Tag Archives: Putin

Will Russia Win?

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Like almost all other Westerners, at the time the Russian-Ukrainian War broke out in February 2022 I was convinced that the Russians would fail to reach their objectives and lose the war. Putting the details aside, this prediction was based on the following main three pillars.

First, the numerous failures, after 1945, of modern, state-run armed forces to cope with uprisings, insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, asymmetrical warfare, and any number of similar forms of armed conflict. Think of Malaysia—yes, Malaysia, so often falsely claimed by the British as a victory. Think of Algeria, think of Vietnam, think of Iraq, think of dozens of similar conflicts throughout Asia and Africa. Almost without exception, it was the occupiers who lost and the occupied who won.

Second, the size of Ukraine’s territory and population made me and others think that Russia had tried to bite off more than it could swallow. The outcome would be a prolonged, very bloody and very destructive, conflict that would be decided not so much on the battlefield but by demoralization both among Russia’s troops and among its civilian population. As, indeed, happened in 1981-1988 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, only to get involved in a lengthy counter-insurgency campaign that ended not just in military defeat on the ground but in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This line of reasoning was supported by the extreme difficulty the Russians faced before they finally succeeded in bringing Chechnya, a much smaller country, to heel.

Third, plain wishful thinking—something I shared with most Western observers. Including heads of state, ministers, armed forces, intelligence services, and the media.

Since then four very eventful months have passed. As they went on, the following factors have forced me to take another look at the situation.

First, the Ukrainians are not fighting a guerrilla war. Instead, as the list of weapons they have asked the West to provide them with shows, they have been trying to wage a conventional one: tank against tank, artillery barrel against artillery barrel, and aircraft against aircraft. All, apparently, in the hope of not only halting the Russian forces but of expelling them. Given that the Russians can fire ten rounds for every Ukrainian one, such a strategy can only be a sure recipe for defeat.

Second, a change in Russian tactics. Greatly underestimating their enemies, the Russians started the war by attempting a coup de main against the center of Ukrainian power at Kiev. When this failed it took them some time to decide what to do next; they may even have replaced a few of their top ranking generals. But then they regrouped and switched to the systematic reduction of Ukrainians cities and towns. Much as, in 1939-40, Stalin and his generals did to Finland. As in both that war and World War II as a whole they resorted to what has traditionally been their most powerful weapons, i.e massed artillery. It now appears that the change enabled them to reduce their losses to levels that they can sustain for a long time. Perhaps longer than the Ukrainians who, by Zelensky’s own admission, are losing as many as 100-200 of their best fighters killed in action each day.

Third, Western military technology, especially anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank weapons, and drones may be excellent. However, limited numbers, the result of years and years of parsimony and the belief that war in Europe had become impossible, plus the need to retrain the relevant Ukrainian personnel, means that it has been slow to arrive in the places where it is most needed. Not to mention the fact that, whereas the Russians are fighting close to home, NATOs lines of communication stretch over hundreds of miles all the way from Ukraine’s borders with Poland, Slovakia and Romania in the west to the Donbas in the east. Almost all the terrain in between is flat, devoid of shelter, and thinly populated.  Meaning that it is ideal for the employment of airpower, precisely the field in which Russian superiority over Ukraine is most pronounced.

Fourth, strict censorship is making the impact of Western economic sanctions on Russia’s population hard to asses. If there is any grumbling, it is being energetically suppressed. Meanwhile, a look at the macroeconomics seems to show that Russia is coping much better than many Westerners expected. Gold reserves have been inching up, enabling Putin to link his currency to gold—the first country to do so since Switzerland went in the opposite direction back in 1999. The Ruble, which early in the war came close to collapse, is back to a seven-year high against the dollar, trend upward. Given the fall in imports as well as the tremendous rise in energy prices, more money is flowing into Russia’s coffers than ever before. Most of that money comes from selling energy, foodstuffs and raw materials to countries such as China and India. China in turn is now the world’s number one industrial power; once its current troubles with COVID-19 are over, it should be well able to provide Russia with almost any kind of industrial product it needs, and do so for a long time to come.

Fifth, the economic impact of the war on the West has been much greater than anyone thought. Saving Ukraine form Russian’s clutches is not like doing the same with Afghanistan. On both sides of the Atlantic inflation is higher than it has been at any time since 1980. Especially in regard to energy, which Russia is refusing to provide Europe with, it is giving rise not just to confusion but to some real hardship. Should it continue, as it almost certainly will, it will give rise to growing popular discontent with the war and demands that their countries’ involvement in it be reduced or brought to an end.  Even if that end means abandoning Ukraine and allowing Putin to have his way with it.

Last not least, beginning with the Enlightenment the West has long preened itself on being a fortress where liberty, law and justice prevail. Now the repeated, highly publicized, requisitioning of the property of so-called oligarchs is beginning to make some people wonder. First, no one knows what an “oligarch” is. Second, the fact that some “oligarchs” have been in more or less close touch with Putin over the years does not automatically turn them into criminals. Third, supposing they are criminals, it is not at all clear why they were left alone for so long and only began to be targeted after the war broke out. Could it be that, in combating the oligarchs, the West is undermining the justice of its cause?

To be sure, we are not there yet. But as growing number of statements that the war is going to be a long one show, it is now primarily a question of who can draw the deepest breath and hold out the longest. And when it comes to that, Russia’s prospects of coming out on top and obtaining a favorable settlement are not at all bad.

