Monthly Archives: March 2024

Guest Article: Why Hamas Will Lose

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By

Colonel (res.) Dr. Moshe Ben David*

Professor Yuval Harari, who teaches modern history at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, has turned himself into one of the leading intellectuals of the Western world. His books, particularly Homo Deus, deal with important turning points in human history as well as our ability to survive into the future. In no small part thanks in part to President Obama’s endorsement, they reached the stop of the best-sellers list. As requests for articles and interviews came pouring in, they also made the author famous. True, many of his best known prophecies have neither materialized nor look as if they are going to be materialized. Instead of making progress towards a better, more peaceful and better off, world what we see is Covid-17, starvation in the Sudan, and war both in Europe and the Middle East; not to mention terrorism over much of the world. None of this has caused Harari to lose confidence in himself and his ability to look into the future. In particular, in an article just published on Israel’s most important news website as well as a CNN-interview with Christiane Amanpour, he discussed the future of Israel’s war against Hamas. Israel, so Harari, has no chance of winning the war. Why? Because, to do so, the government in Jerusalem would have to lay down clear objectives, something which, so far, it has been unable to do. Israel, he went on to say, needs a new government. One that would drop its “preposterous Biblical fantasies” concerning a complete victory and prepare for some kind of compromise. He ends by saying that Israel and Hamas have reached an impasse. Even in case the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) succeed in defeating Hamas and disarming it, the real outcome will be a defeat for Israel. The only way to prevent such a situation is compromise, negotiation and peace.

I’d like to use, as my opening shot, the work of the widely respected American political scientist Bernard Brodie (1910-78). To be viable, so Brodie, a military-political plan must take into account objectives and means; including, among the latter, the balance of armed force and society’s willingness to sacrifice some of its young men in the process of attaining them. Seen in this light, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statement, on the first day of the war, that Israel’s objective is “the complete destruction of Hamas”—the organization which, on 7 October 2023, subjected Israel to a surprise attack and inflicted some 1,000 casualties in a single day—appears both reasonable and attainable. Reasonable, because it reminds one of the Allies’ highly successful “unconditional surrender” during World War II, a formula that proved highly successful. Attainable, because of the military balance in Gaza. Clearly, in case Israel fails to achieve Netanyahu’s stated objective it will have to change its policy. That is what the cabinet is for.

Here it is worth adding that there exists a fundamental difference between the attacker and the attacked. The former, in this case Hamas, can adopt any objectives he wants. The latter, in this case Israel, faces a simple choice: either fight or surrender. Supposing he decides to fight, his only objective can be to defeat the enemy. Everything else comes later and must necessarily depend on events on the battlefield—meaning that the relationship between objectives and means must remain flexible and cannot be nearly as rigid as Harari imagines. Indeed the whole idea of laying down the political objectives ahead of events on the battlefield, which is what he seems to say, is, to use a term I have used before in this article, preposterous.

Second, his claim that, to win the war or at any rate not to lose it, Israel must have a new government. One that will rid itself of all kind of all kinds of illusions concerning total victory and prepared for some kind of compromise. In this context it seems that Harari is unaware of the fact that, right from the beginning of the war, the IDF has been following the government’s guidance step by step. Not a single encounter with the IDF that did not end with Hamas being defeated, either by having its troops killed, wounded or captured or when those troops evacuated their positions, leaving its enemy in control or the battlefield. One does not change a winning horse in the midst of a race; doing so can only strengthen Hamas in its decision to fight on. Besides, what does Harari think a change of government could achieve? Suppose the Israel decides to change its objective as laid down by Netanyahu and aim at replacing Hamas’s rule in Gaza by one run by the (Palestinian Authority) in Ramallah; does anyone really believe that Hamas will tamely sit down and agree? Halil Shkaki, the Palestinian’s Authority’s number one expert on polls and polling, says that 73 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank support Hamas and are in favor of the atrocities it has committed. Furthermore, the Authority spends 1.3 billion shekel, or 7 percent of its annual budget, assisting the relatives of Palestinian casualties who died while fighting Israel. This on top of symbolic gestures such as naming streets and squares after them, praising them in the schoolbooks it makes children study, and the like. Ending the war with a compromise, such as Harari suggests, will only enable Hamas to take over the West Bank in addition to Gaza, putting Israel’s heartland within easy reach of some of the heavy weapons it already has.

