Tag Archives: Russia

One Year Later

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Being a little out of sorts, as they say, it occurred to me to take a look at some of my old posts. Simply to amuse myself, and simply to see how things have worked out. More by accident than by design I hit on one I did early in the Russo-Ukrainian War. Here it is, re-posted without any changes except for the pic.

War in Ukraine

Asked to predict the future of the war in the Ukraine, I took another look at a book I wrote a couple of years ago. English title, Looking into the Future: A History of Prediction. Working on it taught me two things. First, as everyone knows prediction is extremely difficult and often misses the mark. Not seldom with disastrous consequences; as happened in 1914 when statesmen and soldiers predicted a short and easy war (“you will be home before the leaves fall form the trees,” the Kaiser told his soldiers) but found themselves involved in the largest, most deadly, armed conflict in history until then. And second, the methods we use today—questionnaires among experts (the so-called Delphi method), mathematical models, artificial intelligence, what have you—are no better than those that people used thousands of years ago. Such as astrology (Babylon), manipulating yarrow stalks (China), watching birds and consulting oracles (Greece), reading the entrails of sacrificial animals (Rome), interpreting dreams (in all known civilizations), and so on.

I am a historian, so readers will have to forgive me for basing my thought on historical methods. Primarily analogies on one hand and trends on the other.

Here goes.

* Ukraine is surrounded by Russia on all sides except the west, where it borders on Poland, Moldavia and Romania. It consists almost entirely of flat, open country (the famous “Black Earth”). The only mountains are the Carpathians in the southwest and the Crimean Mountains in the extreme south along the coast. There are some large rivers which can form serious obstacles for an attacker. But only if they are properly defended; which, owing to their length, would be hard to do. Here and there are some low. One also encounters quite a number of deep ravines, the best known of which is Babi Yar. But neither form serious obstacles to traffic, particularly tracked traffic. The roads are better than they used to be during World War II and there are more of them; however, with just 2.8 kilometers of them per square kilometer of territory (versus 1.5 in Germany) they are still not up to West European standards. The climate is continental, meaning hot and dry (often uncomfortably so) in summer, extremely cold (with lots of snow) in winter, and rain spread during most of the year.

* Russia has nuclear weapons, whereas Ukraine does not. That is a pity; had it had such weapons as well as a secure second strike force of vehicles to deliver them, war would almost certainly have been out of the question. However, for Putin’s present purpose it does not matter. The last things he wants to do before he occupies Ukraine is to turn it into a radioactive desert. Thanks in part to the help they get from NATO, during recent years the Ukrainian armed forces have grown considerably stronger and better equipped. Fighting morale, based primarily on popular memory of the way Stalin starved millions of Ukrainians in 1930-32, is said to be high. Nevertheless, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively are the forces in question a match for the Russian ones.

* Initially at any rate both sides will rely primarily on the usual conventional weapons: aircraft (which are particularly useful over open terrain as opposed to such as is mountainous or forested), tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery, as well as the motorized columns they need to sustain them. However, they will also make heavy use of less traditional methods. Such as maskirovska (deception), signals warfare, electronic warfare, and, last not least, cyberwarfare. All these are fields in which the Russians have specialized for a long time past and in which they are acknowledged masters; in this respect they are in tune with their master, Putin, who himself rose by way of the intelligence services.

* At the moment the Russians are attacking Ukraine from all directions simultaneously without any clear Schwerpunkt. The Donbas apart, objectives include Kharkov, Kiev, several other key cities, and perhaps the Black Sea and Sea of Azov coasts. Faithful to their long-standing doctrine of “battle in depth,” the Russians attack not just at the front but far behind it as well.

* The Russians will not find it too difficult to “overrun” (whatever that may mean) most of a country as large and as sparsely populated as Ukraine. However, taking the most important cities—Kiev, Kharkov, and Odessa—will be a different matter and will surely only be accomplished by heavy and very destructive fighting. Followed, most probably by guerrilla and terrorism. The way, say, things happened in Iraq.

* Forget about sanctions. They will not deter the Russians. Just as Stalin used to give enormous banquets even during the height of World War II, so Putin and his clique will barely notice them. Whereas the people are used to make do without almost everything. Except vodka, of course, and even consumption of that is said to have fallen over the last few years.

* NATO, with the US at its head, will be involved in the war, but only marginally and without sending troops to participate in the fighting. Instead it will dispatch “defensive” weapons (whatever those may be), provide supplies and intelligence, and perhaps help evacuate some of the wounded as well as assist Ukrainian refugees. All the while continuing to tell anyone who wants to listen, and some of those who do not want to listen, how bad the Russians are, etc. etc.

* China can be expected to make some sympathetic noises. That apart, it will get involved only lightly by expanding trade so as to offset some of the sanctions. It may also use the opportunity to do something about Taiwan. Or not.

* Should the war turn into guerrilla and terrorism, as it very likely will, it may very well open the door to the death of perhaps fifty Ukrainians for every soldier the Russians lose (in Vietnam the ratio was about 75 to one). Even so Putin will still be unable to end the war, which he can do only by setting up a new collaborationist Ukrainian government.

* Though it is likely to happen later rather than sooner, there is a good chance that Putin will find Ukraine stuck in his throat; to quote a Hebrew saying, neither to swallow nor to puke. Given enough time, the outcome will assuredly be to make the war less and less popular inside Russia itself. The Russians will end by withdrawing.

* Just as the defeat in Afghanistan played a key role in the collapse of Communism, so a defeat in Ukraine will almost certainly mean the end of Putin’s regime. Much worse for Russia, it may well cause it to fall back into one of those terrible periods of anarchy it has gone through in the past and which it is Putin’s supreme objective to prevent. He can barely conceal his anxiety in this respect; as by assuring his listeners that 2022 is not 1919 (the year in which Lenin and the Bolsheviks came closest to defeat).