Truth to Say, Qui lo Sa?

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Now that the initial momentum has been spent and replaced by attrition (on both sides), it is possible to speculate about the outcome of the war everyone has been talking about for the last few months.

So here we go.

Outcome No 1. The Ukrainians, supported by the West, succeed in pushing the Russians out and accomplishing their stated objective, which is to reassert their territorial integrity. Whereupon peace talks get under way and everyone goes home happily enough; this is the way eighteenth century “cabinet wars” used to end. Unfortunately, given the Russians’ shorter lines of communication as well as their superior firepower, this outcome is the most unlikely of all.

Outcome No 2. A variant of this outcome is the possibility that internal developments in Russia will lead to a change of policy. Some of Putin’s collaborators, disappointed with the lack of progress and worried about the long-range prospects of their country (and themselves, of course) mount a coup. Or else the combination of reluctant troops with popular discontent forces them to change course. Speculation about this scenario, particularly the one that sees Putin being forced out of office by illness, has ben rife for months.

Outcome No. 3. As both sides keep sending in reinforcements, stalemate ensues. This, in fact, is the situation at present  As time goes on, the populations of more than one NATO country begin to realize the full cost, economic and social and political, of supporting Ukraine. Dissenting voices begin to be heard and cannot be silenced. Making their way from the bottom upward, they cause part of the leadership to wonder how long this can go on. As discontent spreads Kiev’s own allies start putting it under pressure. By way or doing so they may even start reducing or delaying aid. Think of the American retreats from Vietnam (where they abandoned  their South Vietnamese allies), Iraq (where, back in 1991, they did the same to the Shiites), Afghanistan (where they simply left) and Iraq again. Deprived of Western support, the Ukrainians are forced to make the best peace they can.

Outcome No 4. Reorganizing and bringing their full resources to bear, the Russians renew their offensive. No more attempts to end the war with a singe mighty strike. Proceeding systematically and using artillery in order to reduce their own casualties, they attack one city after another to force it to surrender or, if that does not work, reduce it to rubble. Ukraine cracks under the pressure. The government is forced to flee. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare get under way and are suppressed, albeit at the cost of almost unimaginable death, suffering and destruction. As used to be said of the Romans, they made a desert and called it peace.

Outcome No. 5. Terrorism and guerrilla get under way. However, thanks largely to Ukraine’s large size and long borders with NATO countries, they cannot be suppressed any more than they could  in any number of post-1945 wars.  Long-term chaos ensues and may spread to neighboring countries.

Not only may any of these happen, but they may do so in an endless number of combinations and variations. Truth to say, qui lo sa?

On Stalin (again)

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Readers, please note: The following is the text of an interview about the book I did on 8 May with Mr. Pierre Heumann of the German-Swiss weekly Weltwoche. The translation from German is my own.

Heumann: Martin van Creveld, are you a Stalin Versteher (understander/sympathizer)?

Van Creveld: Writing a good biography of someone one hates is practically impossible. That is one reason why there are so many bad books about people like Hitler. And Stalin, of course. What Stalin was aiming at was a Soviet Union which would be shaped according to his ideas and would rule, as its acknowledged master: he himself. Considering his humble origins, I find the way he achieved those aims very impressive.

Heumann: What, in your view, was the heritage he left?

Van Creveld: It depends on whom one asks. In the West he is perceived as a monster. His regime is portrayed as extremely brutal, authoritarian and corrupt. All of which is quite true. However, in Russia the situation is different. Many people respect Stalin as a ruler who played a critical role in establishing the state, then went on to industrialize it on a vast scale, and finally saved it from collapse during the so-called Great Patriotic War.

Studying the material as I did, one thing that struck me was how little charisma Stalin had. His speeches were boring—not because he did not have anything intelligent to say, but because he spoke in a monotone and, unlike Hitler, never raised his voice. Nor did he have to. As his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, once said, “when Stalin says ‘dance,’ a wise man dances.” Everyone understood that Stalin brooked no opposition.

Heumann: Wat similarities do you see between Stalin and Putin?

Van Creveld: Both used the secret services as their primary instrument of government. And both saw themselves as men who had been called upon, whether by fate or by history. Stalin wanted to prepare the world for Communism. Putin wants to prevent or at least delay the collapse of Russia. And there is something else they have in common. To both of them, Russian history is a long story in which the Russians were always the victims. Why? Because Russia has always been backward. One outcome was, and still is, the West’s tendency to look down on Russia as a backward country. Putin personally has repeatedly referred this kind of inferiority complex his countrymen labor under.

Heumann: How do you see the war in Ukraine?

Van Creveld: Stalin, having come under attack by the German Reich, Stalin had no option but to defend himself.  Unlike him, Putin had the choice: to attack or not to attack. He decided to attack. Now Clausewitz’s words have come to haunt him: any attack that does not quickly attain its ends fairly quickly will turn into a defense.

What Putin Wants

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First, a disclaimer. President Putin has neither been whispering in my ear nor appearing in my dreams. Nor did his advisers, senior or junior, civilian or military, official or unofficial. Nor, on the other hand, do I necessarily trust any of the usual sources mentioned by Western media. Meaning, their own countries’ intelligence services, the reports of their journalists and cameramen on the ground, tales told by Ukrainian soldiers, tales told by local Ukrainians, tales allegedly originating in Russian POWs, and so on. All these different sources, and many others besides, have their limits. Many also have an ax to grind: either to deny Russian atrocities or to emphasize them as much as possible.  It is as people say. In war, any war without exception, the first casualty is the truth.

