Monthly Archives: August 2023

Quo Vadis, Israel

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In my last post I tried to explain the nature and purpose of the various parties represented in Israel’s parliament (the Knesset). Consquently, a friend of mine, the award-winning painter Bob Barancik (see on him https://www.creativeshare.com/bio.php) confronted me with some questions of his own. So here are my answers—for what they are worth.

Q: Did the recent raft of insubordinations among reserve air force pilots and IDF officers permanently damage the security of the state against Iran and other hostile Arab states?

A: Possibly so. War being what it is, the most important factor in waging it is not technology, however sophisticated. It is, rather, fighting spirit which in turn can only rest on mutual trust (as people used to say when Germany still had an army, today it’s you, tomorrow it’s me). The way some Israeli pilots, flight controllers, drone-operators ground officers and of course lawyers see it, that trust has been violated by their political superiors who, by seeking to drastically increase the power of the executive in particular, are weakening the judiciary and preparing a dictatorship. This, on top of demanding that the police and the military resort to draconian measures to break the resistance of the occupied Palestinian population—so draconian that, should they be implemented, they have an excellent chance of causing those who carry them out to be dragged in front of the International Court for War Crimes in The Hague.

The problem is like cancer. The longer it persists, the worse it will become and the harder it will be to repair the damage already done.

Q: Could there realistically be a putsch orchestrated by IDF generals and/or security services to forcibly remove Netanyahu, Smotrich, Ben-Gvir from office?

A: I very much doubt it. Do not forget that the IDF, unlike most modern armed forces, is mainly made up not of professionals but of conscripts and reservists. They will be split in the middle, just like the rest of Israeli society. The outcome will be total disintegration.

Q: Could the Camp David Accords simply be ignored by Egypt and a return to old hostilities?

A: Such a move almost certainly will not come all at once but take time and psychological preparation among the masses. Also, an extreme provocation such as an Israeli attempt to expel the Palestinian population of the West Bank. But yes, it could happen.

Q: Do the Arab countries and Iran need Israel to continue to exist as a domestic “punching bag” or is the hatred so great that there could be a genocide of Israeli Jews ala Mufti of Jerusalem?

A: You ask as if Arabs and Iranians were made of the same piece. But they are not. Among the Arabs, the masses, including the better educated, hate Israel more than the government does. In Iran the situation is the opposite.

Incidentally, did it ever occur to you that things may also work the other way around—i.e that, vice vice versa, it is some Israeli circles that are using the threat as a punching bag?

Q: Is it likely that Hezbollah aka Iran will unleash a sustained barrage of missiles that would cripple Israeli infrastructure? Or will Israel’s nuclear capacity continue to deter the mullahs in the short run?

A: Israel has never published any nuclear doctrine it may have. At the same time, the general belief is that its leaders will only resort to nukes in case the country faces complete defeat—as by having its army reduced to the point where it can no longer fight, its logistic infrastructure knocked out, and a considerable part of its territory and population overrun.

With the worst will in the world, Hezbollah does not have what it takes to achieve these aims; so it will depend on Iranian (and Syrian) support. A bombardment with Iranian and Syrian chemical weapons might indeed lead Israel first to threaten and then use its weapons of last resort.

Q: Do you see an exodus of the “best and the brightest” if Bibi and company continue to hang on to power?

A: This is already happening. Many—no one knows just how many—academics, physicians, and other kinds of highly qualified experts are leaving or looking for ways to leave. The shekel, which for several years used to be called the strongest currency one earth, is falling. Tens of thousands, including some members of my own family, are trying to obtain foreign citizenship in addition to their Israeli one. While there are no statistics, my guess would be that there are few Israeli families left that have not considered this possibility more or less seriously.

Q: We live in the postmodern world, where everything is possible and almost nothing is certain.

A: How true. But it does not make forecasting the future any easier. If anything, to the contrary.

Q: Do you believe as someone said, that “This too shall pass”?

A: I think the threat is the most serious one Israel has faced since 1973. Unless very, very great care is taken by Netanyahu, his government and his successors civil war, not just between Jew and Arab but among the Jews themselves, is inevitable. Such a war, especially one that leads to foreign (Arab and Iranian) involvement, might very well mean, finis, Israel.