Finally:

Though based on history, in truth all this is little better than guesswork. It is as Woody Allen said: Do you want to make God laugh? Tell him about your plans.

Not a bad job, I would say.

 

How Empires Fall

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As the philosopher Plato (428-348 BCE) and the statesman/historian Polybius (200-118 BCE) knew very well, empires come and go. The Babylonian Empire rose and declined. The Persian Empire rose and declined. Alexander’s Macedonian Empire rose and broke up. By the first century BCE the idea that the Roman Empire, too, would one day decline and fall had become commonplace among its educated inhabitants; as one of them, the Roman historian Livy, wrote, the empire was “struggling with its own greatness”. However, there was no agreement as to when this would happen, let alone how.

Over time many different reasons were invented to explain the decline. Speaking of the Graeco-Roman world, perhaps the most common one was the idea that power and prosperity undermine themselves. The more powerful and prosperous an empire, the softer its citizens and the more addicted to wine, song and women and the less inclined to serve, fight and die they became. During the late Roman Empire this reached the point where soldiers mutilated themselves so as to avoid military service and, if brought to justice, might be burnt alive. Sooner or later the point was reached when those in charge had to turn to foreigners in order to defend the empire against its enemies. Sooner or later those foreigners would become a liability, either because they did not fight hard enough or because they turned against their employers.

Since then many other explanations have been put forward. Sin or, in most non-Abrahamic religions, insufficient attention to the kind of religious rituals that make the world tick, caused God to turn His face away. Civil war, often the result of religious differences or excessive taxation or both, caused public order to break down. Egoistically-minded people, especially those belonging to the upper classes, refused to have children and raise them, preferring to use contraceptives or engage in homosexual sex. “Imperial overstretch,” a term made popular by the historian Paul Kennedy in his 1987 volume, The Rise and Decline of the Great Powers, created a situation whereby the Empire’s resources, material and human, were inadequate to support its commitments. Excessive use and abuse of natural resources caused the deforestation and desertification, not to say poisoning, of entire districts, even countries. Natural disasters increased in frequency and severity. Often more than one cause, or set of causes, were involved—all mingled with each other and now reinforcing, now contradicting, each other.

Fast forward to the present. As George Orwell in Nineteen-Eighty Four foresaw with uncanny precision, the world in which we live is divided among three gigantic empires: the US and its vassals (Oceania), Russia (Eurasia), and China (Eastasia). The first is defined by its wealth, the liberal-democratic way of life on which its members pride themselves, and its willingness to foster and adopt scientific/technological progress. The second, by its sheer geographical size, its military power, and the ability of its inhabitants to endure and suffer. The third, by the vast number and sheer industry of its people which, some researchers feel, are also the most able of the lot on the average. Again all these factors mix with each other and reinforce each other in a myriad of different ways. Too many by far to allow much more than a bare mention in the present essay.

Now to the hundred trillion dollar ($ 100,000,000,000, the world’s annual GNP) question: since no empire lasts forever, which of them is likely to collapse first? My answer would be, Russia. First, its population of 143,000,000 is by far the smallest and shrinking fast. Second, slightly over a fifth of this population are non-Russian, non-Slav, and even non-Christian. Originally subdued by force of arms, given the right circumstances parts of it may rise against the center, Moscow, causing the empire to break up. In which case, to quote Ukrainian head of state Volodymir Zelensky, only Muscovy will be left.

Third, Russia is immensely rich in natural resources and possessed of a huge arms industry. However, for reasons ill-understood has never been able to develop a strong consumer-driven industry such as, starting in the nineteenth century, has formed the backbone of modern economies and the kind of prosperity they alone seem capable of generating. Fourth, it still lacks the kind of access to the sea, hence to world trade, which first Britain and then the US has enjoyed for centuries.

Last not least, geographically speaking Russia is stuck between the other two empires. At the moment those empires are bitter rivals, quarreling over almost everything from Ukraine in the West to Taiwan in the east. However, that was not always the case. Remember President Nixon’s “opening of China” back in the early 1970s. The Soviet Union’s fear of collusion between Washington DC and Beijing—the sort that could only be, and was, directed at Moscow—even played a role in the Soviet Union’s collapse less than twenty years later. Another such rapprochement constitutes Putin’s nightmare. Should the US and China join forces, as they did against Japan in 1941-45, then there will be little the Kremlin will be able to do about it except threaten others, and hence itself, with nuclear annihilation.

Next, the US. The US has about two and a half times Russia’s population. Add its NATO allies, and the difference amounts to almost six to one. Add Japan, South Korea and Australasia, and it grows to about seven to one. Practically all these people are where they are because, unlike those of Russia, they are willing. They are kept loyal by consent rather than by force; this being an advantage very few previous empires enjoyed.

True, American industry in particular is no longer what it was between about 1945 and 1970 when it easily overshadowed the rest of the world. But it still remains enormously capable in terms of innovation in particular. Attention should also be attracted to the fact that the core member of the Atlantic alliance, i.e the US, is a global island. On the positive side, this means that any attempt to invade the Continental US must remain a pipedream. On the negative side it means that, to complement its own resources and retain its global influence, the US depends on maritime communications. Not only are such communications more vulnerable than land ones, but America’s Navy is even now in the process of losing its supremacy in favor of China. The closer one approaches China’s own shores, the more true that is. Another one of America’s weaknesses is the horrendous deficits it has incurred both in terms of foreign trade and in terms of the budget. Deficits which, unless they are addressed, will surely end up by bringing on the economic collapse not only of the US but of much of the rest of the world as well.

Finally, China. As anyone who has traveled in China can easily see for him- or herself, China’s industrialization over the last decades is one of the greatest, perhaps even the greatest, miracles in the whole of history. During that period its share of world GDP (ppp-calculated) increased more than tenfold, from 2.26 in 1980 to 27 percent at present. The most important constraint on China’s ability to make its weight felt in the world is geography, especially maritime geography. Reaching out for the Pacific Ocean, Chinese merchantmen and men-of-war are flanked by Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea; reaching out for the Indian one, by the Philippines and the Strait of Sumatra. Each of these is an unsinkable aircraft carrier. Xi Jinpin himself is well aware of these facts. As proved, above all, by his launching of the so-called belts and roads initiative whose objective is precisely to bypass his country’s problematic maritime communications by going by land instead.

