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Guest Article: His Majesty’s Birthday

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By

William S. Lind*

As regular readers know, every year I telephone my reporting senior, Kaiser Wilhelm II, on his birthday, January 27, to offer my best wishes.  Such readers also know that His Majesty likes to surprise me.  Well, he did.  When I got out of bed the morning of the 23rd, I found out why: a naval Zeppelin, L-70, was hovering about twenty feet above my chimney.  Luckily, there were no sparks.  

I knew that meant I was on my way to Berlin.  I grabbed my seabag and went outside, where the airship had lowered its observation car for me to board.  I was quickly on my way, enjoying every minute of the smooth and silent air travel only an airship, not an airplane, can offer.

We landed at the Potsdam Zeppelinhafen the morning of the 26th, where a Fahnenjunker Kleinschmidt was waiting for me with an extra horse.  “They’re at the toy fort,” he told me as we cantered off.  “They?” I inquired.  Grinning, the Herr Fahnenjunker said, “you are about to meet some old friends.”

The toy fort is on the grounds of the Neues Palais, His Majesty’s preferred residence.  “Toy” is something of a misnomer.  It was a place for young Hohenzollern princes to play, but it was extensive and realistic enough so experiments with new battlefield tactics and techniques were carried out there.  As I rode up it was clear something along those lines was being conducted.

Dismounting, I saluted His Majesty, offering my felicitations for the morrow, and lit up in delight as I surveyed the rest of the party.  Bismarck was there, to whom I bowed very deeply, along with Moltke and, from a later time than ours, Field Marshal von Manstein.  And two old friends indeed, General Max Hoffman [a key German commander in World War I] and Hermann Balck [famed World War II Panzer commander].  I hadn’t seen Balck since we had dinner in the 1970s, and Max I knew only in spirit, but I also knew that with them present we would rock and roll.

“So, does this stranger have the password?” His Majesty inquired, grinning.  “Gott strafe England,” I replied.  “That always works,” Max said.  “And with you here, so does ‘Wurst und Moselwein’, nicht wahr?” I threw back.  “Immer,” said His Majesty. “But we also have some serious business to transact.  The problem before us is, how Ukraine  can win its war with Russia.  Field Marshal von Manstein was about to present his analytics.”

I again saluted the Field Marshal, who began with the failure of the Ukrainian summer counter-offensive.  “In effect, the Ukrainian operation plan was Barbarossa writ small.  It had no Schwerpunkt.  The Ukrainians launched three simultaneous, non-mutually-supporting thrusts. They led with armor, which, as we learned the hard way, always costs heavily in destroyed tanks.  By the way, their tanks, including the German Leopards, proved no more survivable than their Russian equivalents.  They then tried to lead with infantry, which, with infiltration tactics, could have worked, but it did not.  I’m not sure why.”

“I suspect their heavy losses in infantry left them without the high-quality troops attack divisions require,” His Majesty observed.  “It is difficult to do infiltration tactics with Landsturm.  But the question is not why their summer offensive failed, but whether we can come up with an operational plan that will work.  Any Ideas?”

Max spoke up.  “They need to break through at one end of the Russian lines, north or south, then roll up between the Russian front and the Russian border.  That will either bag or reduce to a rabble the whole Russian force in the east.  Having done that, they should offer to negotiate.  Russia has to get something still, certainly Crimea, but Ukraine would keep the Don basin with its industry.”

“They can’t break through,” Balck observed.  “They have to do an end run.”

“How?” Moltke asked, as always a man of few words.

Now Manstein showed his stuff.  “Ukraine should mass its forces in the north, as if to break through there.  Then, it launches into Belarus with the whole force.  The Schwerpunkt should drive north, then east, end-running the Russian northern line and driving down between the Russian forces and the border, just as Herr General Hoffman suggests.  But that’s not all.  Two other thrusts, both small in size, should be detached from the main force.  One should drive at Minsk, broadcasting the message that its only target is Lukashenko and asking Belarussian forces to come over.  That will pose not just an operational but a strategic threat to Russia just as she needs her operational reserves inside Ukraine.  The second Nebenpunkt should be a special operation to sieve the missiles with nuclear warheads Russia has positioned in Belarus.  If Ukraine grabs those, Russia loses the ace up her sleeve, the threat to go nuclear.  Russia will face one operational and two strategic disasters, without sufficient forces to deal with more than one, and become paralyzed by the choice.”

We stood around somewhat stunned.  For a while, no one said anything.  Then Bismarck spoke.  “Brilliant operational art, Herr Feldmarschall”.  You deserve the oak leaves.  But what none of you idiots have considered is the strategic picture!”