Harari’s third claim, namely that Israel and Hamas have reached an impasses that can only end in an Israeli defeat, is also wrong. Soon after the successful massacre they committed on 7 October Hamas’ leaders announced they were expecting to follow up with additional measures of the same kind. Unfortunately for them but fortunately for Israel, so far it does not appear as if they are able to realize that threat. Here is another, and much more likely scenario: following its successes so far, and after a due period of rest and reconstruction, the IDF will enter the city of Raffia in the southern part of the Strip and do away with the residuals of Hamas’ organized units on land, in the air, at sea, and underground. The oft-heard comparisons with the IDF in Lebanon as well as the American adventures in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq are, in reality, irrelevant. Why? Because the Gaza Strip only comprises 1.42 square miles, equal to 0.00083 percent of Iraqi territory, 0.00055 percent of Afghan territory, 0.0011 percent of Vietnamese territory, and 0.034 percent of Lebanese territory. Once Raffia is dealt with, all Israel will need to defeat what remains of Hamas and completely dominate the country is three brigades.

Dominating the Strip on all sides will also isolate it from the external world and make it much harder to smuggle in the kind of arms, money, and logistic support terrorists and guerrillas require. In this context it is important to keep in mind the fact that Gaza’s population is not homogeneous. About one third, consisting of natives (as opposed to those who left Israel at one point or another), supports the PA and would like few things better than settling accounts with Hamas which has been maltreating them ever since the Israelis withdrew almost two decades ago.

To sum up, it stands to reason that, even after it completes its occupation of the Strip, the IDF will have to carry out sporadic anti-terrorist operations. In doing so it will be able to draw on half a century’s experience not only in the Strip but in the West Bank as well. Ending terrorism will not be easy and will take time. However, given the various types of specialist forces the IDF deploys as well the various innovative techniques it has devised, many of which are the envy of foreign farmed forces and are widely imitated, there is no reason why the struggle will not lead to a successful end. Finally a word about the “preposterous Biblical fantasies” that, says Harari, are dreamt up by all kinds of Israeli extremists, including not a few in the government itself.  Nietzsche in his Untimely Meditations says that those who condemn the past endanger both themselves and others. This is because we are all products of the past, complete with all its problems, passions, errors and even crimes. That again is why, for both individual and nations, to deny their past is tantamount to shooting oneself. This is true of Harari himself; but it is even more true of countless others the world over who think as he does.

Col. (res) Dr. Moshe Ben David, is a retired IDF infantry officer with much experience in counterinsurgency. He is also a former vice president of Amadox Inc.

A Madcap World

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Stanley, The Promethean, Kindle, 2017.

A madcap world filled with madcap characters. A godforsaken English village called Tussock’s Bottom where the favorite drink is a kind of beer affectionately known as Old Stinker. A Christminster (i.e Oxford) Don named Habbakuk McWrath who is an expert on Extreme Celtic Studies and likes nothing better than a good old fashioned brawl of the kind his wild ancestors used to engage in. A British prime minister named Terry Carter, leader of the Conservative Democrats (ConDems, for short). Modelled on a real former prime minister whose name I shall not spell out, he is “a consummate liar and cheap publicity seeker, cravenly addicted to the latest media opinion polls and the number of his ‘likes’ on Facebook and Twitter, perpetually grinning, and with no sincere beliefs about anything except his own importance.” A highly polished French intellectual named Marcel Choux (cabbage) who has declared war on truth—yes, truth—as an instrument of racism, repression, discrimination and a whole series of similar bad things. And who, instead of being sent to the loony bin, is worshipped by the students and faculty of the London School of Politics (aka of Economics and Political Science) who have invited him to receive a prize and give a lecture.

Into this world steps Harry Hockenheimer, a young American billionaire who made his fortune by helping women satisfy their vanity when looking into a mirror. Now 39 years old, happily married to Lulu-Belle who does not make too many demands on him, he has reached the point where he is simply bored with life. Casting around for something significant to do, he hits on the idea of building a robot sufficiently human-like in terms of appearance, behavior and mental abilities to act as a factotum to anyone with the money to buy or rent it. To keep things secret, the decision is made to design and produce the prototype robot not in Hockenheimer’s native California but in Tussock’s Bottom. There he has his assistant set up a high-tech household where everything, from shopping through cleaning to regulating the temperature, is done by computers. At one point Hockenheimer returns to his home away from home only to find that mice, by gnawing on the cables and defecating on them, have turned it in a complete, dirty and smelly, mess. That, however, is a minor glitch soon corrected by a very willing elderly lady armed with a whirlwind of dusters, mops, polishers, sprays, buckets, and  similar kinds of mundane, but highly effective, equipment