A Guide for the Perplexed

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A Guide for the Perplexed is the title of a book written by the late twelfth-century Jewish physician, rabbi and philosopher Moshe Ben Maimon (known, to non-Jews, as Maimonides). Born and raised under Moslem rule in Spain, late in life he moved to Morocco and Jerusalem before settling in Cairo where he took a prominent part in communal life before dying in 1204.  The book, written in Arabic but making use of Hebrew letters, deals with some of the most fundamental issues surrounding Judaism and religion in general. Such as God’s existence, His attributes, His relationship with the world, the ways in which He may be known, the question of necessity versus freedom, and so on. At a time when Israeli politics are hitting the headlines, I shall use its title to explain the smorgasbord of squabbling  parties currently represented in Israel’s 120-member, unicameral, parliament (the Knesset).

Likud (Cohesion). Various parent-parties of Likud go back to the mid-1930s when it was set up as a right-wing, bourgeois counterweight to the dominant Labor Party. Beginning in 1977 it has won most elections and had two of its leaders (Menahem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir) serve as prime ministers.  Starting in 1993 it has been led Benjamin Netanyahu on a hawkish platform whose main tenets are a free (well, more or less) enterprise economy and the determination to retain the occupied territories at almost any cost. Ordinarily one would expect such a party to attract the comfortably off; in fact however, most of its support comes from “the poor and the praying” as Begin once put it. Currently it has 32 seats in the Knesset.

Yesh Atid (There is a Future). Founded by  brilliant journalist and author, Yair Lapid as recently as 2012, Yesh Atid has been running on a more secular platform than that of Likud. Indeed Lapid’s time as prime minister, which lasted from mid 2022 to late in the same year, was in some ways the best in the country’s entire history. Like all parties to the left of Likud, Yesh Atid has proclaimed  its strong desire for some kind of peace with the Palestinians in particular. Also like all parties to the left of Likud, neither it nor its leaders have the slightest idea how this could be achieved. Currently it has 24 seats and is the largest opposition party.

Tikvah Hadasha (New Hope).  Founded by a former minister of defense, General (ret) Benjamin Gantz, currently this party commands 12 Knesset seats and forms part of the opposition. Yet personalities apart, just how it differs from Yesh Atid and why has not joined the latter no one knows.

Shas (short for, Guardians of the Six books of the Talmud). An orthodox-religious party that appeals mainly to the Sephardi poor and  less well educated.  Founded around 1980, since then it has acted as Likud’s more or less  faithful partner in setting up various governments. Forming part of Netanyahu’s coalition, at the moment it has 11 Knesset members. Known mainly for its loathing of everything Ashkenazi as well as the corruption which has caused several of its leaders to spend time in prison.

Religious Zionism. Until 1977 this party regularly teamed up with the dominant left, forming various successive governments and keeping itself busy with such things as kosher food (a great source of income for rabbis, incidentally) and public transportation on the Shabbat. Since then, however, it has turned sharply to the right, gaining support among the West Bank settlers in particular on a platform which in many ways reminds one of Mussolini’s Fascism. Currently it occupies 7 Knesset seats and is a member of Netanyahu’s coalition

United Torah Judaism. Sharply divided between Ashkenazis and Sephardis, this party represents the ultra- orthodox. With currently 7 Knesset seats, it is doing what it can to join Shas in turning Israel into a sort of Jewish Iran. Complete with every kind of restriction on non-kosher food, gay and lesbian and trans life, abortion, public transportation on the Shabbat, and even the right of men and women to enjoy the same beaches, the same swimming pools, and the same pavements.

Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) currently commands 6 Knesset seats. Led by a former rowdy, it has long specialized in mounting pogroms against Arabs, both Palestinian and Israeli ones. If any group has the potential to turn Israel into a Nazi-like state and society, complete with “resident aliens” (Arabs who agree to being relegated to second-rate status without political rights) and expulsion (of Arab who do not) it is this one.