That said, and taking into account not merely Putin’s utterances but some knowledge of Russian history—as gained, among other things, by researching and writing my just-published book, I, Stalin—it seems to me that, in invading Ukraine, Putin and his advisers may be credited with a number of objectives. Here they are listed in what I think is an order of ascending importance.

First, wresting the Donbas away from Ukraine and establishing full control over it. As Lenin himself pointed out during his last years, the Donbas by virtue of its vast reserves of coal and iron ore has long had the potential to turn into a first-class industrial zone. To put those reserves to use, all that was needed was organization—Bolshevik organization.  Under Stalin, and starting with the adoption in 1928 of the First Five Year Plan, the wheels began to turn. Except during World War II, when the Germans occupied the region and razed it almost to the last brick and last metal pipe, they have kept turning right down to the beginning of the present conflict. Of all Putin’s objectives, this is the most likely to be achieved.

Second, establishing a land-bridge between Russia and the Black Sea. Long ago, it was Prussia’s Frederick the Great who said that a province to which one had access by land was worth ten times as much as one to which no terrestrial link existed. Russia’s difficulties in reaching a year-round, ice-free port are a matter of historical record. Occupying the corridor between Mariupol and the Crimea will go a considerable way towards solving the problem. It will also greatly complicate any future Ukrainian attempt to regain the Crimea, which back in 2014 the Russians annexed. I consider it just possible that Putin will achieve this objective.

Third, on the way to achieving these objectives, making sure that any future Ukrainian regime will always serve Russian interests first and foremost. Presumably this would mean a. Some kind of collaborationist government in Kiev; and b. Setting up military bases within the country so as to better control it if necessary. Briefly, something similar to the system the Soviets used between 1945 and 1989 in order to govern their East European vassals. As things look at present, this objective almost certainly will not be achieved.

Fourth, never forget that Russia without Ukraine is a country; Russia with Ukraine is an empire. As Putin has said many times, his objective is to reverse the “catastrophe” of 1989-1991 when the Soviet Union, lost its security zone to the west as well as vast other territories. Nor is this a trivial matter. During the Cold War the distance from the River Elbe, which marked the border between East and West, and Moscow was around 2,000 kilometers. With the former East Germany, the Baltic Countries, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Moldavia all having escaped Moscow’s control, that distance was cut by half; should the Ukraine too become part of NATO,  it will be down to about 850. Now a security zone 850 kilometers wide may seem plenty to most non-Russians. Certainly it does so to an Israeli who grew up in a country only 16 kilometers wide at its narrowest point. But perhaps the Russians, who twice during the twentieth century saw their country invaded and who suffered tens millions of dead as a result, may be forgiven for thinking differently. Certainly Putin is not the only one to think in such terms. Surfing the Net, just recently I came across an alleged American plan to occupy Mars as a necessary step towards protecting the U.S against a combined Russo-Chinese attack launched from the moon. Or was it the other way around? Anyhow. This objective, too, almost certainly will not be achieved.

Fifth, securing for Russia the kind of respect to which, by virtue of its size and power and development and cultural achievements, it feels it is entitled. The West’s chronic underestimation of, and contempt for, Russia, which it perceives as a backward country lacking both good government and many of the amenities of civilized life is also a matter of historical record. Starting some three hundred years ago, the Russian intelligentsia—roughly translatable as that part of the population which has some education and is interested in ideas beyond those directly tied to people’s own daily worries—have been aware of it and resented it. This objective, too, will not be achieved; if anything, to the contrary.

Sixth, as a direct result of all these, securing for Putin personally what he sees as his rightful position as the heir of Alexander Nevsky, Ivan the Dread (not the Terrible, I am told), Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Stalin. Nevsky, for beating back the Estonians, Swedes, Danes, and the Teutonic Order. Ivan, for defeating the Livonians and the Tatars as well as effectively founding the Russian State with its center in “The Third Rome,” as Moscow is sometimes called. Peter, for beating back the Swedes and the Persians as well as his heroic efforts to pull up a recalcitrant Russia and modernize it. Catherine, for annexing the Ukraine (it was under her rule that Russian power first reached the Black Sea) as well as the lion’s share of Poland. Stalin, because it was under his regime that Russia/the Soviet Union reached the peak of its power, making the rest of the world tremble in front of it. Of all Putin’s objectives, this one is the least likely to be achieved.

A final point. Seen through Western eyes, these and all other Russian rulers were autocrats of the worst kind whose most important instruments of (miss) rule were the knout, the labor camp, and the hangman’s noose.  But that is not how Putin himself sees things. According to him, Russians do not need either liberalism or democracy. The reason being that, unlike Westerners, they trust their leaders.

So, he claims, it has been in the past. And so, no doubt, he hopes it will be in the future.

