Monthly Archives: March 2022

The Guessing Game

Posted on by

There are two cardinal reasons why President Putin has almost certainly lost the war he launched over a month ago. Both are as old as history, and both were set forth by Clausewitz around 1830. First, a military operation, large or small, is much like pouring water from a bucket (the metaphor is mine, not Clausewitz’s); the further away from its point of origin it flows, the more momentum it loses and the more vulnerable it becomes to counterattacks directed both against the spearheads and against the attacker’s lines of communication. Just think of Napoleon in 1812. Having invaded Russia with 600,000 men, by the time he reached Moscow he only had 100,000 left; all the rest had either perished by battle, disease and fatigue or been left in the rear to garrison key positions there. 100,000 troops were not nearly enough to force a decision, let alone hold the country down. And so all it remained for him was to retreat.

The second and even more fundamental reason is that time works against the attacker. Why? Because, under most circumstances, conquering and appropriating is harder, and requires greater force, than holding and preserving. An offense that does not attain its objective—from the attacker’s point of view, that would mean a better peace—within a reasonable amount of time is certain to turn into a defense. Think of Hannibal in 218-17 BCE, think of Hitler in 1941-42. Again this applies to any military operation, large or small, old or new.

So far, Putin’s war has proceeded in four stages. First, a combination of geography and numerical superiority enabled his forces to operate on external lines and invade Ukraine from four different directions (northwest, north, east and south) at once. Second, enjoying both numerical and technological superiority, and some logistic problems notwithstanding, those troops pushed the Ukrainians aside and reached the outskirts of the most important Ukrainian cities such as Kharkov, Kiev, Kherson, and Mariupol (important because of its command of the Sea of Azov as well as the road from the Donbas to the Crimea) and put them under siege. Third, especially at Kherson and Mariupol, they tried their hand at urban warfare. Only to find, as countless others before them have also done, that such warfare tends to be very bloody and very destructive. The difficulty of obtaining intelligence, the excellent shelter cities provide to those who defend them, and the way rubbish-filled streets canalize and hamper the attacker’s movements all contribute to this result; between them they cause cites to swallow up armies the way sponges take up water.

Fourth, and rather predictably, the Russians switched from attempts to capture Ukrainian cities to subjecting them to artillery bombardment. Just as, some twenty years ago, they did in Grozny. In Kherson and Mariupol the tactic worked, at any rate up to a point. However, Kiev and Kharkov are much larger than either of those. Besides, Ukraine itself is a large country with many urban areas, large and small. Not even the Russian army, famed for its reliance on artillery, has enough guns to take them on all at once; whereas doing so one by one will require enormous amounts of time which, for the abovementioned reasons, Putin simply does not have.

Fifth, the offensive having exhausted itself, stalemate will set in if, indeed, it had not done so already. Stalemate having set in politics, which right from the beginning played a very important role, will start playing an even more important one. All sides will have a strong interest in ending the war. Hence attempts will be made to do so on terms all of them —Russia, Ukraine, NATO—will find more or less acceptable or at least capable of being presented as such.

Just what the final settlement will look like is impossible to say; most probably, though, it will include the following elements. First, there can be no question of doing away with Ukraine as an independent country and nation. Second, there will be no subservient government in Kiev as there is in Minsk. Third, Russia will make no important territorial gains beyond those made in 2014 and even its ability to hold on to those is in some doubt. Fourth, Ukraine will not officially join NATO, let alone have NATO forces stationed on its territory; but other, more limited, forms of cooperation between the two entities will certainly be established and maintained. Fifth, Putin may, but not necessarily will, lose his post.

Finally, never forget that war, though it makes use of all kinds of physical assets such as numbers of troops, weapons, equipment, roads, communications, topographical and geographical obstacles, and so on, is a human drama above all. As such it is critically affected by every kind of human, often incalculable, drives and emotions; which, collectively, shape the fighting power of both sides. Taking all this into account, it becomes only too clear that anything that can be said about the way future campaigns will develop is no more than what Clausewitz calls a calculus of probabilities.