Israel Beiteinu (Israel, Our Home).  A leftover from the 1990s, when there were several parties claiming to represent freshly arrived immigrants from the former USSR, originally this party took a strong right-wing anti-Arab, stance. Commanding 7-8 Knesset seats, at one point it was sufficiently powerful for its leader, Avigdor Lieberman to, claim and obtain a post as minister of defense under Netanyahu (2016-18). Starting in 2022, though, its influence began to decline. Left in command of just 6 seats, it has drifted into the opposition, focusing mainly on preventing the state from being taken over by the Orthodox parties.

Two Israeli Arab parties, one Islamic/conservative, one (relatively) modern and liberal, commanding 10 seats between them and forming part of the opposition.

Labor Party. Representing the sad remnants of a party that used to rule Israel for decades. With 4 seats at its command Labor, like most of the rest, professes its strong desire for peace with the Palestinians without however, having the slightest idea of how to achieve it or even whether it can be achieved at all. Since this is completely unrealistic, it peddles an Israel version of Wokeness. As a result its appeal is limited, especially among the orthodox and the “traditional” (moderately religious) who, together, form about 60 percent of the overall population.

Noam (Niceness) a one-MK version of National Zionism without the latter’s violent edge.

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As in other countries, all these parties claim to be motivated solely by the public good.

As in other countries, all these parties claim to be peace-loving.

As in other countries, they need a powerful judiciary to keep their ambitions in check.

As in other countries, a plague on all their houses.

As in other countries, a democratic regime cannot do without them.

Back to Basics

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Note: This litte essay was first posted on this blog on 22 December 2022, i.e ten months after Putin started the Russo-Ukrainian War. Since then another nine months have passed. Curious to know how well my original remarks have held up, I re-read and reposted it here. Word by word.

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The war between Russia and Ukraine has now been going on for ten months. With neither side close to victory or defeat, there is a good chance—mark my words—that it will go on for another ten, perhaps even more. Even if serious negotiations get under way, they will not necessarily end the shooting all at once. Such being the case, instead of adopting the usual method of listing all the changes that the war has brought, I want to try and put together a list of the things that it did not and almost certainly will not change.

Suggestions, welcome.

General

Contrary to the expectations of some, notably the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his 1989 essay, “The End of History,” war remains, and will remain, as important a part of global history as it has ever been.

There is no sign that the causes of war, be they divine anger with one or more of the belligerents (Isaiah), or the nature of man (Genesis) , or economic (envy and greed), or the absence of a legal system that can rule over sovereign entities, or simply the personal ambitions of certain rulers, have changed one iota.

War is a social phenomenon rooted in the societies that wage it. As a result, each society wages it in its own way. As society changes, so does war. To win a war, the first thing you need is to gain an understanding of what kind of war it is and what is all about (Prussian general and military critic Carl von Clausewitz).

The nature of war, namely a violent duel between two or more belligerents in which each side is largely free to do as he pleases to the other, has not changed one bit.

War remains what it has always been, the province of deprivation, suffering, pain and death. Also, and perhaps worst of all, bereavement; also of friction, confusion, and uncertainty. Often the more robust side, the one psychologically and physiologically better able to engage with these factors and keep going, will win.

In war everything is simple, but the simplest things are complex (Clausewitz).

Victory means breaking the enemy’s will (Clausewitz); defeat, to have one’s will broken.

All war is based on deception (the ancient, perhaps legendary, Chinese commander and sage Sun Tzu). The first casualty is always the truth.

“It is good war is so terrible, or else we would like it too much” (Confederate general Robert E. Lee; seconded, in 1914, by then First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill). War is the greatest fun a man can have with his pants on (anonymous).

“War is sweet for those who are not familiar with it” (Erasmus of Rotterdam).

“No one has ever benefitted from a long war” (Sun Tzu).

Preparation and Training

The best school of war is war.

“By learning to obey, he learnt to command” (Plutarch on Roman military commander Titus Quintus Flaminius).

 “Their maneuvers are bloodless battles, their battles bloody maneuvers” (Jewish historian Josephus Flavius on the Roman legions).

“I notice that the enemy always has three courses open to him, and that he usually chooses the fourth” (Helmut Moltke to his staff).