The Guessing Game

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There are two cardinal reasons why President Putin has almost certainly lost the war he launched over a month ago. Both are as old as history, and both were set forth by Clausewitz around 1830. First, a military operation, large or small, is much like pouring water from a bucket (the metaphor is mine, not Clausewitz’s); the further away from its point of origin it flows, the more momentum it loses and the more vulnerable it becomes to counterattacks directed both against the spearheads and against the attacker’s lines of communication. Just think of Napoleon in 1812. Having invaded Russia with 600,000 men, by the time he reached Moscow he only had 100,000 left; all the rest had either perished by battle, disease and fatigue or been left in the rear to garrison key positions there. 100,000 troops were not nearly enough to force a decision, let alone hold the country down. And so all it remained for him was to retreat.

The second and even more fundamental reason is that time works against the attacker. Why? Because, under most circumstances, conquering and appropriating is harder, and requires greater force, than holding and preserving. An offense that does not attain its objective—from the attacker’s point of view, that would mean a better peace—within a reasonable amount of time is certain to turn into a defense. Think of Hannibal in 218-17 BCE, think of Hitler in 1941-42. Again this applies to any military operation, large or small, old or new.

So far, Putin’s war has proceeded in four stages. First, a combination of geography and numerical superiority enabled his forces to operate on external lines and invade Ukraine from four different directions (northwest, north, east and south) at once. Second, enjoying both numerical and technological superiority, and some logistic problems notwithstanding, those troops pushed the Ukrainians aside and reached the outskirts of the most important Ukrainian cities such as Kharkov, Kiev, Kherson, and Mariupol (important because of its command of the Sea of Azov as well as the road from the Donbas to the Crimea) and put them under siege. Third, especially at Kherson and Mariupol, they tried their hand at urban warfare. Only to find, as countless others before them have also done, that such warfare tends to be very bloody and very destructive. The difficulty of obtaining intelligence, the excellent shelter cities provide to those who defend them, and the way rubbish-filled streets canalize and hamper the attacker’s movements all contribute to this result; between them they cause cites to swallow up armies the way sponges take up water.

Fourth, and rather predictably, the Russians switched from attempts to capture Ukrainian cities to subjecting them to artillery bombardment. Just as, some twenty years ago, they did in Grozny. In Kherson and Mariupol the tactic worked, at any rate up to a point. However, Kiev and Kharkov are much larger than either of those. Besides, Ukraine itself is a large country with many urban areas, large and small. Not even the Russian army, famed for its reliance on artillery, has enough guns to take them on all at once; whereas doing so one by one will require enormous amounts of time which, for the abovementioned reasons, Putin simply does not have.

Fifth, the offensive having exhausted itself, stalemate will set in if, indeed, it had not done so already. Stalemate having set in politics, which right from the beginning played a very important role, will start playing an even more important one. All sides will have a strong interest in ending the war. Hence attempts will be made to do so on terms all of them —Russia, Ukraine, NATO—will find more or less acceptable or at least capable of being presented as such.

Just what the final settlement will look like is impossible to say; most probably, though, it will include the following elements. First, there can be no question of doing away with Ukraine as an independent country and nation. Second, there will be no subservient government in Kiev as there is in Minsk. Third, Russia will make no important territorial gains beyond those made in 2014 and even its ability to hold on to those is in some doubt. Fourth, Ukraine will not officially join NATO, let alone have NATO forces stationed on its territory; but other, more limited, forms of cooperation between the two entities will certainly be established and maintained. Fifth, Putin may, but not necessarily will, lose his post.

Finally, never forget that war, though it makes use of all kinds of physical assets such as numbers of troops, weapons, equipment, roads, communications, topographical and geographical obstacles, and so on, is a human drama above all. As such it is critically affected by every kind of human, often incalculable, drives and emotions; which, collectively, shape the fighting power of both sides. Taking all this into account, it becomes only too clear that anything that can be said about the way future campaigns will develop is no more than what Clausewitz calls a calculus of probabilities.

So it has been, and so it will remain

Chaos

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As far as anyone can make out, the situation in Ukraine is nothing if not chaotic. Russian forces are said to be advancing on all fronts. Ukrainian forces claim success after success in slowing down the aggressors or even halting them. Now cities are said to have been cut off, now it appears that, in reality, they are not. Cities are occupied, or else they are not and the two sides keep fighting over them. Convoys seem to be get stuck for days on end, but no one knows why. The Russians are running out of supplies. The Russians so far have only committed about three quarters of their forces. The Russian air force is said to be either held back or ineffective, yet President Zelensky keeps begging the West to impose a no fly zone.

Both sides accuse the other of committing war crimes and provide casualty figures; but neither is at all complete or reliable and there is good reason to believe that many are neither. A maternity hospital is said to have been hit, but whether it was done deliberately or as part of what is euphemistically known as “collateral damage” is obscure. The Western sanctions on Russia are working, or else they are little more than a nuisance that can be taken care of with Chinese help. The Russians are running out of young soldiers (hard to believe, since Russia’s birthrate, while below the replacement figure, is actually higher than that of Ukraine). Putin is winning on all fronts. Putin knows he has bitten off more than he can swallow and is desperately looking for a way out. Putin is ill. Putin is mad. Putin is about to be deposed, though no one knows by whom.