Furthermore, China’s ascent has led to a loose, US-led, coalition of other countries forming around its borders; whether through its own fault or that of others, Beijing now has territorial disputes with every one of its fourteen neighbors. Other weaknesses include a declining birthrate that will soon cause its population to be surpassed by that of India; following decades of a “one child” policy, a shortage of young people to man its industries and a corresponding increase in the number of old ones who have to be supported; horrendous ecological problems that led to a shortage of water and made the air of many cities unfit to breathe; and, judging by the ubiquitous and enormously expensive measures used to safeguard internal security, a widespread fear that the Communist regime may not last forever and that, breaking up, it will drag much of the country with it.

These are serious problems that may well lead to the kind of crisis that has many predecessors in Chinese history and which, during the last 200 years alone, killed tens if not hundreds of millions of people. Still, what by now is a highly industrialized country of 1.3 billion—more than that of the US, the rest of NATO, and Russia combined—able and ambitious people will not be easily thwarted from pursuing its imperial goals.

Most important of all, China is and has always been not just the kind of political structure known as a state but a civilization. As such it is about as old as the pyramids; for that reason alone, there is a good chance it will last as long as they have done.

Tertius Gaudens

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These days when everyone is talking about Chatgpt, I find myself thinking of Pablo Picasso. Computers, he is supposed to have said, are completely useless. They can provide answers, but they cannot come up with questions. That is why, this time, I have chosen to put my thoughts in a question/answer format.

What was China’s original stance vis a vis the Ukrainian war?

In February 2022, just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaimed a “friendship without limits” which would bind their two countries together. One sign of this friendship is the fact that, during the first year of the war, Xi has spoken to Putin four times—but did not speak to Zelensky even once.

What came of it?

There has been some cooperation. But not as much as the above statement might imply. So far the most important form of aid China has given to Russia has been to act as a market for the latter’s exports. Including, besides minerals, oil (both crude and distilled), wood and wood products. Also, apparently, some dual use (military and civilian) technology. Also, political support at the UN, in the rest of the world, etc. Recently US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has raised Beijing’s ire by accusing it of preparing to provide arms to Russia. If the accusations are true, then that would mean a step closer towards direct intervention in the war. But whether they are true, and how extensive and significant the resulting aid would be, remains to be seen.

Why has China submitted a peace plan just now?

Hard to say. One thing is certain: it is not because of Xi’s tender, loving heart. One Chinese objective may be to save as much as possible from the general secretary’s belt and road initiative, which depends on peace in Eurasia and was disrupted by the war. Or simply because China, as a great power, feels it cannot afford not to submit some kind of plan for peace. Just as America did in 1905 (the Russo-Japanese War), 1917 (World War I) and 1974 (the Arab-Israeli War), to mention but a few.

God, Napoleon once said, resides in the details. So what are they?

China’s peace proposal consists of twelve rather general points that can be summed up more or less as follows. First, the need to “create conditions and platforms” for negotiations to resume, a process in which China is prepared to “play a constructive role.” Second, the need to avoid the threat or use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Third, the need for all parties to exercise “rationality and restraint” by respecting international law, avoiding attacks on civilians or civilian facilities as well as women and children. Fourth, China hopes to avoid “expanding military blocs–an apparent reference to NATO–and urges all parties to “avoid fanning the flames and aggravating tensions.”

Why does the West oppose the plan?

First, because it does not trust Putin to carry out any agreement he may sign, especially in regard to withdrawing his forces from Ukraine so as to restore the latter’s territorial integrity. Second, in the case of Europe in particular, because allowing Putin to retain at least some of his conquests would mean the end of the post-1945 world order which was based, if on anything at all, on the non-use of force in order to change borders. Third, in the case of Washington, because it comes too early and would not lead to a decisive loss of Russia’s power.

How likely is it to succeed?

Not very. Not just because the details remain unknown. But because Zelensky insists, in my view correctly, on the Russians withdrawing their forces from every inch of his country before serious negotiations can get under way.

So what does the future look like?

As both sides gird their loins for a long war of attrition, we shall see blood, toil, tears and sweat. Ending, perhaps, in bankruptcy; as happened to Britain in 1945 and as may yet happen to both Russia (should if suffer from more Western sanctions) and the US (as a result of its huge balance of trade and current account deficits, which the current war does nothing to reduce). And the EU? Just type “EU” and “bankruptcy” into your Google, and you’ll get your answer.

And where does China fit into all this?

Tertius gaudens.

How Much is Enough?

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How Much is Enough was the title of a 1971 volume published by the RAND (Research and Development) Corporation, an American think-tank with close ties to the United States Air Force which provided the funding. The authors, A. C. Enthoven and K. V. Smith, were both veterans of the Pentagon where they had worked for President Johnson’s Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. Both were experts on systems analysis. At that time it was a fairly new and exciting discipline that sought to subject as many problems as possible to mathematical analysis; including not just military problems but such as comprised health services, education, transportation and the like..

Some of the most important problems, taking up a considerable part of the book, concerned what people called the nuclear strategic balance between the US and the USSR. What, precisely were the objectives of building up America’s nuclear arsenal? How many nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles would be needed to deter the USSR from launching an attack? Supposing deterrence failed and nuclear war broke out, what did victory mean and how to ensure it went to America? Should there be one kind of missile/bomber aircraft or a mix of several different ones? If the latter, then how many of each kind? How to best use them, and against what targets? How many, if any, should be kept in reserve? What was the best way to render them invulnerable to a Soviet attack? And so on and so on.