Strategic-Operational

As the belligerents exchange blow for blow in an attempt to knock out the enemy, war has an inherent tendency to escalate and run out of control.

God tends to be on the side of the larger battalions (Napoleon, who for German readers does not need an introduction). But not always.

“The best way to run a conflict is by negotiation. If you are too dumb to negotiate, use dirty tricks. If you cannot use dirty tricks, resort to maneuver; if you cannot maneuver, fight a battle; if you cannot fight a battle, lay siege” (Sun Tzu).

An army marches on its stomach (Napoleon).

The greater the distance between front and rear, the harder and more expensive it is to keep the army supplied (Sun Tzu).

War is an imitative activity that makes the belligerents resemble each other. The longer the war, the more alike they become.

Everything else equal, the defense is superior to the offense. First, because it does not face constantly extending lines of communication; second, because anything that does not happen favors it. The longer the war lasts, the more likely it is that the attack will turn into a defense.

Morale and Organization

“War is a physical and mental contest by means of the former” (Clausewitz).

In war the moral is to the physical as three to one (Napoleon).

It is with colored ribbons that men are led (Napoleon).

On organization: One Mameluke was a match for three Frenchmen. A hundred Frenchmen were a match for three hundred Mamelukes (Napoleon).

“Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four men who are less brave but trust each other will attack resolutely“ (19-century French military writer Ardant du Picq),

One bad commander is better than two good ones.

Technology and War

Depending on the way they are used, most distinctions between “offensive” and “defensive” weapons are meaningless.

Starting with the club and ending with the Internet, technology has done many things to war. However, it has done almost nothing to reduce, let alone eliminate, the distinctions between land, sea and air (and space) warfare. Nor between theory and practice, offense and defense, concentration and dispersal, a knock-out blow and attrition. And so on.

“Weapons, if only the right ones can be found, make up 90 percent of victory” (British General and military author J. F. C Fuller). Not true. Weapons can make a huge contribution to victory. However, their effects can be offset by superior doctrine, superior organization, superior command, superior training, and, above all, superior morale.

The longer a war lasts, the less important technological superiority tends to be.

Information and data are useful, in fact absolutely essential. But they are not enough. What is needed is lead and explosives. As well as, from time to time, cold steel to terrify the enemy.

On Nukes

War, even large scale war, between belligerents one of which is armed with nukes, remains quite possible. Whether the same applies to a situation when both sides has them remains to be seen. My guess? Probably not.

In so far as there is no defense, nuclear war is not war. It is mass murder.

“No one will ever dare use the damn things” (Field Marshal Bernhard Montgomery of Alamein on nukes).

The nice thing about nukes: If they are not used, no reason to worry. If they are used, no need to worry either.

Guerrilla and Terrorism

“The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we harass” (Mao Zedong).

The “forces of order,” as long as they do not win, lose; the guerrillas, as long as they do not lose, win.

Gender and War

“But for war, the world would sink into a swamp of feminism” Georg W. F. Hegel).

In war, women act mainly in two roles. First, as assistants and cheerleaders. Second, as targets and victims. Everything else is secondary. It would hardly be wrong to say that, without women in these roles, there would have been no war.

Finally –

No principles or doctrines, however good in themselves, well understood, and well applied, can win a war on their own. However, by freeing warriors from the need to think out everything afresh each time, they can provide a lot of help on the way to doing so.

But Will II Last?

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In 1300 CE the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, as it was known, occupied an area of around 7,800 square miles. By 1462 CE that number had increased to 1,700,000. By 1584 CE it had swelled to 2,100,000 square miles. The peak, 8,800,000 square miles. was reached in 1913: celebrating, as Tsar Nicholas II did that year, the 300th anniversary of his Dynasty’s ascent to the throne, he could look back on six centuries during which its domains increased by 284 square miles each year on the average. Subsequent conquests brought some additional territory, especially at the expense of East European countries such as Finland, Poland and Romania, but nothing to compare with pas advances.

