes nature, in the form of the river Scamander, put an end to the slaughter by rising and trying to drown him.

At times the atrocities were planned. The Romans in particular developed sacking cities into a fine art. Putting up guards so as to prevent surprises, dividing the area into sections under strict command, and assigning troops to each one so as to ensure they did not start fighting each other over the booty. At times they were the result of the troops running out of hand, or so the responsible commanders, such as Titus during his destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE (as related by Josephus) and Wallenstein at Magdeburg in 1635, later claimed. At times they helped the cause, at times they did the opposite. To return to the Spanish Fury, historians have often taken it for a turning point that persuaded both sides that they had no choice but to fight on. Remarkably the two processes, the one that leads to war being humanized to some extent and the one that leads in the other direction, may proceed simultaneously.

To return to the present, the brutality of the Russian-Ukrainian War does not need to be recounted. On the other hand, we have seen several attempts to exchange prisoners and keep on exporting grain from Odessa and other ports. As of 2 December 2022, over 12 million tons of grain and other foodstuffs had been exported via the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Above all, Ukrainian claims notwithstanding there has been neither a Russian attempt to destroy the huge nuclear complex at Zaporizhzhia nor a great rise in radiation in the surrounding countryside. If there has been “nuclear terror,” then it seems to have been very limited indeed.

So which will it be?  

Not the First

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The tug-of-war concerning responsibility for the missiles that made their way into Poland a couple of weeks ago, killing two people, is by no means the first of its kind. What follows is a very short list of more or less similar incidents that took place over the last eight decades or so.

Early in the Spanish Civil War “mysterious” submarines, widely believed to be Italian, repeatedly attacked British, French, Soviet, and Spanish Republican vessels in the Mediterranean, damaging and sinking a number of them. In August 1937 alone there were ten such attacks. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini reluctant to escalate against Britain and France, all identifying marks were removed from the submarines ahead of time and all knowledge of the incidents was denied. At the conference of Nyon in November 1937 Britain, France, Italy, and several smaller powers were content to attribute the strikes to “pirates unknown.” In return for being given a free hand in continuing to assist Franco, Italy agreed to have regular Anglo-French patrols in the Western Mediterranean. For a time, indeed, Italian naval vessels kept patrolling the Tyrrhenian Sea, a classic case of the cat being put in charge of the cream. Needless to say, the submarines’ identity did not remain a secret for very long if, indeed, it ever had been. However, the Italian attacks did come to an end—and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain felt that appeasement had worked, an attitude that played a critical role in Munich a year or so later.

During the Korean War there took place numerous—no one knows how many—air combats between American and Soviet-built aircraft. Some of the latter were known to be flown by Soviet pilots, readily identifiable by their chattering with one another on the airwaves in Russian. With both the US and the USSR now in possession of nuclear weapons, the danger of escalation rose to a point never before equaled in history. However, the Soviets denied any direct participation in the war and the US Department of Defense kept the clashes secret as best it could. Thus both sides, each in its own way, cooperated in saving the world by pretending that nothing was the matter.

In the night of 5-6 September 2006 Israeli fighter aircraft attacked a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction northeast of Damascus, thoroughly demolishing it. However the Israelis, hoping to prevent Syria from reacting too sharply as well as limit the expected international denunciation, did not admit responsibility. Its feeble attempts to keep the matter under wraps were unavailing, though, since it took very little time for the truth to leak out. Still fifteen years had to pass before (by then former) Prime Minister Ehud Olmert assumed responsibility for the attack. Since then there have been any number of similar, if smaller, Israeli attacks on Iranian, Syrian and “terrorist” assets in Syria. However, since they have long become routine the media’s interest in them has been limited.

Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17/MAS17)], a scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, was shot down on 17 July 2014 while flying over eastern Ukraine. All 283 passengers and 15 crew were killed. The incident took place during the war in Donbas over territory controlled by Russian separatist forces. Responsibility for the investigation was delegated to the Dutch who concluded that the airliner had been downed by a surface-to-air missile launched from pro-Russian separatist-controlled territory in Ukraine. The missile, the Dutch reported, was a Russian Buk operated by the Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade. It had been brought up from Russia on the day of the crash, fired from a field in a rebel-controlled area, and the launch system returned to Russia soon afterwards. The report did not prevent those involved from blaming each other. Putin, for example, at one point came up with the preposterous claim that, had Ukraine agreed to the rebels’ demands, Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 would not have been shot down.

On 26 September 2022 alarm bells started ringing as pipes forming part of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 developed huge leaks. NATO, with Biden at its head, quickly started blaming the Russians. However, many observers found it hard to imagine why Putin would sabotage a system he controlled anyway. More likely, they said, it was the Americans who had done it in an attempt to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russia and put the latter at loggerheads with the former. A month earlier, on 7 February, Biden himself contributed to this interpretation by saying that, though the pipe was under German control, “we” had the capability of bringing the supply to an end.