Today in NATO’s capitals—Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, and to some extent less important ones too—somewhat similar questions are being asked. With this difference that, as far as the public record is concerned, the issue is not nuclear weapons but how many conventional ones, specifically tanks, to send to Ukraine’s aid. Where and how to employ them, and so forth. It goes without saying that the discussions are highly classified. Still it is possible to draw up a list of some of the most important questions that, in one combination or another, will have to be resolved before a decision is make.

  1. The nature of the mission. Is it to be defensive—just enabling Zelensky and his men to hold out until something gives—or offensive—liberating the Donbas and the Crimea? Suppose the latter is the case and these objectives are attained but the Russians still keep on fighting—as they did in 1812 and, in different ways, both in 1917-18 and 1941—what then? Note that, as a general rule, fighting on the defensive is easier and requires fewer forces than going on the offensive does.
  2. Losses. How many tanks are the various NATO countries prepared to lose, and in what time frame?
  3. Availability and production. Not only are at least some tanks going to be lost, but they are expensive beasts. A brand-new Leopard II costs about 15 million Euro. As a result, no country has an unlimited supply of the most modern tanks in particular. How many tanks can the NATO countries send into the field without putting their own security at too great a risk? How many can be sent now? How many in the future? How long will producing and fielding new ones take?
  4. Substitution. Suppose NATO country A sends some tanks to fight in Ukraine. Will the rest make up for the deficit?
  5. As the Russian invaders have discovered to their cost, and contrary to their image as kings of the battlefield, tanks are vulnerable. To other tanks. To certain kinds of anti-tank weapons. To drones, especially such as are used to attack them from above rather than from the front where tanks carry their thickest armor. Such being the case, tanks rarely operate on their own but are regularly escorted by other forces, primarily artillery, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft defenses, and engineers. How many of those can be sent now? How many in the future? How long will producing and fielding them take? How long will training Ukrainian troops in operating the tanks take?
  6. How many tanks can be supported and kept supplied? Bear in mind that tanks and their supporting forces require huge amounts of supplies. Depending on the terrain as well as the kind of operation, a modern battle tank such as the Leopard II will easily consume 3.4 L/km on road and 5.3 L/km off it. Plus ammunition, plus spare parts. Plus, in case they fight on the defense, various engineering materials. Plus all kinds of other supplies (food, water, medical supplies) which, though small in weight, are must arrive at the right place at the right time. To aggravate the problem, tanks rarely remain at the same place for long, forcing the logistic tails to follow them.
  7. What are the Russians likely to do in response? Open a new front by dragging Belarus into the war? Start at least some operations in NATO territory? Mobilize even more troops? Resort to tactical nuclear weapons?
  8. Finally, politics. Building a model of what a nuclear exchange might be like, Enthoven and Smith all but ignored politics. Indeed their tacit (but far from unreasonable) assumption was that, in that case, there would be no politics. However, the war in Ukraine is not a one-time spasm. If only for that reason, NATO planners cannot ignore them. How much political capital are the various countries, both leaders and populations, prepared to spend in assisting Ukraine? For how long?

In the long run it is this question that is likely to be the most important of all.

Guest Article: The Greatest Danger

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By

William S. Lind*

An article in the December 9, 2022 Wall Street Journal brought some rare good strategic news about the war in Ukraine.  It seems that a few of Ukraine’s allies understand that a complete Russian defeat could bring about the dissolution of the Russian state, and that this represents the worst possible outcome.

The Journal article, “Ukraine Minister Urges Bold Support from Western Allies,” reports that:

Ukraine’s foreign minister called on the country’s allies not to fear a possible breakup of the Russian state as a consequence of the war. . .

Though Kyiv’s Western allies are united over the goal of preventing a Ukrainian defeat, not all embrace the objective of a full-blown Ukrainian military victory. . . 

Some of these allies worry that such an outcome could destabilize the nuclear-armed Russian state, potentially leading to its fragmentation and wide-scale unrest, with unpredictable global consequences.

The Journal article does not identify the states that are expressing this concern, but hurrah for them.  They are daring to inject a note of realism into a policy world dominated by Washington’s neo-Wilsonianism, which has already led to the destruction of several states, including Iraq, Syria, and Libya.  These (undoubtedly European) governments expressing their concern about a potential Russian break-up seem to have grasped the central fact of the 21st century strategy, namely that a state collapse is a greater danger than state bad behavior.  Europe would be facing fewer problems today if Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya were all functioning states ruled by tyrants.

As I have written many times, state collapse is the greatest danger we face and it is spreading.  We may be witnessing it in Iran.  I too would be happy to see the fall of Iran’s Islamic theocracy and the return of the young Shah, who’s father it might be remembered, was overthrown because he tried to modernize his country. But if the result of the ayatollah’s demise is a collapse of the Iranian state, which is a fairly fragile state because much of the population is non-Persian, then we are better off with the theocrats.

China, too, is facing unprecedented disorder, largely because of misgovernment by Xi Jinping.  He botched the coronavirus problem (which probably started in a military lab in Wuhan that was tasked with developing biological weapons), collapsed the Chinese real estate market which is where most middle-class Chinese stashed their savings, and then rewarded himself with an unconstitutional third term.  A more effective assault of the legitimacy of Communist Party rule is difficult to imagine.  But as Washington delights in China’s problems, it forgets that China’s history is one of internal disunion, civil wars, and prolonged periods of warring states.  Mix that with nuclear weapons and, as with Russia, it should be clear that stabilizing the Chinese state is a primary strategic objective.  Of course, all the Wilsonians do is bleat more pathetically about “democracy” and “human rights.”

That is unrealism Washington may pay for heavily.  If Russia or China break up into stateless regions, the world economy will tank the way it did in the 1930s, or worse.  America will not escape a second Great Depression.  If Washington’s folly results in nuclear weapons hitting American cities, the Blob (the foreign policy establishment) will find itself out of work if not hanging from lampposts.  

