Next to the Bear

Posted on November 24, 2022 by Martin van Creveld

The other day a Ukrainian TV station contacted me and asked me whether we could do an interview about what spending one’s life in the shadow of a large and aggressive neighbor is like. As, for example, the citizens of the German Federal German Republic (until 1989), South Korea, Taiwan, and of course my very own Israel all have done. As so often happens, I found the question intriguing. So having spent some time mulling over it—I do not claim to have done much research—I jotted down some answers.

Ere we start, though, it is important to note that much will depend on who you are. Including: age, gender, marital status, education, profession, whether or not you have children to look after, how close to (or far from) the security apparatus you are, any advance training you may have received, etc. Visiting the FGR for the first time back in 1976, I was impressed by the fact that every single bridge and tunnel was marked with data, complete with pictures of tanks, about the weight and dimensions of the vehicles that could pass through. On another, more recent, visit I witnessed some firemen and their families having their picnic suddenly interrupted as sirens called on them to present themselves for duty. It was merely an exercise and everyone was sure of it. Still I was impressed by the calm, orderly way in which the men went about their business (the women, burdened as they were with children, stayed behind).

That said, based on my experience in three out of the four abovementioned countries as well as some of the literature, here are some of the ways people react to such a situation.

First, the ostrich syndrome. People ignore the problem as much as they can; and rightly so, or else they could not exist. This, my hosts during a short visit to Seoul (which is only some 50 kilometers south of the border with North Korea) is how the inhabitants of that city react. Having got used to it for seven decades, they simply refuse to take the announcements of their own security apparatus seriously but continue with their lives as usual. It has worked countless times in the past; so why not this one? Seoul at 1500 o’clock when young female office workers start flooding the streets—what a treat for the eyes!

Second, they share their worries with others in the hope of gaining relief. This is the Israeli method par excellence. For many years one of the most important words in the language was hamatsav (the situation). Humor, including black humor, helps. For example, German women during the last months of World War II used to tell each other that a Russian lying on one’s belly was better than an American flying high over one’s head. There were plenty of similar jokes floating about; by one story Hitler himself guffawed at them.

Third, they do, or at any rate pretend to do, something about it. As by laying down plans; cleaning up their air-raid shelters (those of them who have them); acquiring all kinds of emergency supplies such as water, canned food, batteries, first aid equipment, tools, and perhaps weapons; joining a civil defense organization; participating in all kinds of exercises; moving to a district or settlement less likely to be affected; and so on. In fact almost any kind of activity, by releasing dopamine or serotonin or devil knows what, can relieve the mind, redirect it and refresh it.

Fourth, they pray. That even goes for self-proclaimed atheists. I do not know how many times, I’ve heard Israelis say: I’ve just got a new baby. Pray that, eighteen years from now, he (much less often, she) will not have to join the military. Having three children and eight grandchildren, I should know.

Finally –

People, societies and circumstances vary enormously. However much thought governments, armed forces, social services and ordinary people invest in the matter, and however thorough the preparations they make, surprises are inevitable. Very often there is no knowing how the situation will unfold and how people will react when confronted with der Ernstfall, the real thing, as the Germans say. One moment the country is at peace. The next one the sirens come to life, bombs and missiles hit (or miss!) their targets, one finds oneself fighting for survival, and the chief of staff, having undergone a mental breakdown, resigns (this actually happened to the Norwegians when the Germans invaded them in 1940). Heroes become cowards and cowards, heroes. This may be carried to the point where heaven and earth literally change places.

Thinking the Unthinkable

Posted on August 25, 2022 by Martin van Creveld

When a dictatorship is in trouble, ten to one that it will seek a way out in the form of war. Judging by China’s increasingly bellicose behavior in respect to Taiwan over the last few weeks, its dictatorship—and, yes, a dictatorship it is—ten to one that it is in deep trouble indeed. Consider:

After decades of sustained economic growth during which per capita GDP increased seventyfold, the point seems to have been reached where the formulae first put into place by Deng Xiaoping during the 1980s no longer work. In particular, as President Xi Jinpin himself is well aware, the gap between rich and poor has grown to the point where it threatens the stability of the regime—as it has done many times in the past. New methods are urgently needed. However, so far there is no sign that they are being discovered, let alone implemented.
In many places all over China, unbridled industrialization over the last four decades has resulted in ecological disasters without parallels in Chinese, and perhaps human, history. Unbreathable air. Undrinkable water. Vast quantities of poisonous materials seeping into the ground and reducing or eliminating its fertility.
China’s decades-long policy of one child per family has long led to a situation whereby fewer and fewer young people have to support more and more elderly ones, forming a major brake on productivity. So far, attempts to remedy the situation by relaxing some controls do not seem to be working.
By the best available evidence Corona originated in China. Next, its spread was encouraged by the Government’s reluctance to allow neutral observers to investigate the disease and do what had to be done. Combined with Beijing’s bullying behavior towards its smaller neighbors, this has caused its international credibility to suffer.