To conclude, “unidentified” military operations are anything but rare. Each time one comes to light, all those involved as well as some of the uninvolved will say exactly what they consider useful, with no reference to “the truth;” even if doing so means performing a U turn, as happed to President Biden in reference to the missile that landed in Poland. Provided only it is considered useful by one or more parties no argument, however outrageous, is likely to remain unused.

If only it were not so dangerous, it would be funny.

Why Freud Got It Wrong

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[Originally posted on April 23, 2014. Here reposted because, among God knows how many censors busily censoring every possible source of information, it seems more relevant than ever].

Freud got it wrong. The strongest drive that rules the species of homo which has the impudence to call itself sapiens is not sex. It is the urge to shut up those with whom one disagrees. Here are some examples, all taken from supposedly liberal, supposedly democratic, countries. In Australia, the government tried to impose draconian restrictions on its citizen’s access to various kinds of material on the Net. It was even been polite enough to ask the US for its approval (approval, thank goodness, was not given). In Canada, a newspaper editor who republished those famous Danish cartoons of the prophet Muhammad was summoned to explain himself before a government committee.

But it is not only the left which tries to dictate to people how to think. In France under Chirac and Sarkozy, teachers and professors who believe that French colonialism was an evil thing and did not help those who were subject to it in their march towards liberté, égalité and and fraternité were threatened with sanctions. In Britain, attempts were made to prevent a Dutch member of parliament who believes that the Koran is evil from entering the country. No surprise, that; in recent years, each time an Arab or Islamist has farted the British have wetted their pants.

In Germany some years ago, the geniuses at the Bundesministerium for Family and Youth tried to ban a children’s book. The author was Michael Schmidt-Salomon; the title, Where Can I find the Way to God, Please? Asked the Little Piglet. It attacked bishops, kadis and rabbis, presenting them all as rogues out to swindle people. If those people rejected the confidence trick, violence might ensue. On this occasion the High Constitutional Court, to its credit, denied the Ministry’s request.

And how about the US? In the self-proclaimed “land of the free” the situation is no better than anywhere else. In the media, in political life, even in sports and entertainment, anyone who utters a word that could possibly be constructed or mis-constructed as “racist” or “sexist” risks losing everything. The redoubtable Ann Coulter, who had seven conservatively-oriented books on the New York Times best seller list, has even engaged on a regular witch-hunt against what she pleases to call “liberal” professors. She encourages students to spy on them, exposes their alleged thoughtcrimes, and demands that they be fired; all while calling them by their names.

And how did the universities react to the assault? For centuries past, an essential part of their mission has been to defend freedom of thought. Yet in- and out of the US most universities, coming under the steamroller of political correctness, have long started sawing off the branch on which they sit. For daring to suggest that, in his view and as much research indicates, women may not have the same innate ability at mathematics as men, do, Larry Summers, president of Harvard University and a former secretary of the treasury under Clinton, lost his job.

As Voltaire once said, “I do not agree with a word you utter; but I will fight to the death for you right to do so.” As he also said, most philosophers are cowards. As Alan Kors and Harvey Silvergate in their book, The Shadow University, showed, many American universities regularly open the academic year by extensively briefing students on what they are, and are not, allowed to say. Those who, advertently or not, overstep the guidelines are persecuted and prosecuted. Often this is done in complete violation of the most basic rules that are supposed to govern a fair trial. So bad have things become that there now exist several organizations whose sole mission in life is to defend students’—and professors’—constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of speech against the universities where they study or teach.

Restrictions on freedom of thought and speech are, of course, nothing new. During most of history they were imposed either by dictatorial governments or by priests who, often working hand in hand with those governments, did not want anybody to question the hold religion gave them over society. For two centuries after the American and French Revolutions the West, to the extent that it did not turn either Communist or Fascist, took justified pride in the fact that it had done away with censorship and cast off most of those restraints. It was even thought, with very good reason, that this freedom was one of the cardinal factors that made the West as successful as it was.

No longer. What distinguishes the last two decades from most of their predecessors is the fact that much of the pressure in this direction is exerted in countries that are supposedly democratic and free. It seems to come not from above but from below, i.e. society itself. Nowadays in most “advanced” countries whenever anybody says or writes anything, there is certain to be somebody else around who finds his words “inappropriate” or “offensive.” To return to America’s universities, in many of them things have now reached the point where only blacks may write dissertations about blacks, gays about gays, lesbians about lesbians, and so on. Objectivity, or at any rate the attempt to reach it, has been thrown overboard. Yet where objectivity is lacking any attempt to understand also necessarily comes to an end. Whenever the alleged offender is at all prominent, a demand for an apology is certain to follow. Often the apology itself is but a cover for greed as “compensation” is demanded and mandated. There has even come into being an entire class of lawyers who, cruising the law, spend their time looking for cases of this kind.