America is deeply riven over irreconcilable cultural differences, to the point where all that holds it together is a seeming prosperity – seeming because it is built on ever-increasing levels of private and public debt.  When the inevitable debt/financial crisis hits, that alone may endanger the American union.  Add a weakening or vanishing of states around the globe and the 21st century could end up a repeat of the 14th century.  

Let us hope those European states worrying about the potential break-up of the Russian Federation don’t lose their nerve.

Addendum:  The recent “coup attempt” in Germany will go down in history as the “Clown Putsch.”  Not only did the idiots behind it think a couple dozen men could overthrow the German state, they imagined they could put Prince Henry of Reuss on the Imperial German Throne.  Every legitimist, monarchist and Reichsburger knows that the throne belongs to the head of the House of Hohenzollern and no one else.  When Germany again becomes a monarchy, it will be through constitutional means and it will reflect a broad consensus among the German people that they want a Kaiser.

*   This article has been posted on 22 December 2022 at TraditionalRight

Back to Basics

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The war between Russia and Ukraine has now been going on for ten months. With neither side close to victory or defeat, there is a good chance—mark my words—that it will go on for another ten, perhaps even more. Even if serious negotiations get under way, they will not necessarily end the shooting all at once. Such being the case, instead of adopting the usual method of listing all the changes that the war has brought, I want to try and put together a list of the things that it did not and almost certainly will not change.

Suggestions, welcome.

General

Contrary to the expectations of some, notably the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his 1989 essay, “The End of History,” war remains, and will remain, as important a part of global history as it has ever been.

There is no sign that the causes of war, be they divine anger with one or more of the belligerents (Isaiah), or the nature of man (Genesis) , or economic (envy and greed), or the absence of a legal system that can rule over sovereign entities, or simply the personal ambitions of certain rulers, have changed one iota.

War is a social phenomenon rooted in the societies that wage it. As a result, each society wages it in its own way. As society changes, so does war. To win a war, the first thing you need is to gain an understanding of what kind of war it is and what is all about (Prussian general and military critic Carl von Clausewitz).

The nature of war, namely a violent duel between two or more belligerents in which each side is largely free to do as he pleases to the other, has not changed one bit.

War remains what it has always been, the province of deprivation, suffering, pain and death. Also, and perhaps worst of all, bereavement; also of friction, confusion, and uncertainty. Often the more robust side, the one psychologically and physiologically better able to engage with these factors and keep going, will win.

In war everything is simple, but the simplest things are complex (Clausewitz).

Victory means breaking the enemy’s will (Clausewitz); defeat, to have one’s will broken.

All war is based on deception (the ancient, perhaps legendary, Chinese commander and sage Sun Tzu). The first casualty is always the truth.

“It is good war is so terrible, or else we would like it too much” (Confederate general Robert E. Lee; seconded, in 1914, by then First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill). War is the greatest fun a man can have with his pants on (anonymous).

“War is sweet for those who are not familiar with it” (Erasmus of Rotterdam).

“No one has ever benefitted from a long war” (Sun Tzu).

Preparation and Training

The best school of war is war.

“By learning to obey, he learnt to command” (Plutarch on Roman military commander Titus Quintus Flaminius).

 “Their maneuvers are bloodless battles, their battles bloody maneuvers” (Jewish historian Josephus Flavius on the Roman legions).

“I notice that the enemy always has three courses open to him, and that he usually chooses the fourth” (Helmut Moltke to his staff).

Strategic-Operational

As the belligerents exchange blow for blow in an attempt to knock out the enemy, war has an inherent tendency to escalate and run out of control.

God tends to be on the side of the larger battalions (Napoleon, who for German readers does not need an introduction). But not always.

“The best way to run a conflict is by negotiation. If you are too dumb to negotiate, use dirty tricks. If you cannot use dirty tricks, resort to maneuver; if you cannot maneuver, fight a battle; if you cannot fight a battle, lay siege” (Sun Tzu).

An army marches on its stomach (Napoleon).

The greater the distance between front and rear, the harder and more expensive it is to keep the army supplied (Sun Tzu).

War is an imitative activity that makes the belligerents resemble each other. The longer the war, the more alike they become.

Everything else equal, the defense is superior to the offense. First, because it does not face constantly extending lines of communication; second, because anything that does not happen favors it. The longer the war lasts, the more likely it is that the attack will turn into a defense.

Morale and Organization

“War is a physical and mental contest by means of the former” (Clausewitz).

In war the moral is to the physical as three to one (Napoleon).

It is with colored ribbons that men are led (Napoleon).

On organization: One Mameluke was a match for three Frenchmen. A hundred Frenchmen were a match for three hundred Mamelukes (Napoleon).

“Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four men who are less brave but trust each other will attack resolutely“ (19-century French military writer Ardant du Picq),

One bad commander is better than two good ones.

Technology and War

Depending on the way they are used, most distinctions between “offensive” and “defensive” weapons are meaningless.

Starting with the club and ending with the Internet, technology has done many things to war. However, it has done almost nothing to reduce, let alone eliminate, the distinctions between land, sea and air (and space) warfare. Nor between theory and practice, offense and defense, concentration and dispersal, a knock-out blow and attrition. And so on.

“Weapons, if only the right ones can be found, make up 90 percent of victory” (British General and military author J. F. C Fuller). Not true. Weapons can make a huge contribution to victory. However, their effects can be offset by superior doctrine, superior organization, superior command, superior training, and, above all, superior morale.

The longer a war lasts, the less important technological superiority tends to be.

Information and data are useful, in fact absolutely essential. But they are not enough. What is needed is lead and explosives. As well as, from time to time, cold steel to terrify the enemy.

On Nukes

War, even large scale war, between belligerents one of which is armed with nukes, remains quite possible. Whether the same applies to a situation when both sides has them remains to be seen. My guess? Probably not.

In so far as there is no defense, nuclear war is not war. It is mass murder.