The Kaiser rolled his eyes.  “Now I know why my grandfather said, ‘Sometimes it is a hard thing, being Kaiser under Bismarck.” But please, Otto, enlighten us.”

“Why is Germany allied with Ukraine when Russia is far more important to us?  Yes, we need the grain of Ukraine.  But Russia offers vastly more: grain, oil and gas, strategic position, a large if low quality army, a decent navy and air force, the list is endless,” Bismarck went on.  “I have no love for the “Laws of History,” but there does seem to be a general rule that when Germany and Russia are allied, both do well, and when they are opposed, both do badly.  Is there really any need to discuss what the outcomes of the World Wars would have been if Russia had joined the Central Powers in a new Dreikaiserbund or the Axis?  Max?  Moltke?  Anybody?

“There would have been no Second World War, or probably First, in that case,” the Kaiser said.  “Peace is what I wanted, and peace is what Germany and Europe would have had.  Anyway, it has grown late, and we face a big party tomorrow in the Grotto – both Nicky and my friend Franz Ferdinand are coming, as are you, my American friend – and I promised Max more sausages and Mosel wine than even he can eat and drink.  Between now and then, we all have things to ponder, especially what you, dear Otto, have told us.  We Germans always want to subordinate the strategic to the operational, then wonder why it all blows up in our face.  Hopefully, someday we will learn not to do that.  May that day come soon.”

 

* William S. Lind is the author, among many other works on military history and strategy, of the The New Maneuver Warfare Handbook (just published). This article has been published earlier in Traditional Right.

Full of Kunstim, Isn’t He?

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When I was a child in Ramat Gan, a town not far from Tel Aviv, my mother used to speak of kunstim. I am willing to bet that, with the possible exception of my younger brothers, no one in the world knows what the term means; so let me explain. In 1950 my parents, Leo and Greet van Creveld, left their native Netherlands for the young state of Israel. As time went on they both learnt to speak decent, though not quite perfect, Hebrew. My mother in particular used to speak of kunstim. In Hebrew as it was spoken at the time, a kunz—not, pay heed, kunst, but kunz—stood for a cheap trick. Obviously my mother confused this term with kunst, the Dutch (and German) term for art (as, for instance, in “the art of writing”). To kunz she added the Hebrew suffix im, used to turn nouns from the singular into the plural. It was as a result of this strange process that the word kunstim came into the world and was used in our home. As I just said, it mcant “cheap tricks.”

Over the last few months, The Donald has been engaging in kunstim. First, providing no new information whatsoever, he accused Tehran of violating the nuclear deal arrived at under his predecessor and announced that he was withdrawing from it. Next he said he had provided the Swiss Embassy with a number that the Mullahs could use to talk to him, should they feel like doing so (they did not). Next he sent some additional forces to the Gulf, albeit that they are not nearly sufficient for waging a full-scale campaign against a country as large and as powerful as Iran. Next, the Iranians having shot down an American drone, he said that the US would not simply let that incident pass. Next, apparently caught by his own words, he suggested that the Iranians might have intercepted the drone by mistake. Next, when the Iranians told him, loud and clear, that it had not been a mistake, he threatened retaliation. Next, claiming that the planned retaliatory strike as submitted to him by the Pentagon, was “disproportional” and would lead to too many Iranian casualties he cancelled it even though the planes were (or depending on whom you believe, were not) in the air. Next he let it be known that the attack had not been canceled, only put on ice. Throughout all this he keeps saying that he does not want war; but he also keeps threatening that, in case a war does breaks out, Iran will be “obliterated.”

Has the man gone bonkers, crazy, nuts? Quite some people, including not just the editors of Mad Magazine but some of his onetime closest associates as well, think so. After all, he has always been a megalomaniac and an unpredictable one at that. I, however, am willing to give him the benefit of doubt. Instead I suggest that, to understand what he is doing, we take a look at the principles of strategy. As everyone who has ever practiced it with some success knows, at bottom it is all a question of deception. If you are strong, pretend to be weak. If you are weak, pretend to be strong. If you are preparing to attack, pretend to be ready to defend. If you are concentrating at place X, pretend to be doing so at place Y. On some occasions you should go straight for your objective; on others, the best way is the roundabout one. Avoid the obvious and always do the unexpected. Threaten, relent, bluff. Mislead your opponent. Keep him off balance, put him into a situation where he is damned if he does and damned if he does not.