So it has been, and so it will remain

Spring

Posted on by

A lawn full of colorful crocus in Copenhagen, Denmark. Similar:

Like everyone else, I am looking for some good news in a world seemingly gone mad. Alas, I am no poet. Or else I would have used my own words to celebrate the coming of spring. Before I serve you another person’s flowers, though, I want to tell you of something I used to do many years ago. You think it is funny, you think it is weird? Honi soit qi mal y pense.

Along with my young family, I spent the years 1969-71 and 1975-76 in London. First, working on my dissertation (Hitler’s Strategy, 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue). Later, on sabbatical writing Supplying War. Though the landlords were kind—I have nothing but good memories of them—the lodgings were, by today’s standards, quite miserable. We did not even have a toilet to call our own, sharing the one we used with another couple instead. Rent being cheap, though, we were able to afford a little Hillman Imp. Second hand, of course, white, with a red stripe along the side. It had two doors and an opening rear window. I still remember the registration number—DKM-789-C. During the eighteen months or so we had it it broke down many times. Nevertheless, never did I enjoy a car more. Probably not a country house within a hundred miles of London we did not visit!

However, its most important use was to take me a couple of miles northeast from Kilburn to Hampstead Heath where I used to go running two or three times a week. Each year, come late February/early March the crocuses, yellow, blue and white would show themselves. Just as in the pic. And you know what? Coming back from my run, I used to lie down on the ground and kiss them. Yes. Kiss them.

With that off my chest, here is my favorite description of spring (by a lady, unknown to me, who identifies herself as Lhtheaker):

 

The grass is green across the hill,
But yellow blooms the daffodil.
It’s sunshine on a little stalk,
A friendly flower, I bet they talk…

Of little kids, too long inside
They burst outdoors to play and hide.
Tracking mud and bringing bugs.
Look, there’s footprints on the rug!

Tiny whirlwinds, these little tykes,
They skin their knees while riding bikes.
They rip and roar, they’re running wild!
What fun it is to be a child.

It grows warmer every day.
Shoo the children out to play!
Pick the flowers, play in mud.
Too much rain, here comes a flood!

My snowy, winter days are gone.
I mourn them, but I hear a song
Of birds in trees; wind chimes ring.
I guess it might as well be spring!

Chaos

Posted on by

As far as anyone can make out, the situation in Ukraine is nothing if not chaotic. Russian forces are said to be advancing on all fronts. Ukrainian forces claim success after success in slowing down the aggressors or even halting them. Now cities are said to have been cut off, now it appears that, in reality, they are not. Cities are occupied, or else they are not and the two sides keep fighting over them. Convoys seem to be get stuck for days on end, but no one knows why. The Russians are running out of supplies. The Russians so far have only committed about three quarters of their forces. The Russian air force is said to be either held back or ineffective, yet President Zelensky keeps begging the West to impose a no fly zone.

Both sides accuse the other of committing war crimes and provide casualty figures; but neither is at all complete or reliable and there is good reason to believe that many are neither. A maternity hospital is said to have been hit, but whether it was done deliberately or as part of what is euphemistically known as “collateral damage” is obscure. The Western sanctions on Russia are working, or else they are little more than a nuisance that can be taken care of with Chinese help. The Russians are running out of young soldiers (hard to believe, since Russia’s birthrate, while below the replacement figure, is actually higher than that of Ukraine). Putin is winning on all fronts. Putin knows he has bitten off more than he can swallow and is desperately looking for a way out. Putin is ill. Putin is mad. Putin is about to be deposed, though no one knows by whom.

Millions of messages are being sent, intercepted, recorded, decrypted, stored, and analyzed by every possible means from artificial intelligence down. Some are even being falsified. To make things worse still, joining the Niagara of words is a tsunami of images. Attempting to prove their claims, both sides are publishing countless photographs, clips, videos, or whatever they are called. And that does not even include the millions of images sent out by the media on their own initiative. However, most of the time it is impossible to say who took them, when, where, in what context, and for what purpose. To say nothing of the fact that, since the uniforms worn by both sides and much of the materiel they use are broadly similar, it is often impossible to say what is what. One gets to see a shot up vehicle; but who destroyed it impossible to say. One sees wrecked building; but who wrecked it and why is impossible to say. A corpse is shown lying on the pavement; but whose corpse it is, and who killed him, is anything but clear. Briefly, it is not true, as Hitler’s propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels used to say, that bilder luegen nicht. Indeed that itself is perhaps the greatest lie of all.