“No one will ever dare use the damn things” (Field Marshal Bernhard Montgomery of Alamein on nukes).

The nice thing about nukes: If they are not used, no reason to worry. If they are used, no need to worry either.

Guerrilla and Terrorism

“The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we harass” (Mao Zedong).

The “forces of order,” as long as they do not win, lose; the guerrillas, as long as they do not lose, win.

Gender and War

“But for war, the world would sink into a swamp of feminism” Georg W. F. Hegel).

In war, women act mainly in two roles. First, as assistants and cheerleaders. Second, as targets and victims. Everything else is secondary. It would hardly be wrong to say that, without women in these roles, there would have been no war.

Finally –

No principles or doctrines, however good in themselves, well understood, and well applied, can win a war on their own. However, by freeing warriors from the need to think out everything afresh each time, they can provide a lot of help on the way to doing so.

Which Will It Be?

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The immediate threat to Ukraine having been lifted and with the war going on and on, history shows that one out of two opposed things are likely to happen.

First, the two sides may agree, either explicitly or tacitly, on a certain set of rules to govern their behavior. As by not employing certain weapons, notably in the West, poison. As by not combating certain classes of people (known, in the middle ages, as “innocents,”) and more or less leaving them alone. As by recognizing protected areas (often such as are considered holy, such as churches) where those innocents may find refuge. As by exchanging prisoners (often one of the first things they agree on). And as by recognizing the value of long-term assets (known, today, as “infrastructure”) such as fruit trees, cattle, canals, bridges, and the like.

Let me be clear: very few of these and other cases resulted from sheer goodness of heart on the part of the belligerents. In this as in other respects, what counts is calculation concerning each side’s interests. One of the most instructive instances of the way things worked occurred during the Dutch Revolt, alias the Dutch War of Independence, which started in 1568 and lasted, with one major interruption between 1609 and 1612, until 1648. Right at the beginning captured Dutch leaders, specifically two well-known noblemen (Egmont and Horne) were treated as rebels and executed by the Spanish commander in chief, the fearsome Duke of Alba. In 1576 the sack of Antwerp, known as the Spanish Fury, may have caused the death of no fewer than 17,000 of the city’s inhabitants. By 1625, things had got to the point where one of Alba’s successors, Ambrosio Spinola, not only accepted the surrender with honor of the important city of Breda but treated the defeated Dutch city commander, Justin Nassau, with extraordinary respect and dignity. Later the act of surrender was painted by one of the greatest artists of the age, Diego Velazaquez. Far from being an isolated case, it was based on a similar one by Rubens. Both contemporaries and subsequent critics agreed that it was fairly accurate. As one of them wrote, Velazquez’s masterpiece “demonstrates the glimpses of humanity that can be exposed as a result of the war and commends Spinola’s consideration for Nassau and the Dutch army.”  

Not by accident did the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius write his de Jure Belli ac Pacis, the most famous treatise ever on the topic, during the same year. There is, however, another possibility. Entering a war the troops, especially fresh ones with no experience of how frightful it really is, may be quite innocent. Innocent, they may find it hard to change their ordinary civilian behavior in favor of ruthlessly killing and destroying. For me personally, the nature of the problem was brought home by a conversation I had years ago with an Israeli battalion commander who took a critical part in the ferocious battles that kept the Golan Heights for Israel back in 1973. At first, he said, my men, most of them 20-21 years old and inexperienced, were so careful that they did not dare drive their tanks over the irrigation pipes that dotted the terrain. Very soon, though, all such considerations were flung aside. They did what had to be done and, at times, what did not need to be done. Including some things he, the battalion commander, did not want to talk about but which, many years later, still made him shudder.

To generalize on this, war is the province of intense, often maniacal, excitement. Not to mention hatred, suffering, pain, death, and mourning. Often the longer it lasts the more powerful these emotions; making the fighting harder and harder to control and carrying the danger turning it into an orgy of violence in which men no longer know what they are doing. The abovementioned Spanish Fury is one notable example of this. But there are plenty of others; just think of the terrible scene in book XXI of the Iliad where Achilles, having suffered the loss of his friend Patroclus, goes on a killing spree unequalled in the whole of literature. Such as, in the end, causes nature, in the form of the river Scamander, put an end to the slaughter by rising and trying to drown him.

At times the atrocities were planned. The Romans in particular developed sacking cities into a fine art. Putting up guards so as to prevent surprises, dividing the area into sections under strict command, and assigning troops to each one so as to ensure they did not start fighting each other over the booty. At times they were the result of the troops running out of hand, or so the responsible commanders, such as Titus during his destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE (as related by Josephus) and Wallenstein at Magdeburg in 1635, later claimed. At times they helped the cause, at times they did the opposite. To return to the Spanish Fury, historians have often taken it for a turning point that persuaded both sides that they had no choice but to fight on. Remarkably the two processes, the one that leads to war being humanized to some extent and the one that leads in the other direction, may proceed simultaneously.

To return to the present, the brutality of the Russian-Ukrainian War does not need to be recounted. On the other hand, we have seen several attempts to exchange prisoners and keep on exporting grain from Odessa and other ports. As of 2 December 2022, over 12 million tons of grain and other foodstuffs had been exported via the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Above all, Ukrainian claims notwithstanding there has been neither a Russian attempt to destroy the huge nuclear complex at Zaporizhzhia nor a great rise in radiation in the surrounding countryside. If there has been “nuclear terror,” then it seems to have been very limited indeed.

So which will it be?  

But It Is All We Have

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In theory, wars should end when the defeated have no one left to fight and the victors can do whatever they likes. In practice, many if not most wars do not end in this way. As the end approaches and few doubts remain concerning the outcome, the loser will try and get the best terms he can; whereas the victor may be tempted to spare himself further effort, treasure and blood. Another possibility is for stalemate to prevail; causing both sides to have second thoughts about whether their goals can in fact be achieved and start to look for a way out.