Millions of messages are being sent, intercepted, recorded, decrypted, stored, and analyzed by every possible means from artificial intelligence down. Some are even being falsified. To make things worse still, joining the Niagara of words is a tsunami of images. Attempting to prove their claims, both sides are publishing countless photographs, clips, videos, or whatever they are called. And that does not even include the millions of images sent out by the media on their own initiative. However, most of the time it is impossible to say who took them, when, where, in what context, and for what purpose. To say nothing of the fact that, since the uniforms worn by both sides and much of the materiel they use are broadly similar, it is often impossible to say what is what. One gets to see a shot up vehicle; but who destroyed it impossible to say. One sees wrecked building; but who wrecked it and why is impossible to say. A corpse is shown lying on the pavement; but whose corpse it is, and who killed him, is anything but clear. Briefly, it is not true, as Hitler’s propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels used to say, that bilder luegen nicht. Indeed that itself is perhaps the greatest lie of all.

Except for the sheer amount of information being passed around, there is nothing new or exceptional about all this. Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese soldier-scholar who probably wrote his Art of War around 500 BCE, says that all warfare is based on deceit and that, of all the ways to defeat an enemy, tricking him is the swiftest and the best (also in the sense of being the least bloody). Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian general and military theorist who wrote vom Kriege during the 1830s, says that, in war, almost all information (Nachrichten) is contradictory, false, or both. Napoleon, who though neither a theoretician nor a writer was one of the greatest commanders who ever lived, adds that making sense of the confusion is a task not unworthy of geniuses such as Isaac Newton and Leonhard Euler. He himself, incidentally, was a master of deceit—a talent he displayed not just on campaign, as by “stealing a march” on his enemies, but while playing cards as well.

For all the vast technological apparatus it uses, modern war has not been exempt from these problems. To the contrary, in some ways it has made them worse than ever. One factor responsible for this is the sheer amount of information in the hands of, or being generated by, decision makers, soldiers, intelligence services, the media, and individuals on all sides. Let me provide just one example of what this may mean. Back in 1991 headquarters US Marine Corps, preparing to invade Kuwait, received a million and a half satellite-images of the terrain in front of it. This, on top of other kinds of information too numerous to detail here. So enormous was the flood that the images were almost entirely useless—the manpower, the expertise and the time needed to make them useful where simply not available. Since more was being added every hour, processing all of them would have lasted literally forever. The development of artificial intelligence may have alleviated some of these problems. But certainly not all.

A second problem originates in the illusion that we are in full command of our faculties, meaning that our senses provide us with a realistic idea of the world around us. In fact, however, this is by no means always the case. Our minds are colored by fear, elation, hope, despair, disappointment, and a thousand other emotions. Coming on top of this, often what we see depends, not on incoming information but on what we are; as shaped by education, training, prejudice, and so on. No two people, no two organizations, are the same or see the world in the same way. Which means that, even if all the relevant information is available, the task of entering into the enemy’s mind and guessing his intentions is very difficult, not seldom impossible.

Third, in war all these problems are exacerbated by what Clausewitz calls its Strapazen. War is the most strenuous activity any human can engage in by far. To those who have not gone through it the mental and physical stress are simply unimaginable. Partly because of the ever present danger to limb and life, one’s own and those of others; and partly, at the upper levels, because the fate of countries and populations may very well depend on it. Such is the strain that it often causes even the very bravest and most stable to behave somewhat strangely. If not all the time, then certainly some of it. Under such conditions no wonder (as Napoleon said) that false reports proliferate. Some people see entire armies where, in fact, there are none; others don’t see armies even when those armies are right in front of their noses. 

A final point that, as far as I am aware, analysts have raised rarely if at all. It goes without saying that, ceteris paribus, the chaos of war affects both the conqueror and the conquered. However, as a rule creating order out of chaos—the conqueror’s task—is a lot harder than doing the opposite; think, for example, of building a new wall brick by brick as opposed to taking up a sledge hammer and bringing it down. Without imposing order on a recalcitrant country, the Russians cannot win. As a result, this factor will probably work in favor of the defender. The Israelis in Lebanon, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Americans in both Afghanistan and Iraq all tried their hand at this game. Ultimately, to no avail.

Ukraine is a large country with long, hard to seal, borders as well as tens of millions of able and highly motivated inhabitants. Chances are that the same will happen in this case.

A Very Bad Man

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The war in Ukraine goes on and on. Though analysts are as numerous as flies on a heap of you know what, the truth is that one knows how it is going to end. Such being the case, I want to put my latest thoughts on record.

First, Putin may be a very bad man. However, there is no point in continually saying so. Based on historical reasoning, he is doing what he believes he must on behalf of his country. That historical reasoning itself is neither better nor worse than any other reasoning of this kind; part reality, part myth, part propaganda. Never mind. To cope with him, it is first of all necessary to understand what he thinks, why, and what can and cannot be done about it. The more so because he has enough nuclear weapons to blow up the world.

Second, this is a war of survival not only for Ukraine but for Russia as well. In the case of Ukraine, that is because defeat would reduce it to a Russian province. Much as it used to be since 1793 when Catherine the Great joined Austria and Prussia in partitioning Poland, a move which for the first time took Russia to the shores of the Black Sea. In the case of Russia it is because, should this struggle be lost, the country can expect to disintegrate into who knows many warring fragments. Just as happened in 1990. Recovery, even supposing it will be possible at all, will take decades. See, as an example of what it may be like, The Time of Troubles (1598-1613).

Third, this is going to be a long and bloody conflict. Albeit that it may have taken a little longer than was originally planned—not something at all unusual in war—the Russians have reached Ukraine’s most important cities and put them under siege. They have not, however taken them. As I have written before, urban warfare is perhaps the most difficult form of war an attacking force can engage on. Just think of the months-long battle of Stalingrad in 1942-43, and you’ll know what I mean.