Except for the sheer amount of information being passed around, there is nothing new or exceptional about all this. Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese soldier-scholar who probably wrote his Art of War around 500 BCE, says that all warfare is based on deceit and that, of all the ways to defeat an enemy, tricking him is the swiftest and the best (also in the sense of being the least bloody). Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian general and military theorist who wrote vom Kriege during the 1830s, says that, in war, almost all information (Nachrichten) is contradictory, false, or both. Napoleon, who though neither a theoretician nor a writer was one of the greatest commanders who ever lived, adds that making sense of the confusion is a task not unworthy of geniuses such as Isaac Newton and Leonhard Euler. He himself, incidentally, was a master of deceit—a talent he displayed not just on campaign, as by “stealing a march” on his enemies, but while playing cards as well.

For all the vast technological apparatus it uses, modern war has not been exempt from these problems. To the contrary, in some ways it has made them worse than ever. One factor responsible for this is the sheer amount of information in the hands of, or being generated by, decision makers, soldiers, intelligence services, the media, and individuals on all sides. Let me provide just one example of what this may mean. Back in 1991 headquarters US Marine Corps, preparing to invade Kuwait, received a million and a half satellite-images of the terrain in front of it. This, on top of other kinds of information too numerous to detail here. So enormous was the flood that the images were almost entirely useless—the manpower, the expertise and the time needed to make them useful where simply not available. Since more was being added every hour, processing all of them would have lasted literally forever. The development of artificial intelligence may have alleviated some of these problems. But certainly not all.

A second problem originates in the illusion that we are in full command of our faculties, meaning that our senses provide us with a realistic idea of the world around us. In fact, however, this is by no means always the case. Our minds are colored by fear, elation, hope, despair, disappointment, and a thousand other emotions. Coming on top of this, often what we see depends, not on incoming information but on what we are; as shaped by education, training, prejudice, and so on. No two people, no two organizations, are the same or see the world in the same way. Which means that, even if all the relevant information is available, the task of entering into the enemy’s mind and guessing his intentions is very difficult, not seldom impossible.

Third, in war all these problems are exacerbated by what Clausewitz calls its Strapazen. War is the most strenuous activity any human can engage in by far. To those who have not gone through it the mental and physical stress are simply unimaginable. Partly because of the ever present danger to limb and life, one’s own and those of others; and partly, at the upper levels, because the fate of countries and populations may very well depend on it. Such is the strain that it often causes even the very bravest and most stable to behave somewhat strangely. If not all the time, then certainly some of it. Under such conditions no wonder (as Napoleon said) that false reports proliferate. Some people see entire armies where, in fact, there are none; others don’t see armies even when those armies are right in front of their noses. 

A final point that, as far as I am aware, analysts have raised rarely if at all. It goes without saying that, ceteris paribus, the chaos of war affects both the conqueror and the conquered. However, as a rule creating order out of chaos—the conqueror’s task—is a lot harder than doing the opposite; think, for example, of building a new wall brick by brick as opposed to taking up a sledge hammer and bringing it down. Without imposing order on a recalcitrant country, the Russians cannot win. As a result, this factor will probably work in favor of the defender. The Israelis in Lebanon, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Americans in both Afghanistan and Iraq all tried their hand at this game. Ultimately, to no avail.

Ukraine is a large country with long, hard to seal, borders as well as tens of millions of able and highly motivated inhabitants. Chances are that the same will happen in this case.

When the Guns Fire

Posted on by

Two weeks into the war—no need to explain which war I am referring to here—the situation appears to be as follows.

 

 

General

Contrary to the view of some of us, who considering the military balance predicted a fast and fairly easy Russian Blitzkrieg, this is turning out to be a prolonged and quite bloody war. Unless some miracle happens, it will get worse before it gets better.

Military Operations

Russian military operations are being conducted in full force and with few if any restraints. 

