Now that he U.S withdrawal from Afghanistan has become a fait accompli, people all over the world expect to understand why and how it happened. In particular, judging by any number of discussions on the Net, the following questions demand answers.

How did the U.S get involved in Afghanistan?

U.S involvement in Afghanistan started in the early 1980s. That was when President Reagan decided to assist the Afghan Mujahedeen (Holy Warriors) , who were fighting against the Soviet occupation of their country, by providing them with weapons, money, and advisers. Using classical guerrilla methods, for close to a decade the Mujahedeen harried the Red Army, which at the time many experts considered most powerful in the world. The number of Afghan casualties, refugees included, has been estimated at 2,000,000. Nevertheless, in 1989, having suffered perhaps 13,000 killed and with nothing to show for their efforts, the Soviets gave up and retreated north to their own country. As they did so the Mujahedeen did not even bother to shoot at them.

Go on.

The resulting political vacuum was filled by a group known as the Talban (Religious Students.) They in turn sheltered Al Qaeda, a terrorist organization led by the Saudi Osama Bin Laden and well known to the American intelligence community from other terror attacks it had mounted at various places around the world. Following 9-11, when the Taliban refused to hand over Bin Laden, the U.S Government under George W. Bush had little option but to launch an offensive—any other decision would have swept those who made it clean out of office.

How difficult was the challenge the Americans faced?

Afghanistan (“Wild Country”) has long presented would-be conquerors with four main challenges. First, the terrain, which is mountainous and, in many places, all but roadless. Second the climate, which is continental and, in winter, often makes traffic impossible for week on end. Third, the fact that there is not, nor has ever been, a single government capable of making peace on behalf of the entire population with all its numerous tribes, groups, and clans.

Making things worse for the Americans, Afghanistan is a landlocked country located on the other side of the world from the U.S. While part of the logistic burden was sustained by developing LOCs (lines of communication) by way of Pakistan, the consequent dependence on air transport turned the invasion into a enormously costly logistic nightmare. Not that the Americans did not do their best—they invested vast resources. In the whole of history no other country has ever done nearly as much. In the end, though, to no avail.

Still, the U.S had the most powerful military on earth whereas the Taliban had neither a regular army, nor an air force, nor an air defense system, nor computers, nor artificial intelligence, nor any number of other gizmos said to be essential for modern warfare. Mines apart, throughout their most important weapons were Kalashnikov assault rifles, mortars, and anti-tank missiles, all of them cheap and easy to obtain and operates. Many Taliban did not even have uniforms, preferring to wear their traditional jelabias instead.

The Jelabias at any rate often prevented the Americans from distinguishing Taliban combatant from the civilian population, which in turn not seldom meant heavy casualties, euphemistically known as “collateral damage,” among the latter.

At a deeper level, it was the Taliban and not the Americans who had the most important factor of all: namely the will to fight for their country, for their religion, and for their traditions. Specifically including that part of them which regulate everything pertaining to women.

This last point is worth exploring in somewhat greater detail. In any society that has ever existed, women (and children) represent by far the most important thing warriors have and fight for. Ergo, any outside attempt to interfere with the opponents’ women and children is bound to give rise to the most strenuous resistance. Better die than wath one’s wife in the conquerors’ arms, said the Homeric hero Hector! By trying to impose Western feminism on the country, the US made sure that much of the native population, both male and, often enough, female, would resist tooth and nail. Which was just what, especially in the countryside, it did.

Anything else?

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What should the Americans have done differently?

Tactically and operationally, one can think of any number of things they could have done differently. For example, by using more boots on the ground during the first weeks of the conflict they might have prevented the Taliban, forced by the American bombing to disperse in all directions, from escaping and reorganizing. As, among many others, both Bin Laden and Mohamed Omar, the Taliban leader directly responsible for giving him shelter, did.

Much more important, starting in 1945 there have been any number of armed conflicts in which Western forces were defeated by local guerrillas. Think of the struggles that brought down the Dutch, British, French and Portuguese empires. Think, above all, of Vietnam. Following this experience, the Americans should have decided, secretly and well in advance, how long the campaign should last—say, ninety days. That period having passed, they should have proclaimed victory and withdrawn. While promising to return if necessary, of course.

After Bush, but before Biden, came Presidents Obama and Trump. Where did they fit in?

Both inherited a bad situation. Obama did the best he could, sending in the “surge” which registered some successes at first but ended without having achieved anything. Trump, as usual, did little but bluster. Bottom line: neither stood a chance either against the Taliban or against their own public opinion which had long become apathetic and, to the extent that it cared at all, wanted nothing better than an end to the conflict.

To return to the beginning, given the number of Western defeats we just mentioned, you’d think that there must have been warning voices.

There were some. A few even predicted that Afghanistan would end as Vietnam did, with pro-American Afghans desperately clinging to their departing guests’ helicopters. However, they were drowned in a mighty chorus of patriotic fervor and calls for revenge. With the memory of the 1999 “victory” over Serbia still fresh in people’s mind, President Bush himself gave the cue. He claimed that America had overcome the so-called Vietnam Syndrome and was ready to treat its enemies as they deserved to be treated. Seldom in history has anyone proved more wrong, I suppose.

Let’s switch from the past to the future. What are the most likely consequences of America’s failure?

In the short run, a significant loss of prestige that will make the US more hesitant about invading some countries and other countries less confident that the Americans will come to their assistance in their hour of need. This in turn is bound to affect America’s position throughout the world. Including Europe where some countries may start rethinking their position in NATO and in respect to Russia. Better make a deal with Putin than trust Biden, they will say.

While America loses, its main foreign opponents—China and Russia—are gloating over its failure. Hoping to profit, both suck up to the Taliban, claiming they themselves neither are, nor ever have been, anti-Islamic and promising every kind of assistance in rebuilding the country.

And in the long run?

As the British in India among others learnt to their cost, Afghanistan, left to its own devices, has never been a comfortable neighbor to have. On one hand there is the “government” which, however, is corrupt from top to bottom and does not have the power to control the clans and tribes that live in the outlying provinces in particular. On the other there is a warlike and often well armed population many of whose members do as they please, behaving as if borders did not exist. Add the absence of a proper bureaucracy to bridge the gap between the two, and all that’s left is a godawful mess.

To use a metaphor, currently the Afghan bride, war-ravaged and desperately poor as she is, is being courted not by one but by two powerful suitors. Whoever wins, I wish them joy of her.