In almost every case, the opening of negotiations will be marked by some kind of ceremony, great or small. Once they get under way they may be either direct or indirect. Direct negotiations mean a meeting, or more likely a series of meetings, between the representatives of both sides; indirect ones, meetings in which intermediaries play a prominent, sometimes decisive, role. During the Middle Ages conducting them was normally the task of the Church; shuttle diplomacy, made famous in 1973-74 by U.S Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as he flew between Jerusalem, Cairo and Damascus, is by no means a modern invention. A similar role is likely to be played by some neutral party or else by the United Nations. Negotiations may be limited to the actual belligerents, or else they may involve other parties as well. As happened, for example, during the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, which was attended by delegations from almost every European state, and also during the Conference of Versailles in 1919-20.

Contrary to what many people think, peace-negotiations and fighting are by no means exclusive. Instead, very often they take place simultaneously. An excellent example was the so-called Hundred Years War. Starting in 1337 and ending in 1453, in reality it consisted of a whole series of wars, some simultaneous, some consecutive, with pauses in between. Throughout the hundred-and sixteen years it lasted there was probably not one in which peace negotiations did not go on; if not between the principals, i.e the kings of both countries, then between some of their subordinates who, under the prevailing decentralized feudal system, often enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom to do as they saw fit. One issue on which agreement was sometimes sought was an exchange of prisoners—just as it is today following the fall of Kherson.

The peace-negotiations surrounding the Thirty Years War started in 1635 but only ended in 1648 (not counting the closely related war between France and Spain, which went on until 1657). Attempts to end the Vietnam War got under way in 1969 but took four years to complete; just deciding on the shape of the conference table in such a way as to satisfy all the participants (the U.S, South Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and North Vietnam) required months.

Applying the above generalities to the current conflict in Ukraine, what can we reasonably expect?  Point number one: most likely, negotiations will be indirect at first but direct later on. At present Zelensky is determined not to sit down with Putin’s representatives, let alone the man himself. But not sitting down with Putin does not necessarily mean that any kind of negotiation between Ukraine and Russia must be ruled out. Some kind of intermediary, most likely the UN or else a country, such as India, currently not involved in the conflict may be called in to provide its good services. Another possibility is that Putin will be remeoved by his own people and that his successors will prove more amenable to negotiations than he has been.

Point number two: very probably, given how numerous the NATO countries are and the fact that Putin has very few close allies, he will reject a peace congress and insist on one-on-one negotiations. Formally at any rate other countries will be excluded, though they may try to position themselves on the sidelines so as to gather what crumbs they can.

Point number three: almost certainly, the negotiations will take a long time to complete. At least months, more likely years. As they go on, the shooting may stop—or else it will continue, albeit intermittently and on a reduced scale. See, by way of an example of the way the two things can mix, the Vietnam War.

Point number four: seen from Moscow, victory—whatever that may mean—seems far away, perhaps even further than it did on the day its armies first launched their invasion nine months ago. On the Ukrainian side, even taking into account Zelensky’s recent victories, it does not look as if his proclaimed aim of ejecting the Russians from all of the territory they have taken since 2014 is at all realistic. It being impossible to settle the issue by force of arms, it is very likely that, in the end, some kind of compromise will be struck. One that, while granting Ukraine much of what it wants, will at any rate enable Putin to claim victory; for example, by means of a NATO declaration that Ukraine will not be allowed to join that organization.

Finally: this short article is based on nothing else but history. Often in the past history has proved itself a poor guide to the future. But it is all we have

War in Ukraine, Again

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Reader, Please note: This interview was originally done in German for a paper called, Junge Freiheit (Young Freedom). But much of what it has to say also applies to NATO as a whole.

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JF: What do you think about Russia’s supply system? Some Western media have been claiming that inside the Kremlin, there are hot debates concerning the desirability and necessity of general mobilization.

MvC: You must realize that practically everything you, I, and most Westerners—who know no Russian and have no access to the original sources in the original language–learn about the conflict must pass through a series of lenses first. They are, 1. Ukraine’s own intelligence services and propaganda apparatus; 2. The West’s intelligence services; and 3. The West’s news agencies. Personally I would not consider any of these as particularly reliable; in any war, the first casualty is always the truth.

JF: Seen from a German point of view, how important is this war?

MvC: Should Russia win this war and be left in possession of Ukraine, Putin and his eventual successors will pose a vital danger to the West. As, to use an analogy, Hitler did after his defeat of Poland in 1939. That is why I am all in favor of Germany delivering weapons to Ukraine. However, there are several conditions that must be met first. Number one, Germany’s own defenses must not be significantly weakened; no point in holding the extremities if the center folds.  Number two, to maximize cost-effectiveness and prevent duplication the deliveries should be coordinated with the rest of NATO. Third, it is a question, not just of delivering weapons but of sending those that Ukraine needs most.

JF: Considering what we are told about the war, which systems would be most useful for Kiev?

MvC: Basically they are of three kinds. First, anti-aircraft defenses. Second, those that will enable the Ukrainians to identify and locate Russian targets, especially supply convoys, depots, etc., way behind the front. Third, those that will enable those targets to be hit and destroyed from a distance.

JF: The Americans and the Brits are sending many weapons to Ukraine. What has been the impact of those weapons so far?

MvC: Clearly they are very important indeed. Had it not been for them, the only strategy left to the Ukrainians would have been to allow the Russians to overrun their county as they themselves resorted to guerrilla and terrorism. Presumably the outcome would have been Russian reprisals and even greater death and destruction than is actually the case.

JF: People often speak of the drones Turkey has been providing Ukraine with. How important are they, really? Are we talking about an effective system, or is it just a question of reinforcing Ukrainian morale by delivering a blow here, a blow there?

MvC: It seems to be a very good system with many advanced capabilities. That is why, according to the media, the chief of Ukraine’s air force Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk, has called it “life-giving”. The popularity of the drone in Ukraine led to a song, “Bayraktar” being written about the drone while throwing insults at the Russian army and the invasion. Yet none of this means that it is some kind of silver bullet that will quickly win the war—several have been shot down.