 

Coming from several directions at once, they have succeeded in occupying one important city (Kherson) and are currently besieging and shelling several others. As one would expect from the side that is short of almost everything, Ukrainian resistance, though deserving of all respect, appears to be sporadic and ill-coordinated with each city and each force acting more or less on their own. Though Russian airpower does not play as much of a role as most people thought it would, it does dominate the sky. Still the Russians have not yet got even close to breaking the Ukrainian will to resist and fight. Perhaps, to the contrary.

Spread and Escalation

Contrary to many predictions, too, so far the war has remained inside Ukraine and did not spread to neighboring countries such as Moldavia and Poland.

Nevertheless, spread (“horizontal escalation, as it is sometimes called) and escalation remains very real possibilities. Suffice a single mistake, most likely in connection with NATO aircraft overlying Ukrainian territory (either deliberately or by accident) or with a Russian attacks on NATO attempts to assist Ukraine, to set Europe aflame and perhaps bring it to a glowing end. No wonder NATO is resisting President Zelensky’s calls for the establishment of a 

 

non-flight ban over his country. But it is not going to happen.

The Situation in Russia

The sanctions are really hurting Russia’s population. Not so much because people are starving, as they were during under Stalin in 1930-31 as well as during and immediately after World War II. But because of their sense of being cut off from the world. Including news emanating from any sources except their own government, not known as the most truthful in the world. The oligarchs have also taken heavy losses.

On the other hand, there is no sign of serious opposition to Putin. Claims about him being angry with his generals—at any rate, angry enough for it to make a difference—also seem to be without sufficient foundation in fact.

Economic Impact

The sanctions on Russia apart, the impact of the war on the global economy has been very serious. Production is down, inflation is up. That is especially true for such products as energy (oil and gas) and wheat. Gold is king. As always, though, there are those who prof

 

it. Including, above all, owners and producers of the commodities in question. And including arms manufacturers in many places around the world.

On one hand, the international rating agencies keep announcing Russia’s imminent bankruptcy. On the other, Russia is among the greatest profiteers. Not only is it among the largest producers of both energy and wheat, but it sells them dear to whomever will buy. Primarily, it seems, China. Now even Germany has announced it cannot do without Russian gas. Which of these two trends prevails we shall see soon enough.

As I am writing these lines on 9 March the Euro is slightly up against the dollar whereas gold and gas are slightly down. Are people getting used to the new reality? Again, we shall see soon enough.

International Impact

The Russian attack on Ukraine has brought almost all of Europe’s remaining countries closer together. Countries that always refused to join NATO and/or the EU (which is also an alliance against attack, albeit that it is seldom mentioned) are now actively considering doing just that. Good; but one doubts whether it can last.

Some false prophets notwithstanding, so far the war has not led China to mount an attack on Taiwan. Instead, the Chinese leadership seems to be weighting its options. There is a good chance that, if the war continues as it almost certainly will, China will emerge as the great tertius gaudens. Without firing a shot, what is more.

 

Attempts to End the War

So far, none of any importance. But clearly any solution, even if it does not fully meet Putin’s initial demands, can only come at the expense of Ukraine. Given how fearful NATO is, such a solution is not impossible. But it will take time.

 

Varia

Following decades of neglect, events are forcing Europe’s politicians as well as its populations to take war and the military seriously. There is even occasional talk of a return to conscription. However, it probably won’t happen. Even if it does, putting the necessary arrangements in place, procuring the necessary weapons and equipment, and organizing the necessary training will take years.

Following decades of feminist b.s, it turns out that few if any women participate in combat either on the Ukrainian side or, much less so, the Russian one. Ukrainian men are expected to fight and are barred from leaving the country, which some consider a violation of their human rights; Ukrainian women are not. Had events not been as tragic as they are, one could almost have said, “alles in ordnung” (everything is OK).

To Sum Up

The first casualty is the truth. Which incidentally means that there is no way to verify the casualty figures published by both sides.

Ukraine, Russia, Europe and the world are in an even greater mess than usual.

When the guns fire, the children cry.

Just Published!

Posted on by

Exactly 69 years ago:

Gentlemen of the celestial assembly!