In the whole of history only two empires, the Mongol one and the British one, ever controlled more land. Much of this success was due to the fact that, especially in the north and the east (Siberia), the lands the Tsars and his men took over were either empty or nearly so. But not all; trying to expand, very often Russians met with determined resistance. By one list—surely a very partial one—the victims included Tatars (who had to be thrown off first), Kazakhs, Poles, Belarussians, Ukrainians, Cossacks, Moldavians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Finns, Galicians, Georgians,  Bessarabians, Armenians, Tajiks, Caucasians, Circassians, Chechens, Uzbeks, and Turkmens. And this is just a select list. Some of these nations were small, others large. Some were Slavs, others belonged to other races. Some were Christians (themselves divided into two major denominations), others not. Some were officially recognized in Moscow, others not.

Come 1989-1991. As the gigantic empire began to crumble Russia was left with 147,000,000 people, just a little over half of the 1990 Soviet figure. Over the three decades since then a combination of low fertility and a falling life expectancy has made things much worse for Russia. Back in 1990 roughly one in eighteen people on earth got his marching orders from the Kremlin. Thirty years later the number was down to just one in fifty-nine a two-thirds decline.

Nor is that all. As hostilities between Ukraine and Russia proceed and show some signs of a coming Russian defeat, any number of countries have waked up to the fact that, at some time in the past, they lost territory to Russia without signing any treaty to legitimize the transfer. Among them are the following:

Estonia. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Estonia hoped for the return of more than 2,000 square miles of territory annexed by Russia in 1945. By the Treaty of Tartu, which dates to 1920, the land in question was part of Estonia (even though the majority of inhabitants spoke Russian). However, when Russia’s first post-Soviet Government, led by Boris Yeltsin, came to power in 1991 he refused to abide by it and left things as they were.

Japan. In this case the dispute is over the Kurile Islands (Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Khabomai group). All of these belonged to the Japanese Empire from 1855 until the 1945 Soviet–Japanese War when the Soviet Union occupied them as well as the southern part of Sakhalin Island. Meeting at Yalta, the Western Allies recognized Soviet sovereignty. However, when Japan signed its treaty of capitulation to the Soviet Union the matter was not mentioned, thus enabling Tokyo to lay claim to what it called the “controversial northern territories”. Here it is worth adding that the islands’ population (those of them that have any) is entirely Russian. Why? Because, under Soviet occupation, all Japanese were expelled.

Finland. The 1939-40 Soviet-Finish War, as well as World War II which followed it, saw Finland allied with Germany. This led to its losing about ten percent of its territory to the Soviet Union, a situation which the latter’s subsequent disintegration did nothing to change. However, the matter has not been settled: while Russian leaders such as Yeltsin and Putin have repeatedly declared it “closed,” Finnish ones have been equally persistent in saying that it might be “revised” by “peaceful means.” Now that Finland has become a member of NATO the matter may again be laid on the table.

Germany and Poland. World War II left Koenigsberg, a German city going back to the Middle Ages, as a Soviet enclave within Lithuania and Poland, both of which would certainly lay a claim to it if the opportunity presented itself. In addition the Germans, who lost the city in 1945 and who in 1990 signed a treaty renouncing it, have been showing an increased interest in it.

There are several other unresolved territorial issues between Russia and its neighbors, though none sufficiently important to be worth discussing here. But people have long memories. The mere fact that a treaty has been signed and remains in force by no means always means all potential for conflict has been eliminated. Should Putin win his war, then there is little doubt that at least some of these issues will come alive. Should he lose it, then there is even less doubt that some of them will.

The real elephant in the room is not some god-forsaken tribes but China. Back in 1990 the Soviet Union and China signed an agreement that settled, or was supposed to settle, the border problems affecting them. It should, however, not be forgotten that, back in the nineteenth century, a series of treaties gave Russia approximately 600,000 square miles of territory at China’s expense, mostly in Manchuria. To be sure, the authorities in Beijing gave their agreement to these treaties; yet the name by which they are often known, “unequal,” speaks for itself.

To be sure, too, the lands in question are among the least populated on earth. Yet that is precisely the problem: the empty territories to the north are attracting Chinese immigrants the way a lamp attracts insects. Some sources have even mentioned their number, 1,000,000 per year: given that China has almost ten times as many people as Russia does, this is not surprising.