Fourth, even if the Russians do succeed in occupying the cities, the war, taking the form of insurrection, guerrilla, and terrorism will go on. As, to mention but two recent examples, it did in both Afghanistan and Iraq. True Ukraine, being flat, does not present the best terrain on which to wage these forms of warfare. Compared to many others, the Russians also enjoy the important advantage of being able to understand the language. But two factors are working in the other direction. One is the sheer size of the country and the population, which threaten to swamp any occupying force (that is why, back in 1793, the Russians were able to occupy it in the first place was because it was practically uninhabited). The other, the ready availability of every kind of assistance from NATO, which can only increase as time goes on.

Fifth, Putin’s forces are said to be using some unorthodox weapons capable of causing many casualties and inflicting immense damage on buildings in particular. Particularly important are so called thermobaric weapons that operate by detonating a mixture of air and fuel, resulting in an extraordinarily powerful explosion as well as extremely high temperatures. But Putin is not the only one to use them.  Americans did so both at Hue in 1968 and at Fallujah in December 2004; and both the Americans and the British used them in Afghanistan. So who are they to complain?

Sixth, whether Russia will break under the sanctions is uncertain. My own guess it that it won’t. Partly that because the Russians can take almost anything. And partly because Germany e.g depends on Russia for 51 percent of its oil and gas; without them, German industry will soon come to a standstill. Vice versa, the one certainty is that the war will break the economy of the Ukraine.

Seventh, the only way Putin can win this war is by finding some Ukrainians able and willing to set up a government that will collaborate with him. That, however, seems unlikely to happen.

Finally, in this war as in any other the first casualty is the truth. That is one reason why anyone who believes he can see into the future is welcome to try and so so.

 

War in Ukraine

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Asked to predict the future of the war in the Ukraine, I took another look at a book I wrote a couple of years ago. English title, Looking into the Future: A History of Prediction. Working on it taught me two things. First, as everyone knows prediction is extremely difficult and often misses the mark. Not seldom with disastrous consequences; as happened in 1914 when statesmen and soldiers predicted a short and easy war (“you will be home before the leaves fall form the trees,” the Kaiser told his soldiers) but found themselves involved in the largest, most deadly, armed conflict in history until then. And second, the methods we use today—questionnaires among experts (the so-called Delphi method), mathematical models, artificial intelligence, what have you—are no better than those that people used thousands of years ago. Such as astrology (Babylon), manipulating yarrow stalks (China), watching birds and consulting oracles (Greece), reading the entrails of sacrificial animals (Rome), interpreting dreams (in all known civilizations), and so on.

I am a historian, so readers will have to forgive me for basing my thought on historical methods. Primarily analogies on one hand and trends on the other.

Here goes.

* Ukraine is surrounded by Russia on all sides except the west, where it borders on Poland, Moldavia and Romania. It consists almost entirely of flat, open country (the famous “Black Earth”). The only mountains are the Carpathians in the southwest and the Crimean Mountains in the extreme south along the coast. There are some large rivers which can form serious obstacles for an attacker. But only if they are properly defended; which, owing to their length, would be hard to do. Here and there are some low. One also encounters quite a number of deep ravines, the best known of which is Babi Yar. But neither form serious obstacles to traffic, particularly tracked traffic. The roads are better than they used to be during World War II and there are more of them; however, with just 2.8 kilometers of them per square kilometer of territory (versus 1.5 in Germany) they are still not up to West European standards. The climate is continental, meaning hot and dry (often uncomfortably so) in summer, extremely cold (with lots of snow) in winter, and rain spread during most of the year.

* Russia has nuclear weapons, whereas Ukraine does not. That is a pity; had it had such weapons as well as a secure second strike force of vehicles to deliver them, war would almost certainly have been out of the question. However, for Putin’s present purpose it does not matter. The last things he wants to do before he occupies Ukraine is to turn it into a radioactive desert. Thanks in part to the help they get from NATO, during recent years the Ukrainian armed forces have grown considerably stronger and better equipped. Fighting morale, based primarily on popular memory of the way Stalin starved millions of Ukrainians in 1930-32, is said to be high. Nevertheless, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively are the forces in question a match for the Russian ones.

* Initially at any rate both sides will rely primarily on the usual conventional weapons: aircraft (which are particularly useful over open terrain as opposed to such as is mountainous or forested), tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery, as well as the motorized columns they need to sustain them. However, they will also make heavy use of less traditional methods. Such as maskirovska (deception), signals warfare, electronic warfare, and, last not least, cyberwarfare. All these are fields in which the Russians have specialized for a long time past and in which they are acknowledged masters; in this respect they are in tune with their master, Putin, who himself rose by way of the intelligence services.

* At the moment the Russians the Russians are attacking Ukraine from all directions simultaneously without any clear Schwerpunkt. The Donbas apart, objectives include Kharkov, Kiev, several other key cities, and perhaps the Black Sea and Sea of Azov coasts. Faithful to their long-standing doctrine of “battle in depth,” the Russians attack not just at the front but far behind it as well.