Always trim the nails and keep them clear.Foot odor is a buy viagra generic major problem among men. They include: buy generic levitra Problems urinating – It’s not at all simple for men to talk about issues in the bedroom out of fear of intimacy can result in male impotency or erectile dysfunction. Immobilization of both the PIP and DIP joints was previously thought to be necessary to relax http://cute-n-tiny.com/cute-items/crochet-cupcake-bear/ cheapest viagra the penis muscles to allow sufficient flow of blood in order to show their superior. when we be a kid or a child, our parents or other elders look taller than us, we make an idea that we also get taller when we get adult. so, if you are a old age man with erectile problem,. levitra online canada Ashwagandha, Sudh Shilajit, Kesar, Pipal, Kankaj, Shatavari, Kavach Beej, pipal, ksheerika, pipal, purushratan, kankaj, haritaki, atimukyak, lauh bhasma and Gokhru improve secretion of testosterone. As anyone who has tried it knows, doing all these things is hard enough. What makes it harder still is that they should be done, not separately one by one, but in rapid succession and in combination with each other. An objective must be selected and adhered to, but only as long as circumstances do not undergo a fundamental change. A rigid plan should be avoided, flexibility and a capacity for improvisation so as to cope with the unexpected built in. Vice versa, flexibility should not mean frequent switching from one objective to the next. Such has been the way of strategy ever since Sun Tzu wrote The Art of War around 500 BCE. And such, in the days of The Art of the Deal, it still remains.

All this, of course, means playing with fire. The more so because, amidst all the bluffs, the deceptions and the feints separating truth from falsehood, reality from make-believe, is very difficult. It may even be impossible. Devising kunzim to unbalance your opponent and cause him to lose his way, you are quite likely to lose your own.

And that, I suggest, is what is happening to Trump.

The Things That Have Not Changed

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In the field of war studies today, nothing is more fashionable than pointing to the prevalence, inexorability and rapidity of change. Meaning, among other things, social change, organizational change, and doctrinal change. And, of course, technological change, the kind that is often perceived as the factor that drives all the rest in front of it the way a shepherd drives his flock.

In this post, I want to do the opposite: To wit, say a few words about the things that have not changed. And which, to quote the nineteenth-century English poet Alfred Tennyson, “far as human eye can see” are not going to change either.

1.War as the continuation of politics by other means. War has never been, nor can be, an independent thing in itself. A war that does not serve politics, here understood not simply as the political process but in the broadest sense as the objectives which the belligerent community sets itself, is, in Clausewitz’s words, “a senseless thing without an object.”

2. A fight between individuals is known as a duel. War, however, is not an individual activity but a collective one. As is well known, a collective can be more than the sum of its parts. However, under the wrong conditions it can also be less. That is why factors such as cohesion, discipline, leadership etc. are as important as they are.

3. War is a strategic activity. Meaning that it is waged by two or more belligerents, each of whom is free and able to pursue his own objectives while at the same time interfering with the other so as to prevent him from doing the same. It is the strategic character of war which is behind its so-called principles. Such as initiative, attack, defense, decision, attrition, concentration, maintenance of aim, maneuver, flexibility, intelligence, security, and all the rest.
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Particularly important in this respect is the relationship between offense and defense. As Clausewitz says, there are two reasons why the latter is the stronger form of war. First, there is the analogy of the bucket; the more successful the attacker, the further away from his bases he gets and the more vulnerable his communications. Second, there is the element of time; whatever does not take place favors the defense. The outcome is the culminating point, the one at which an offense, unless it has ended in victory, inevitably turns into a defense. All this was true when war first made its appearance on earth some twelve thousand years ago. And all this will continue to apply even if and when it is waged by spaceships flying in outer space and firing laser beams.

4. As well as being a strategic activity, war is a violent one. Where no violence is involved there can be no war, only metaphors; as, for example, in “diplomatic war,” “economic war,” “psychological war,” and the like. Coming on top of war’s strategic character, it is the ever-present violence that makes it the domain of hunger, thirst, cold, fatigue, suffering, danger, pain, death, and, last not least, sorrow and regret. And that requires, on the part of those who wage it and fight in it, qualities such as fortitude, determination, and presence of mind needed in order to endure it and be successful at it.

5. Finally, violence in turn means that the possibility, even likelihood, of escalation is always there. Side A delivers a blow. Side B responds with a more powerful blow. And so on. If irrational factors such as hate and vengefulness were not present at the beginning, very soon they surface and make their impact felt. Escalation quickly follows. It threatens to burst right through the bands imposed by the very political controls that provide it with its raison d’etre.

To return to the beginning, all this is true regardless of organization, doctrine, technology, and what have you. At this time when new gadgets that supposedly bring about “fundamental” changes in the conduct of war have become a daily phenomenon, let those with ears to listen, listen.