These are but a few of the challenges with which the Chinese Communist—in fact it is anything but Communist—Party has to cope. Whether or not they will actually drive the country to war over Taiwan is anyone’s guess; however, it is possible to say a few words about what such a war may look like.

As so often in the past, the war will be preceded by a period of intensified wireless activity, mobilization, troop movements, news-blackouts, etc. In theory these and many other preparatory measures should be easily detected by the intelligence services of Taiwan and its allies (primarily South Korea, Japan, and of course the USA). But whether they will be detected, let alone believed and acted upon, is another matter altogether. Think of the German offensive against the USSR, think of the Japanese one against Pearl Harbor. In both cases plenty of warnings were available right under the intelligence services’ noses; yet when they came they did so as complete surprises.
As so often since 1939, any Chinese offensive is certain to start in the air with attacks on Taiwan’s headquarters, communication- and transportation centers, anti-aircraft defenses, airfields and missile bases. Taking into account numbers alone, the People’s Liberation Army should be able to win these early combat operations. But then numbers are not everything; Taiwan’s defenses are up to date and well trained. From what one reads it appears they are also prepared to fight.
The next stage will be fought primarily at sea. Early on the initiative will be in the hands of the Chinese Navy as it tries to blockade Taiwan and soften it up in preparation of the coming invasion. Taiwan, however, has it own anti-submarine forces and is certain to use them in a determined attempt to resist the aggressor and keep its lines of communication open.
Suppose which is by no means certain, that at this stage the PLA can prevail. In that case it will surely use its ships to mount a large scale invasion. That, however, does not mean its problems will be over and victory, automatic. As history shows, sea- to land operations are about the most difficult of all and require a high degree of expertise which the PLA, for lack of experience, does not have. The seas around Taiwan are choppy with strong tides and, during certain seasons, torrential rains; not for noting are they known as The Black Ditch. The coast itself is rockyand hard to navigate. Thus an invasion may fail before it even gets properly started—as twice happened to the Mongols when they tried to invade Japan in 1271 and 1284 and also, to use he most famous example of all, to the Spanish Armada in 1588.
A coup de main intended to win a war with a single blow may succeed. Or else, as Putin’s initial invasion of Ukraine showed once again, it may fail. In case it succeeds, little else will remain to be said. In case it fails, a prolonged campaign to break Taiwan’s by no means negligible land forces and subdue the island will ensue. The outcome of such a campaign will depend very largely on the joker on the pack, meaning the US and in particular, its navy. To avoid being trapped in the Strait, the US 7^th fleet, which is based in Japan, will be deployed not west of Taiwan, as laymen might think, but to the east of it. From there it will send its aircraft in an attempt to stop the invaders either before they touch land or at a later point when it will be a question of keeping their supply lines open.

To sum up, the above difficulties notwithstanding a Chinese attempt to subdue an isolated Taiwan would stand a reasonable, if by no means certain, expectation of success. However, launching it in the teeth of American military power, the greatest on earth, would be a very risky venture indeed. And this without even considering the ever-present threat of nuclear escalation, whether deliberate or accidental, which literally might bring about the end of he world.

Thinking the unthinkable, as 1960s-vintage strategists used to say.

Focus on Taiwan

Posted on October 7, 2021 by Martin van Creveld

Now that China’s star seems to be on the ascendant and that of the US, following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, on the decline, many people around the world wonder whether a military clash between the two behemoths and their allies is likely. And, if so, how it might come about, what it might look like, and what the outcome might be. The following represents a short attempt to answer these questions.

How did the current rivalry between China and the US originate?

Between the two world wars China and the US were actually allies, albeit very unequal ones. What kept them together was their common fear and hatred of Japan which invaded Manchuria, considered by many an outlying region of China, in 1931, and China itself six years later. True, prior to Pearl Harbor the US never officially declared war on Japan. But it did provide China’s ruler, General Chiang Kai-shek, with money, advisers, training, weapons, and the nucleus of a small air force (General Chennault’s Flying Tigers).

As World War II ended and it became clear that Mao and his communist legions would win China’s ongoing civil war, the US did what it could to prevent such an outcome. To no avail. By the end of 1949 Mao, actively supported by the Soviet Union, was in control of the whole of China. Whereas Chiang and his remaining adherents fled to the island of Taiwan, off China’s coast, where he and his successors enjoyed strong American support.