At the moment relations between Moscow and Beijing, focused as they are on Washington’s attempt to prevent the former from taking over Kiev, are as good as they have ever been. But will it last?

Victory for Ukraine?

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A year and a half after it got under way, the war in Ukraine shows no sign of coming to an end. Not coming to an end, it is interesting to explore what might happen in case Zelensky’s famous counteroffensive finally starts doing more than reoccupying half a godforsaken village here, half a godforsaken village there, but gains some real strategic traction instead. As, for example, by developing the following scenario.

In the flat, mostly open terrain that is Ukraine airpower ought to be the key to everything. Worried about Ukraine’s ground-based air defenses, Putin’s air force continues to make its existence felt mainly by its absence from the battlefield; a development which, ere hostilities broke out, few people predicted or would have predicted.

Next, so the scenario, Ukrainian forces put the Kerch Strait rail and road bridges out of action. Not just for hours or days as they have done at least twice in the past, but in such a way as to require extensive repairs lasting weeks or months. Armed, trained and supplied by the West, Zelensky’s troops break through key Russian fortifications somewhere along the front. They retake some occupied territory and cut their enemies’ land bridge that reaches from the Donbas along the Azov Sea coast all the way down to the greatest prize of all: the Crimea with its great port, Sebatopol.

With their logistics in a mess, and perhaps left without clear instructions from Moscow, major parts of Russia’s fighting force disintegrate. Others either retreat or surrender. Relying on combinations of modern technologies, including not just land-to sea missiles but perhaps unmanned surface vehicles too, Ukraine could blockade and barrage Crimea, trapping Russia’s Black Sea Fleet like bugs in a bottle. If Ukrainian forces appear to be preparing for a frontal assault on Crimea, risks of Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons might rise—with consequences that would require more than one separate article to think out.

Short of Putin resorting to the use of nuclear weapons a comparison of the forces on both sides, along with the outcome of recent combats, suggests that Ukrainian forces could prevail. Conversely, any major Russian attempt to take back even modest amounts of previously occupied territories would likely fail. Were Russia’s air force and antiaircraft defenses to suffer substantial losses, this could weaken the defense of Moscow or other Russian strategic assets.

Ukrainian forces appear not to be using Western arms to attack targets in Russia. However, with their home-manufactured weapons they are increasing indirect and direct fire strikes against headquarters and logistical facilities, transportation hubs, and troop formations deep inside Russia. Even early in the war, a Ukrainian Neptune missile was able to sink the Moskva, Russia’s Black Sea flagship. By now even Moscow, almost a thousand kilometers in the rear, has been repeatedly hit by Ukrainian drones. Not that they caused any great damage; as is also the case with their Russian counterparts, the warheads they carry are too small to kill more than a few people (mostly civilians) here, bring about the collapse of a building there. However, their psychological impact is said to have been considerable.

Such, seen from the point of view of Kiev and its Western backers, is the optimistic scenario. Note, though, the elephant in the room: namely, the fact that it leaves the Donbas, its natural resources and its industry, in Russian hands. Heavily fortified–fortification is an art in which, as Germans of all people should know, the Russians are past masters—and containing quite some mixed-population cities, it is a tough nut to crack. Disorderly, to be sure, but packed not only with regular Russian forces but with every kind of militia under the sun. Just look at the weeks-long struggle for Bachmut. And behind those cities Russia’s endless spaces, soon to be enveloped in the arms of General Winter, will be waiting.

Such developments will no doubt reduce Putin to dire straits. They will not, however necessarily bring about the end of the war. That could be achieved only in case he and his clique finally give in and ask for negotiations—something which, as long as he remains in control, is unlikely to happen.

So everything depends on Putin being removed by his own people, likely either the military, the various security services, or some combination of both. Speculation about such a coup has been rife right from the first days of the “special military operation.” With the exception of the rather strange and ill-understood Wagner “Uprising,” though, there are few signs to show either that Putin’s will is weakening or that he is losing control.

My conclusion? Even if Ukrainian forces book additional military successes like those outlined above, the real decisions will be political and have to be made in Moscow and specifically behind the walls of the Kremlin. Until they are, the war will go on.