Approaching completion the robot is christened Frank Meadows, as inoffensive a name as they come. He also goes through a number of tests that highlight his phenomenal memory as well as his ability to remember, articulate and do anything a human can, only much better and much faster. Meadows starts his career by visiting the local pub where he plays darts with his fellow visitors and wins the game hands down. Next he deals with an obnoxious policeman who, having attacked him, ends up in a muddy ditch and is subsequently fired from the force. He takes part in a TV show called A Laugh a Minute whose host, Jason Blunt, “a flabby stupid, greedy, and arrogant exhibitionist with a chip on both shoulders” ends up by physically attacking Frank and, for his pains, is dumped back into his seat like a sack of potatoes. He spends many hours listening to Hockenheimer who does his best to explain to him the way the world works. He… but I will not spoil the story by telling you how it ends. Nor will I let you have the author’s real name and identity; that is something you will have to find out for yourself.

Amidst all this political correctness, inclusionism, identitarianism, and any number of similar modern ideas are mercilessly exposed not just for the nonsense they are but for the way their exponents bully anyone who does not join them. All to the accompaniment of jokes, puns, wordplay and double entendres such as only Brits seem able to come up with. To be sure, Stanley is no Jane Austin and does not even pretend to trace the development of character the way great novelists do. However, almost any page of this book you may pick up will either make you helpless with laughter or, at the very least, bring an ironic smile to your face. Get it and spend a couple of hours—it is not very long—reading it from cover to cover. I promise you you will not be disappointed.

On Escalation

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To most people, whether or not a ruler or country “uses” nuclear weapons is a simple choice between either dropping them on the enemy or not doing so. For “experts,” though, things are much more complicated (after all making them so, or making them appear to be so, is the way they earn their daily bread). So today, given Putin’s recent threat to resort to nuclear weapons in case NATO sends its troop into Ukraine, I am going to assume the mantle of an expert and explain some of the things “using” such weapons might mean.

  1. Making verbal threats. Almost eight decades have passed since the first nuclear weapon was dropped on Hiroshima (without any kind of warning, nota bene). Since then there have been plenty of occasions when countries, statesmen and politicians threatened to use the nukes in their arsenal. Eisenhower did so in 1953 in connection with the Korean War; Khrushchev in 1956 in connection with the Suez Crisis; Kennedy in 1962 in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis, Nixon in 1973 in connection with the Arab-Israeli War of that year; India and Pakistan in 1998 in connection with the Kargil War; and so on right down to Putin today. Some of the threats have been overt and rather brutal, others more or less secret and veiled. Some were delivered directly, others with the help of a third party.
  2. To put some muscle behind the threat, weapons may be moved out of storage and put on display. Normally everything pertaining to nukes is kept highly secret. Here and there, though, countries have allowed their nuclear warheads, or replicas of them, to be shown, photographed, and celebrated for what they might do to opponents. In particular Russia, China and North Korea like to parade their intercontinental ballistic missiles. True monsters they are, any one of which can demolish almost any city on earth within, say, less than an hour of the order being given. Some such displays are accompanied by verbal threats, others not. At times the sequence is reversed in the sense that display precedes threats rather than the other way around.
  3. Raising the state of alert. Again contrary to what most people think, putting nuclear weapons to use, in other words commanding and controlling them, is by no means simply a matter of pushing the proverbial button. First, those in charge of the weapons must make sure they are always ready to be launched at a moment’s notice. Second, they must make sure the weapons are not launched by accident, or by unauthorized personnel, or by an authorized officer somewhere in the launching chain either deliberately disobeying orders or going out of his or her mind. The two requirements, speed (lest the weapons are targeted and destroyed before they can be launched) and reliability contradict each other; making the problem of nuclear command and control as difficult as any we humans have to face. Raising the state of alarm will cut through some parts of the problem—though just how, and to what extent, is rightly kept one of the most guarded secrets of all.
  4. Going a step further, weapons and delivery vehicles may be tested. Pace any number of computer models and exercises, ultimately the only way to make sure one’s nuclear weapons will work is to test them. Such tests, of course, may also be used in an attempt to influence the enemy’s behavior—as was notoriously the case when India and Pakistan both tested a number of weapons back in 1998. Some tests may be conducted in or over some outlying part of one’s own country as American, Soviet, British, French, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani and North Korea ones all were. Others may take place over some part of the vast no-man’s world that constitutes the earth’s oceans; for example, the Israeli-South African bomb said to have been detonated over the Indian Ocean back in 1979. It is also possible to send some of one’s missiles hurtling over enemy country, as North Korea has often done in respect to Japan.Each of the above mentioned methods represents a different way of (hopefully) “using” one’s nuclear weapons in order to influence the enemy’s behavior without bringing about Armageddon. Historically all have been implemented quite often, some even as a matter of routine. The problem is that, since no country or leader has ever admitted giving way to a nuclear threat, it is hard to say how effective such threats were. There are, however, additional ways states might put their nuclear weapons to use.
  5. Launching a limited nuclear strike at some less important enemy target such as outlying, more or less unpopulated, spaces or else a ship at sea. All in the hope of scaring the opponents to the point where he’ll give way to one’s demands, but without, if at all possible, risking a nuclear response.
  6. Launching a limited nuclear strike at the enemy’s nuclear or, in case he does not have them, conventional forces. Targets might consist of early warning installations, anti-aircraft and missile defenses, troop-concentrations, communication centers, depots, etc.
  7. Launching a limited nuclear strike at the enemy’s industrial infrastructure.
  8. Launching a nuclear strike at all of the targets mentioned in bullets 5 to 7.
  9. Launching a full scale nuclear strike at the enemy’s main demographic centers.