* The Russians will not find it too difficult to “overrun” (whatever that may mean) most of a country as large and as sparsely populated as Ukraine. However, taking the most important cities—Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa—will be a different matter and will surely only be accomplished by heavy and very destructive fighting. Followed, most probably by guerrilla and terrorism. The way, say, things happened in Iraq.
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* Forget about sanctions. They will not deter the Russians. Just as Stalin used to give enormous banquets even during the height of World War II, so Putin and his clique will barely notice them. Whereas the people are used to make do without almost everything. Except vodka, of course, and even consumption of that is said to have fallen over the last few years.

* NATO, with the US at its head, will be involved in the war, but only marginally and without sending troops to participate in the fighting. Instead it will dispatch “defensive” weapons (whatever those may be), provide supplies and intelligence, and perhaps help evacuate some of the wounded as well as assist Ukrainian refugees. All the while continuing to tell anyone who wants to listen, and some of those who do not want to listen, how bad the Russians are, etc. etc.

* China can be expected to make some sympathetic noises. That apart, it will get involved only lightly by expanding trade so as to offset some of the sanctions. It may also use the opportunity to do something about Taiwan. Or not.

* Should the war turn into guerrilla and terrorism, as it very likely will, it may very well open the door to the death of perhaps fifty Ukrainians for every soldier the Russians lose (in Vietnam the ratio was about 75 to one). Even so Putin will still be unable to end the war, which he can do only by setting up a new collaborationist Ukrainian government.

* Though it is likely to happen later rather than sooner, there is a good chance that Putin will find Ukraine stuck in his throat; to quote a Hebrew saying, neither to swallow nor to puke. Given enough time, the outcome will assuredly be to make the war less and less popular inside Russia itself. The Russians will end by withdrawing.

* Just as the defeat in Afghanistan played a key role in the collapse of Communism, so a defeat in Ukraine will almost certainly mean the end of Putin’s regime. Much worse for Russia, it may well cause it to fall back into one of those terrible periods of anarchy it has gone through in the past and which it is Putin’s supreme objective to prevent. He can barely conceal his anxiety in this respect; as by assuring his listeners that 2022 is not 1919 (the year in which Lenin and the Bolsheviks came closest to defeat).

Finally:

Though based on history, in truth all this is little better than guesswork. It is as Woody Allen said: Do you want to make God laugh? Tell him about your plans.

No Deception without Self-Deception

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Months after the Ukrainian crisis broke out, the long-expected Russian invasion of that country still had not taken place. Depending on which analyst you choose, there are many possible explanations for this. The first was that, at a time when his dear ally Xi was doing whatever he could to make a success of the winter games in Beijing, Putin did not want to ruffle his feathers too much. The second, that he needed time to try and sow dissension among his opponents, not all of whom were equally enthusiastic about fighting him; as, for example, became clear when Germany refused to provide Ukraine with weapons. The third, that his preparations were insufficient and needed to be completed. The fourth, that the weather, with the spring muddy season (rasputitsa, as it is called) around the corner, was unsuitable. It might, indeed, play havoc; if not with Putin’s tanks then with the follow-up columns that carry the ammunition they fire, the fuel they need, the spare parts on which they depend, and so on.

The fifth, explanation is that he was deterred by NATO’s declarations and demonstrations of support for Ukraine; including, in particular, the threat of sanctions. The sixth, that military action would be unpopular with Russia’s own people who are unhappy with the way things are going. The seventh, which seems to be gathering favor, that he has maneuvered himself into a pickle and is increasingly desperate to find a way out of the adventure on which he embarked. One, which, even if it succeeds, is quite likely to involve his country in a long and costly war against desperate resistance. And which, if it fails, may bring about not only the fall of his own rule but the disintegration of Russia itself; considering that, out of its population of about 145.000,000 18 percent consists of minorities some of which are just waiting for an opportunity to break free.

No more than any of the analysts whose views I keep reading do I have an answer to the question. I do, however, think I know the point when all of us in Washington, in London, in Paris, in Berlin, in NATO’s remaining capitals, and in many other places should really get worried. Namely, when Putin’s tanks start moving: not forward towards their Ukrainian objectives but away from them, back towards their peacetime bases and depots.

Consider:

Thursday, 2 August 1990. Saddam Hussein’s army invades and occupies Kuwait. Not, however before some days had passed during which he or his assistants claimed to be preparing to withdraw Iraq’s forces from the border area where he had deployed them. Needless to say, each time he did so the news was flashed around the world. Needless to say, each time it was received with a deep sigh of relief. And needless to say, each time it was false.
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Saturday, 6 October 1973. In the midst of Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, all over Israel the air alert sirens start howling. This quickly turns out to be the signal for a combined offensive by several hundreds of thousands Egyptian and Syrian troops against Israel. Repeatedly during the previous months, the Egyptian army in particular had been holding exercises that they could have used as cover for starting a war. Repeatedly they did not—until, on the day in question, they did.

Wednesday, 21 August 1968. Warsaw Pact forces, including Soviet, East German, Polish and Hungarian units, invade Czechoslovakia. Meeting hardly any resistance, they quickly occupy the country. The crisis, which followed on what was known as the Prague Spring, had been going on for months. It climaxed in mid-August when the Warsaw Pact units, having completed maneuvers on Czechoslovak territory, left the country—only to immediately turn around and return.

