As the wars between Israel and Hamas, Israel and Hezbollah, Israeland Syria, Israel and Iran, and Israel and the Houthi of Yemen keep going, the belligerents apart no country has assumed a more important role in the conflict than Egypt did and does. In this post I will try to shed light on some of the more important issues at stake as well as take a guess at what the future may bring.

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At the time Israel proclaimed its independence on 15 May 1948 Egypt was still under British occupation, as indeed it had been from 1882 on. However, this fact did not prevent the government of Egyptian King Farouq from sending their army into Palestine with the objective, first, to appease his own public opinion—which was very anti-Israeli—and second, offset any gains the remaining Arab states might make by invading Palestine and annexing part of it. As it turned out, the calculus did not work. By early 1949 the Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi excursions into Palestine had all been halted, though not quite turned back (the Jordanians in particular remained in possession of East Jerusalem and the West Bank). Meanwhile, further to the south the Egyptian expeditionary force had come close to being annihilated; in the event, they were only saved by the threat of British intervention.

The official end of Israel’s war of independence in July 1949 did not lead to peace either with Egypt or with any other Arab country. Instead, both on Israel’s border with Egypt—now moved northward so as to leave the government in Cairo in control of the Gaza Strip—there took place any number of incidents. Most were very small; a theft here, a murder there. A few, however led full scale between Israel and its neighbors, threatening not only the Middle East but, thanks to Superpower meddling, world peace. This period lasted until late 1973 when the last Israeli-Egyptian war came to an end. Resulting in stalemate it opened the long road towards peace, albeit that this was by no means always apparent at the time.

The next stage got under way in 1977 when President Anwar Sadat of Egypt visited Israel’s capital, Jerusalem. Thanks in large part to US mediation, by 1981 a peaceful relationship between the two countries, along with a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, the peninsula’s demilitarization, and the establishment of diplomatic, economic and some tourist ties was in place and working fairly well. To be sure, things did not always proceed as smoothly as the Israelis in particular would have liked. In particular, Israel’s attempts to tackle terrorism from Lebanon by invading that country (1982 and 2007) as well as its persistent failure to move toward an end to its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza often led to grumbling in Cairo. Deliberately or not, the latter also failed to properly seal the tunnels linking the Sinai and Gaza, thus enabling Hamas to receive large supplies of money, arms and supplies. So much so, in fact, that when Israeli troops in early 2024 invaded the underground tunnels they described them as a “superhighway.” Still on the whole the peace agreement held, greatly benefitting both countries.

The outbreak of the next major round of Israeli-Palestinian hostilities on 7 October 2023 appears to have taken Egypt by surprise, causing it to try and follow a number of different courses simultaneously. Formally the peace between the two countries, including diplomatic relations, trade, and limited military cooperation against the independence-seeking Bedouins of the Sinai, remained in place. Faced with problems in the west (anarchy in Libya), the south (anarchy in the Sudan, Ethiopia’s attempt to divert the Nile), the southeast (the Red Sea where the Houthis’ have been mounting attacks on maritime traffic, causing a decline in Egypt’s income from the Suez Canal), and the east (where Iran has been doing whatever it can to stir up trouble) Cairo knew better than to add another country to its list of enemies. Yet it did not mind the Israelis learning some bitter lessons concerning the limits of their military power and the need to enter into some kind of relationship with Hamas; if teaching those lessons meant at least partially closing an eye to the vast inflow of money, supplies and arms from the Sinai to Gaza, so be it.

Above all, official Cairo has its own public opinion to consider. Especially but by no means exclusively that prevailing among the better educated and professional classes in the cities. Starting at least as early as 1982, it has been these classes which were most vehemently critical of Israel. If not to the point of actually abrogating the peace treaty and preparing for war, certainly by limiting contacts with it and putting them on hold.

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Prediction is difficult, especially of the future. Faced with the ongoing war, essentially there appear to be three courses of action Egypt might take. They are as follows:

1. Stick to its present course of working with the US and Qatar to lean on both Hamas and Israel to end the shooting war in one way or another. This would probably be the preferred policy, except that it does not appear to stand much of a chance of achieving its objective anytime soon. One thing, though, appears certain: the longer the war, the harder it will be for Egypt to keep doing what it has been doing or trying to do up to the present.
2. Take a much stronger pro-Israeli line in all that regards to a. the Israeli prisoners in Hamas’ hands; b. an eventual cease fire; and c. the weakening of Hamas control over Gaza. Given how unpopular Israel is in Egypt right now, and also how obdurate both Israel and Hamas have been and still are, such a change seems rather unlikely.
3. In everything pertaining to the war, turn against Israel (and the US). In case the present regime continues in force, any such change will probably proceed slowly and gradually. However, in a dictatorship such as Egypt a sudden upheaval, most likely in the form of a military coup, can never be ruled out. Right now, sitting in my study I can see the balcony on which, years ago, I received two Canadian intelligence officers who had previously gained long experience serving in Egypt. To my question whether a coup aimed at unseating then President Hosni Mubarak was possible, both of them hastened to reassure me it was not.

As has been said, no one believes there is a plot to kill the emperor until he is killed.