I am standing here today in front of you. Not because I wanted to—it is you who have dragged me here. Not to express my regrets—my second wife’s death apart, regrets I have none. Not to justify myself—I need no justification. Not to prevent future historians from spreading even more lies about me—being dead, what do I care? Not so that you may acquit me—I know full well you won’t. Not because I believe you exist; as a historical materialist, I do not. To quote the great Marx, religion is the opium of the masses. Heaven and hell are but fables the self-styled “upper classes,” using those lick-spittles, the priests, have invented to keep those masses in their place.

And not to glorify my own role in history, not inconsiderable as it may have been. But solely to help ensure, as far as I can, that memory of the way the first-ever government of the proletariat, by the proletariat, for the proletariat, came about, overcame all obstacles, and triumphed, should not perish from the face of the earth.

So I hereby submit my res gestae. A summary, unembellished but truthful, of my deeds in the material world, the only really existent one. From this time forth I never will speak word.

 

6 March 1953

A Very Bad Man

Posted on by

The war in Ukraine goes on and on. Though analysts are as numerous as flies on a heap of you know what, the truth is that one knows how it is going to end. Such being the case, I want to put my latest thoughts on record.

First, Putin may be a very bad man. However, there is no point in continually saying so. Based on historical reasoning, he is doing what he believes he must on behalf of his country. That historical reasoning itself is neither better nor worse than any other reasoning of this kind; part reality, part myth, part propaganda. Never mind. To cope with him, it is first of all necessary to understand what he thinks, why, and what can and cannot be done about it. The more so because he has enough nuclear weapons to blow up the world.

Second, this is a war of survival not only for Ukraine but for Russia as well. In the case of Ukraine, that is because defeat would reduce it to a Russian province. Much as it used to be since 1793 when Catherine the Great joined Austria and Prussia in partitioning Poland, a move which for the first time took Russia to the shores of the Black Sea. In the case of Russia it is because, should this struggle be lost, the country can expect to disintegrate into who knows many warring fragments. Just as happened in 1990. Recovery, even supposing it will be possible at all, will take decades. See, as an example of what it may be like, The Time of Troubles (1598-1613).

Third, this is going to be a long and bloody conflict. Albeit that it may have taken a little longer than was originally planned—not something at all unusual in war—the Russians have reached Ukraine’s most important cities and put them under siege. They have not, however taken them. As I have written before, urban warfare is perhaps the most difficult form of war an attacking force can engage on. Just think of the months-long battle of Stalingrad in 1942-43, and you’ll know what I mean.

Fourth, even if the Russians do succeed in occupying the cities, the war, taking the form of insurrection, guerrilla, and terrorism will go on. As, to mention but two recent examples, it did in both Afghanistan and Iraq. True Ukraine, being flat, does not present the best terrain on which to wage these forms of warfare. Compared to many others, the Russians also enjoy the important advantage of being able to understand the language. But two factors are working in the other direction. One is the sheer size of the country and the population, which threaten to swamp any occupying force (that is why, back in 1793, the Russians were able to occupy it in the first place was because it was practically uninhabited). The other, the ready availability of every kind of assistance from NATO, which can only increase as time goes on.

Fifth, Putin’s forces are said to be using some unorthodox weapons capable of causing many casualties and inflicting immense damage on buildings in particular. Particularly important are so called thermobaric weapons that operate by detonating a mixture of air and fuel, resulting in an extraordinarily powerful explosion as well as extremely high temperatures. But Putin is not the only one to use them.  Americans did so both at Hue in 1968 and at Fallujah in December 2004; and both the Americans and the British used them in Afghanistan. So who are they to complain?

Sixth, whether Russia will break under the sanctions is uncertain. My own guess it that it won’t. Partly that because the Russians can take almost anything. And partly because Germany e.g depends on Russia for 51 percent of its oil and gas; without them, German industry will soon come to a standstill. Vice versa, the one certainty is that the war will break the economy of the Ukraine.

Seventh, the only way Putin can win this war is by finding some Ukrainians able and willing to set up a government that will collaborate with him. That, however, seems unlikely to happen.

Finally, in this war as in any other the first casualty is the truth. That is one reason why anyone who believes he can see into the future is welcome to try and so so.