What happened next?

As long as the Soviet Union continued to exist, the US regarded Moscow as its own main rival. By comparison China, large but underdeveloped, was secondary. The Korean War having ended in 1953, now the US treated China as the Soviet Union’s most important ally; now it tried to exploit emerging differences between the two communist powers. As, for example, the Nixon administration did in 1969-72.

Following the Soviet collapse in 1990-91, it looked as if the US had no “peer competitors” (as the phrase went) left. This so-called “unilateral moment” lasted until about 2010. On one hand there was China’s economic and military power, which kept growing at a phenomenal rate. On the other, long before Washington withdrew from Iraq (2020) and Afghanistan (2021) it began to show signs of weakness in Afghanistan and Iraq. Though no shots were exchanged, before long the two behemoths, China and the US, found themselves locked in a struggle not unlike the Cold War of old.

Let’s stop here. Where does Taiwan fit into all this?

Over the years, the role played by Taiwan has changed. At first, following Chiang’s flight, it presented the Chinese people with an alternative model and focus of loyalty that might one day take over. True, this line of thought was never very credible; how can a flea swallow an elephant? However, there could be no doubt about the island’s strategic importance.

Taiwan is a critical link in a series of strongholds. They are, from north to south, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Together they block China’s access to the Pacific, much in the same way as the British Islands used to block the access of Germany and, before Germany, France, to the Atlantic and the world’s trade routes in general.

To make China’s position more difficult still, there are the Straits of Malacca which sit across its communications with the Indian Ocean, southeast and south Asia, and Africa. Including the Middle East, which now accounts for fifty percent of China’s oil imports. The recently announced Belt and Road Initiative notwithstanding, these five strongholds can be used by whoever owns them in order to control a huge chunk of China’s foreign trade. On which much of the country’s economic performance, and with it its political stability, depends.

What you are saying is that re-possession of Taiwan is critical to China’s future as a global superpower.

That’s right.

So is China going to invade Taiwan?

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Had it been simply a question of China versus Taiwan, and given the (im)balance of forces between those two, such a war could only have one outcome. Taiwan, however, has long received strong support from the US which does not want the island to fall to Beijing.

Suppose China does gird its loins and invades. What would the ensuing war be like?

Taiwan is an island. Accordingly, China’s first move would be to impose an air and naval blockade. If necessary, capturing or sinking a couple of Taiwanese ships so as to show it means business. Supposing Taiwan does not surrender, China might follow up with an air and missile strike aimed at its enemy’s air force, anti-aircraft defenses, and navy. That done, Beijing might use amphibious forces to invade. Or it might simply sit and wait for its quarry to surrender.

It is also possible, though less likely, that, to retain surprise, China would strike Taiwan’s defenses before imposing a blockade. However, such a move would be extremely risky and the principle of the thing would remain more or less the same.

But you have just said that Taiwan is not on its own.

That is correct. In such a war, everything would depend on the US. Initially the latter’s most likely move, perhaps joined by a few others such as South Korea and Australia, would be to send in a couple of carrier strike groups. The objective would be to break the Chinese blockade without actually firing. In case it works, fine. In case it does not, God knows what will follow.

Suppose such a war gets under way and escalates; who wins?

In such a war, China will be operating close to its own shores whereas America’s lines of communication would stretch all the way across the Pacific. As a result, for China to build up a local superiority will be relatively easy. The more so because some of America’s forces, especially the navy, will probably be tied up elsewhere. As a result, I’d put the chances of a Chinese victory—whatever that may mean—at over 50 percent.

However, there is an elephant in the room. Faced with the fall of Taiwan, at some point the US might threaten the use of nuclear weapons. For example, in case something goes wrong and a carrier with its 90 aircraft and 5,000 or so crew members is lost.

But China’s nuclear arsenal, complete with the necessary delivery vehicles, is growing. Do you really believe the US will put San Francisco and Los Angeles at risk in order to rescue Taipei?

Do you really believe China will put Beijing and Shanghai at risk in order to seize Taipei?

So what is your prognosis?

As you know, no nuclear weapon has been used in anger from 1945 on. Not during the 1948-49 Berlin Crisis. Not during the 1958 Quemoy Crisis, not during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and not during any number of other, less acute, crises both between the Superpowers and between other nuclear countries (e.g. India and Pakistan). Based on this record, it seems to me that both sides are far too aware of the dangers of nuclear war to risk one such breaking out. More likely the Chinese, in the hope that their rivals will be the first to blink, will go on putting as much pressure on Taiwan as they think they can away with. But without actually opening fire.