Monday, 5 June 1967. Israel attacks Egypt and annihilates its air force, thereby opening the way towards its crushing victory in the Six Day War. At that time the crisis in the Middle East, which got under way when Egypt’s ruler Abel Nasser sent his forces into the Sinai, had been ongoing for three weeks. The climax came on the weekend of 2-3 June when many Israeli reservists were suddenly sent home on leave and could be seen on the beaches of Tel Aviv, thus creating the impression that war was not imminent and might indeed not break out at all. A bad error, as it turned out.

Needless to say the Soviets, as they then were, were aware of these precedents. The more so because they themselves had made use of the technique. And the more so because they were historically-minded; starting already in 1917, no army has ever put a greater emphasis on military history than the Red-Russian one. Starting with the Biblical Israelites’ capture of the city of Ai, and proceeding through the Greek one of Troy, any number of commanders and armies have owed their success to this simple trick.

As I’ve written before, whether Putin is going to invade Ukraine I have no idea. I do, however, suggest that two points be kept in mind. First, beware of any Russian troop withdrawal—that may well be the most dangerous moment of all. And second, no deception without self-deception.

The Master and Kiev

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Whether or not Vladimir (“World-Owner,” according to one translation) Putin is going to march on Kiev I do not know. However, it seems to me that, having invested so much in making ready for such an invasion—propaganda, money, political capital, and all kinds of military moves—he cannot now simply order a retreat without having achieved anything. Even at best, such a retreat would deal a grievous blow to his prestige and his future ability to get anything out of anybody. At worst it might lead to his removal from office and, since Russia is not and never has been a democracy, a political shakeup. One whose consequences, first for Russia and then for large parts of the rest of the world, could be incalculable.

Such being the case, in this post I shall assume that an invasion is being planned and, unless the West makes some important concessions, will be carried out. Sooner rather than later, and perhaps under the guise of a response to some Ukrainian “provocation.” What might such an invasion look like? The obvious starting point would be the Donbas, a Ukrainian province now under the rule two different self-proclaimed pro-Russian governments.. It has everything an invader could wish for: agriculture, industry, minerals (coal), and the kind of flat terrain that used to be occupied by the Cossacks and now offers few serious obstacles to a modern mechanized army.

Seen from Moscow, an offensive directed at this part of Ukraine would also have the advantage that it is located hundreds of miles east of Russia’s frontier with NATO. As a result, for the latter to assist the government in Kiev would be limited at best; the more so because the Black Sea is now little more than a Russian lake. The invasion might, indeed, form a stepping stone towards a deeper one aimed at forming a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea which it has been occupying for the last seven years.

On the other hand, such a half-measure would hardly suffice to achieve Putin’s objective, which is to halt and if possible reverse the eastward expansion of NATO. And it would almost certainly mean a prolonged war with Ukraine and its population of 35-40 million. Coming from the north (Russia proper), the west (Belorussia) or the south (the Crimea), the Russian forces allocated for such a war would be able to move almost anywhere. The Ukrainian army is said to number about 200,000. However, it is not terribly well equipped with modern heavy weapons in particular; and indeed it is hard to see where it could have got them, given that it cannot buy them from Russia (of course) and has been too poor to buy many of them from the West.

In short, pushing the Ukrainians aside while reaching for the country’s principal cities—Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkov, and of course Kiev itself—should present the Russian forces with no particular problem. The more so because they will have near complete command of the air. Probably the most important difficulty facing them would be operational. Meaning, the inability of their widely-spread attacking columns to quickly come to each other’s aid in case of need. This fact might well cause the Russian High command to think in terms of trying to achieve its objectives not in a single massive lunge but in two or, supposing things go well, even three sequential ones. First in the west, in order to stop NATO from interfering and achieve local superiority. And then shifting the center of gravity further south and east. In that case the space between the Russian columns would be partly filled by special units capable of independent operations and designed primarily to spread confusion and chaos.

However, simply defeating the Ukrainian army and reaching Ukraine’s main cities would hardly be enough to end the conflict. Partly that is because Ukraine would still have an estimated 300,000 more or less trained men left. And partly because modern urban warfare can and often will shift the balance against the attacker and in favor of the defender. The main reasons for this are as follows:

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Second, complex terrain will reduce the attacker’s advantages in terms of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, the utility of aerial assets, and his ability to engage at a distance.

Third the profusion of buildings, perhaps including some quite tall ones, means that much of the fighting will take place at close quarters. To make things even more difficult for the attacker, often it will be necessary to engage simultaneously over the ground, on the ground, and under the ground.

Fourth, the attacker must move and, by doing so, expose himself. Not so the defender, who can remain in his prepared positions. Should those positions be targeted by artillery or from the air the defender, provided he keeps his flexibility and does not wait too long, can always abandon them and retreat to others further back.

Fifth, the kind of massive firepower that reduces buildings and even entire neighborhoods to rubble will not necessarily deprive the defender of cover. Often, indeed, the rubble will provide the defender with as much, if not more, concealment and cover than intact neighborhoods can; just think of Stalingrad. The larger the city, the more true this is.

Occupying the cities in question will not solve these problems; to the contrary, doing so may well aggravate them. Briefly, urban warfare tends to act as a meat grinder. The outcome is likely to be attrition and stalemate. But stalemate will demand from the attacker exactly that of which, unlike the defender, he only has a limited supply: time.

To be sure, death and destruction in the Ukraine would be horrendous. But to see what time can do to an invader, ask the Americans in Vietnam (1964-75), Afghanistan (2002-21), and Iraq (2003-21; not to mention the Soviets in Afghanistan (1980-88).