Many of the offenses against freedom of speech are committed in the name of minors. Supposedly they must be isolated from all kinds of “false” ideas. For example, that God does not exist; or that sex before marriage is not morally wrong; or that their teachers may sometimes mislead them; or whatever. Now radio is called the villain, now TV. Now video games are to blame, now the Net. Those in charge of these technical instruments and their contents ought to be restrained, silenced, and punished if necessary. Not that there is anything new in this. The need to “protect” the young has often been used to justify some of the worst crimes of all; look at the execution of Socrates 2,412 years ago.

Perhaps worst of all, little if any of this is written into positive law. Since nobody knows what is and is not permitted, those who still dare engage in non-mainstream discourse are forced to watch their every step. What remains tends to become repetitive and tepid. The end result is the endless repetition of meaningless clichés, what George Orwell in 1984 called duckspeak. Perhaps authoritarian figures such as Russia’s Putin have got it right after all. With them, at any rate, one knows where one stands.

Next to the Bear

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The other day a Ukrainian TV station contacted me and asked me whether we could do an interview about what spending one’s life in the shadow of a large and aggressive neighbor is like. As, for example, the citizens of the German Federal German Republic (until 1989), South Korea, Taiwan, and of course my very own Israel all have done. As so often happens, I found the question intriguing. So having spent some time mulling over it—I do not claim to have done much research—I jotted down some answers.

Ere we start, though, it is important to note that much will depend on who you are. Including: age, gender, marital status, education, profession, whether or not you have children to look after, how close to (or far from) the security apparatus you are, any advance training you may have received, etc. Visiting the FGR for the first time back in 1976, I was impressed by the fact that every single bridge and tunnel was marked with data, complete with pictures of tanks, about the weight and dimensions of the vehicles that could pass through. On another, more recent, visit I witnessed some firemen and their families having their picnic suddenly interrupted as sirens called on them to present themselves for duty. It was merely an exercise and everyone was sure of it. Still I was impressed by the calm, orderly way in which the men went about their business (the women, burdened as they were with children, stayed behind).

That said, based on my experience in three out of the four abovementioned countries as well as some of the literature, here are some of the ways people react to such a situation.

First, the ostrich syndrome. People ignore the problem as much as they can; and rightly so, or else they could not exist.  This, my hosts during a short visit to Seoul (which is only some 50 kilometers south of the border with North Korea) is how the inhabitants of that city react. Having got used to it for seven decades, they simply refuse to take the announcements of their own security apparatus seriously but continue with their lives as usual. It has worked countless times in the past; so why not this one? Seoul at 1500 o’clock when young female office workers start flooding the streets—what a treat for the eyes!

Second, they share their worries with others in the hope of gaining relief. This is the Israeli method par excellence. For many years one of the most important words in the language was hamatsav (the situation). Humor, including black humor, helps. For example, German women during the last months of World War II used to tell each other that a Russian lying on one’s belly was better than an American flying high over one’s head. There were plenty of similar jokes floating about; by one story Hitler himself guffawed at them.

Third, they do, or at any rate pretend to do, something about it. As by laying down plans; cleaning up their air-raid shelters (those of them who have them); acquiring all kinds of emergency supplies such as water, canned food, batteries, first aid equipment, tools, and perhaps weapons; joining a civil defense organization; participating in all kinds of exercises; moving to a district or settlement less likely to be affected; and so on. In fact almost any kind of activity, by releasing dopamine or serotonin or devil knows what, can relieve the mind, redirect it and refresh it.

Fourth, they pray. That even goes for self-proclaimed atheists. I do not know how many times, I’ve heard Israelis say: I’ve just got a new baby. Pray that, eighteen years from now, he (much less often, she) will not have to join the military. Having three children and eight grandchildren, I should know.

Finally –

People, societies and circumstances vary enormously. However much thought governments, armed forces, social services and ordinary people invest in the matter, and however thorough the preparations they make, surprises are inevitable. Very often there is no knowing how the situation will unfold and how people will react when confronted with der Ernstfall, the real thing, as the Germans say. One moment the country is at peace. The next one the sirens come to life, bombs and missiles hit (or miss!) their targets, one finds oneself fighting for survival, and the chief of staff, having undergone a mental breakdown, resigns (this actually happened to the Norwegians when the Germans invaded them in 1940). Heroes become cowards and cowards, heroes. This may be carried to the point where heaven and earth literally change places.