Whether or not Vladimir (“World-Owner,” according to one translation) Putin is going to march on Kiev I do not know. However, it seems to me that, having invested so much in making ready for such an invasion—propaganda, money, political capital, and all kinds of military moves—he cannot now simply order a retreat without having achieved anything. Even at best, such a retreat would deal a grievous blow to his prestige and his future ability to get anything out of anybody. At worst it might lead to his removal from office and, since Russia is not and never has been a democracy, a political shakeup. One whose consequences, first for Russia and then for large parts of the rest of the world, could be incalculable.
Such being the case, in this post I shall assume that an invasion is being planned and, unless the West makes some important concessions, will be carried out. Sooner rather than later, and perhaps under the guise of a response to some Ukrainian “provocation.” What might such an invasion look like? The obvious starting point would be the Donbas, a Ukrainian province now under the rule two different self-proclaimed pro-Russian governments.. It has everything an invader could wish for: agriculture, industry, minerals (coal), and the kind of flat terrain that used to be occupied by the Cossacks and now offers few serious obstacles to a modern mechanized army.
Seen from Moscow, an offensive directed at this part of Ukraine would also have the advantage that it is located hundreds of miles east of Russia’s frontier with NATO. As a result, for the latter to assist the government in Kiev would be limited at best; the more so because the Black Sea is now little more than a Russian lake. The invasion might, indeed, form a stepping stone towards a deeper one aimed at forming a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea which it has been occupying for the last seven years.
On the other hand, such a half-measure would hardly suffice to achieve Putin’s objective, which is to halt and if possible reverse the eastward expansion of NATO. And it would almost certainly mean a prolonged war with Ukraine and its population of 35-40 million. Coming from the north (Russia proper), the west (Belorussia) or the south (the Crimea), the Russian forces allocated for such a war would be able to move almost anywhere. The Ukrainian army is said to number about 200,000. However, it is not terribly well equipped with modern heavy weapons in particular; and indeed it is hard to see where it could have got them, given that it cannot buy them from Russia (of course) and has been too poor to buy many of them from the West.
In short, pushing the Ukrainians aside while reaching for the country’s principal cities—Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkov, and of course Kiev itself—should present the Russian forces with no particular problem. The more so because they will have near complete command of the air. Probably the most important difficulty facing them would be operational. Meaning, the inability of their widely-spread attacking columns to quickly come to each other’s aid in case of need. This fact might well cause the Russian High command to think in terms of trying to achieve its objectives not in a single massive lunge but in two or, supposing things go well, even three sequential ones. First in the west, in order to stop NATO from interfering and achieve local superiority. And then shifting the center of gravity further south and east. In that case the space between the Russian columns would be partly filled by special units capable of independent operations and designed primarily to spread confusion and chaos.
However, simply defeating the Ukrainian army and reaching Ukraine’s main cities would hardly be enough to end the conflict. Partly that is because Ukraine would still have an estimated 300,000 more or less trained men left. And partly because modern urban warfare can and often will shift the balance against the attacker and in favor of the defender. The main reasons for this are as follows:
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Second, complex terrain will reduce the attacker’s advantages in terms of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, the utility of aerial assets, and his ability to engage at a distance.
Third the profusion of buildings, perhaps including some quite tall ones, means that much of the fighting will take place at close quarters. To make things even more difficult for the attacker, often it will be necessary to engage simultaneously over the ground, on the ground, and under the ground.
Fourth, the attacker must move and, by doing so, expose himself. Not so the defender, who can remain in his prepared positions. Should those positions be targeted by artillery or from the air the defender, provided he keeps his flexibility and does not wait too long, can always abandon them and retreat to others further back.
Fifth, the kind of massive firepower that reduces buildings and even entire neighborhoods to rubble will not necessarily deprive the defender of cover. Often, indeed, the rubble will provide the defender with as much, if not more, concealment and cover than intact neighborhoods can; just think of Stalingrad. The larger the city, the more true this is.
Occupying the cities in question will not solve these problems; to the contrary, doing so may well aggravate them. Briefly, urban warfare tends to act as a meat grinder. The outcome is likely to be attrition and stalemate. But stalemate will demand from the attacker exactly that of which, unlike the defender, he only has a limited supply: time.
To be sure, death and destruction in the Ukraine would be horrendous. But to see what time can do to an invader, ask the Americans in Vietnam (1964-75), Afghanistan (2002-21), and Iraq (2003-21; not to mention the Soviets in Afghanistan (1980-88).