One well known nuclear strategist, Herman Kahn, in his 1962 book distinguished among no fewer than forty different stages on the “escalation ladder.” In practice, there are two reasons why the ladder is largely theoretical. First, the various stages are likely to be hard to keep apart. Second, even if the side using the weapons does keep them apart in his own mind, the other is highly unlikely to share his views. In particular, a strike that one side sees as relatively harmless may very well be perceived by the other as a mere prelude. Thus bringing about the very retaliation he seeks to avoid.

As far as publicly available sources allow us to judge, up to the present Putin has limited himself to the first of these nine stages. That is less–considerably less–than some others have done before him. So the question is, will he stop there?

Concerning Gaza

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The following is an interview I did for a leading Austrian magazine. Although, in the end, the text did not see the light of print, I considered it interesting enough to post it here.

How did Hamas come to be the leading political force in Gaza?

Hamas is an Islamic Movement with deep roots in Arab history, especially Egypt with its Moslem Brotherhood. It started its rise to prominence in the late 1970s and early 1980s when Ariel Sharon, serving under Prime Minister Menachem Begin, was Israel’s minister of defense. As he and his advisers saw it, the best way to oppose the growing power of Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Movement and counter the First Palestinian Intifada (Arabic for “shaking off”), was by encouraging another, more religiously-inclined, and hopefully more moderate, movement in the southern, poor and backward, half of the West Bank. The focus was to be prayer, education and charity, not anti-Israeli terrorism.

Looking back, the policy never stood a chance. Instead of becoming less radical than the PLO Hamas, by refusing in principle any peace with Israel, became more so. Israeli efforts to suppress the movement, including the “targeted killing” of its first leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and his successor, Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi proved unavailing. To the contrary: rather than watch its power declining, Hamas spread to the Gaza Strip. In 2007, a year after Israel withdrew from the Strip, it mounted a coup, killing some of the PLO’s officials in the Strip and driving out the rest.

Which historical errors need to be mentioned here?

I am not sure one can talk about historical errors here. The attempt to distinguish “good” Arabs (with who one could talk and, perhaps, reach some kind of compromise) and “bad ones” (who only understood the language of violence and war) has deep roots in Zionist/Israeli history. It is as if leaders on both sides, Israel and the Hamas, have been playing to a pre-prepared script. One similar to the tyche (fate) that carried the heroes of Greek tragedies to their doom.

You write that in the early 1980s, Ariel Sharon and his advisers believed that Hamas, with its strong emphasis on Islam, would be the ideal vehicle to redirect Palestinian energies from the fight against Israel to the practice of Islam. From today’s perspective, that sounds extremely absurd. According to this reading, are the “Hamasniks” less religious than previous, generations?

And asked provocatively: Does such a thesis also apply to the other side? How religious is Benjamin Netanyahu? His conduct of the war is now being criticized by his closest allies.

Whether or not the present generation of Hamas activists are more or less religiously-minded than their predecessors is hard to say. It seems, however, that, perhaps to a greater extent than their predecessors, they have succeeded in drawing on both Islamic religion and Palestinian nationalism. The combination is explosive. Along with dozens of similar organizations active in dozens of other countries, starting with Daesh (ISIS) in Iraq and ending in the United Kingdom where 75 percent of the security services’ workload is due to Islamic terrorism, it will continue to make its impact felt for a long time to come.

As to Netanyahu, he comes from a secularly-minded family—his father was a history professor. He, Netanyahu, has never practiced Judaism the way orthodox Jews do. Depending on the audience he is addressing, now he stresses that fact, now he tries to draw a thin veil over it. Truly a man for all seasons. One thing, though, appears certain: following in the footsteps of his principal mentor, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (served 1983–1984, 1986–1992) he is a hard liner. Even more so in private, I am told, than in public.

How do you rate Benjamin Netanyahu as a person? Is war a means for him to stay in power? Do you see a politician comparable to Netanyahu in history? What future does this man have in Israeli politics and in Israeli historiography?

As I just said, Netanyahu is a man for all seasons. He will tell anyone whatever he thinks will serve, first himself—he is in deep legal trouble–and then the cause. As has been the case with all his predecessors and will presumably be the case with his successors as well, that cause is to secure the continued existence of Israel. Nor do I blame him for saying e.g that an Iran-supported Palestinian State in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is incompatible with that existence.

The situation in Gaza is devastating. Israel has to justify itself. In my opinion, the role of the neighboring state of Egypt is neglected. Why doesn’t the international community put more pressure on Egypt to at least grant asylum to Palestinian women and children? Studies show that Gaza is the most dangerous place in the world to be a child. Why do so many supposed “brother states” turn a blind eye to this fact?

It was an Egyptian cleric, Hassan al-Banna, who founded the Islamic Brotherhood back in 1928. Egypt being under British occupation at that time, his message, consisted of two main parts. First, the need to reject anything Western and modern, from secularism to women’s rights; and second, the drive to replace them by a Koran-based Islamic State. With one exception—Mohammed Morsi, himself an Islamist, who only lasted for one year before the military overthrew him–since then every Egyptian ruler, hereditary or not, military or not, socialist or not, has experienced trouble with the organization. The number of Brotherhood activists who, over the years, have been imprisoned, tortured and/or executed must run into the tens of thousands, probably more.

The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is now a little over forty years old. But this has not prevented the Egyptian government from turning a blind eye to the fact that many, if not most, of the weapons Hamas is currently using in Gaza were smuggled in from Egyptian-owned Sinai. Indeed the spectacle of Israel’s problems in Gaza, as long as they remain limited, may not unwelcome among certain circles in Cairo. But this coin also has a flip side. Opening the border between Egypt and Gaza, if only in order to enable refugees to reach other Arab countries (which may or may not let them in) could help destabilize Egypt. And that is the last thing President Abdel a-Sisi wants or needs.

Do you have any ideas about what will happen to the Gaza Strip in the long term? Who lives there in 2044? Will there ever be peace? If yes how?

As the famous Italian nuclear scientist Enrico Fermi is supposed to have said, making predictions is difficult, especially of the future. Still, let me try.

Ever since 1967, the year when the Six Day War was fought and Israel found itself in control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, I personally have been on the Israeli left. Back in 2005 I even published a book, Defending Israel, to explain my position. I am afraid that, since then, that position has changed. With Iran actively involved in fighting Israel on four fronts—Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and the Red Sea—Israel has absolutely no choice but to retain some form of control over the first two of those. After all, from Tel Aviv to Gaza it is only about 55 kilometers; from Tel Aviv to the West Bank, about 30.

25 years ago you wrote in the NZZ that Israel needed someone in the Gaza Strip to whom it “could hand over the key”. “Experience shows that breaking up an organization leads nowhere.” From the Israeli point of view, you would then be dealing with an even worse organization. Do you still see it the same way in 2024? 

The greatest danger today is not another, even more radical, Palestinian Organization in Gaza but no organization at all. The outcome can only be anarchy and more bloodshed. A good foretaste of what will happen was provided on Thursday 29 February when Gazans, desperate for food, fought each other while at same time being fired at by Israeli troops who, caught in the middle, feared for their lives.

You went on to say about the 2006 Lebanon War: “So Israel’s disproportionate war may not be so bad. It can lead to calm and peace.” That sounds worryingly current… Would you say the same thing about the status quo in Gaza?

The best thing that could happen to Gaza would be for it to come to some kind of arrangement with Israel so that life can begin to return to normal, more or less. But things do not seem to be moving in that direction, do they?

You recently wrote in “Die WELT” that the winner of the current Gaza war has already been determined: Hamas. What do you mean?

It was Henry Kissinger who once said that the regulars, as long as they do not win, lose; whereas the guerrillas, as long as they do not lose, win. You can spell out the details for yourself.

Finally, are you for or against a ceasefire?

Who could be against a ceasefire? But not at any price.