JF: Recently we have seen the Ukrainians using very simple technologies such as pickup-mounted rockets. Operated by crews of four or five, they seem to be causing the Russians lots of trouble. Obviously war is assuming new faces. What else can we expect?

MvC: Almost any war, provided only it lasts long enough, will lead to one of two outcomes (or both). On one hand, it will accelerate the development and deployment of new weapons and weapon systems. On the other, it will cause old systems to be dragged out of the magazines, refurbished, and re-employed. Think of 1940. As the very time when the British, to combat the German submarines, were developing the world’s first shortwave radar they also leased fifty World War I-vintage destroyers from the U.S.

JF: It seems that the most recent Russian weapons, such as hypersonic cruise missiles and the T-14 tank are not going on active operations. Why is that?

MvC: The hyper fast weapon has been tested several times and seems to work.  Possibly the reason why it has not been used more often is because its range, about 2,000 kilometers, is way beyond that is needed in this particular conflict.

The T-14 appears to have experienced some technical problems which delayed its deployment. Serial production only began around the time the war broke out.

JF: Do you think Kiev will able to go on the offensive again? As by reconquering occupied territory and holding it against the Russians?

MvC: War is a dynamic business. Even during the years of stalemate in 1915-18 both sides on the Western Front—not to mention the Eastern one–were occasionally able to make limited gains. But will the Ukrainians retake all or most of the land they have lost? I doubt it.

JF: During our last interview, held early in the war, you warned against underestimating the Russians. Are you still of this opinion? In your view, how far is the Kremlin prepared to go?

MvC: In any war, underestimating the enemy is the greatest error of all. History is full of the cadavers of those who did so.

JF: Will they go all the way to the Crimea??

MvC: What do you mean? The Russians already occupy both the peninsula itself and the corridor leading to it. Albeit that their control of the latter is somewhat shaky.

What I Want of Joe Biden Revisited

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Shortly after Mr. Biden took office, I posted a short piece—No. 367, to be precise—on “What I Want of Joe Biden.” Now that the Congressional elections are just weeks away, I want to try and see the extent to which my

 January 2020 wishlist has been realized. So here it is, each wish followed by a short comment (in bold letters).

Domestic Policy

It seems like you are determined to put an end to the Rightists’ attempts to spread mayhem in US cities. Good. But do not forget to do the same with the Leftists who have been doing the same. Only more often.

Comment: Thank goodness, there has been no repetition of 6 January 2021. However, under the surface the pot goes on boiling. Both Right and Left are becoming more extreme, crushing the center between them. Partly in preparation for the next explosion, partly because of the efforts to ban or at least limit the acquisition of firearms, Americans of all persuasions now own more of the latter than ever before. And the number of mass shootings is increasing.

Strive to end the policies which, starting half a century ago, have discriminated against men. Especially such as are white, young, relatively poor, and without a college education. These men are not only frustrated. They have guns, and, some of them being former military or police, knew all too well how to use them. Nor will they necessarily give them up if called upon to do so. Should their grievances not be addressed the results will be incalculable. Quite possibly, worse than those of the Civil War in which 600,000 Americans—about six percent of the entire US population, as it then was—perished. Want a more up to date idea of what it will look like? Lebanon 1975-1990, provides a good model. As does Syria from 2011 on.

Comment: From what I read and hear it appears that discrimination against men, especially such as are white, young, relatively poor, without a college education and, for good measure, heterosexual has gotten worse rather than better. Barring radical change, an explosion of some kind is inevitable.

Immigration is a sticky subject. Some want more of it, some, less. Whatever you do about it, make sure the US regains control of it. A state that does not know who does and does not live within its territory is, in a very real sense, not a state at all.

Comment: As of 2016, the number of unauthorized immigrants was estimated at 10.7 million, representing 3.3% of the total U.S. population. Though perhaps making fewer headlines, the problem remains as sticky as it has ever been. Entire communities are collapsing under the burden. To repeat, a state that does not know who does and does not live within its territory is, in a very real sense, not a state at all.

Another sticky subject is abortion. Personally I hate it. But it seems to me that forcing a baby to be born against its parents will is even worse.

Comment: This is another field in which things have become worse rather than better. The Supreme Court’s decision to cancel Americans’ right to have an abortion and allow each state to go its own way in this respect has been a blow to the chin, especially that of the Democrats. While the fight is by no means over yet, in this field as in so many others extremism reigns.

Stop throwing vast sums away by lining the pockets of those out of work owing to the corona epidemic. Instead, set up work-creation programs. Just as your illustrious predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt, did during the New Deal. For nonacademic youth, set up apprenticeship systems like those of Germany and Switzerland. If college students are assisted in all kinds of ways, why not others? After all, the proverbial plumber, along with the electrician and auto-mechanic and carpenter and builder, is just as necessary to society as his (or her) academically-trained white collar colleague is. Nothing like a sense of purpose and $$$ in a boy’s pocket to turn him from a dangerous vandal into a law-abiding citizen.

Comment: Corona no longer makes many headlines. But it does remain a danger to be carefully considered before it breaks out again.

Foreign Policy

Coming to power, Trump promised to mend relations with Russia. Instead, his bluster has only made things worse. A strategy meant to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing by favoring one over the other would make better sense. The way Nixon did it back in 1972-74. Don’t call it divide et impera, of course. But do use the method.

Comment: Largely as a result of the war in Ukraine, relations with Russia have become much worse than they were in early 2021. Whatever attempt has been made to drive a wedge between Russia and China, moreover, it has not succeeded. In fact the unspoken alliance between the two countries is one major reason why the Russian economy has been holding on as well as it does.

Coming to power, Trump promised to mend relations with China. Again it has not happened, and now something very like the Cold War is rapidly escalating. Make up your mind, Joe, which of the two threats to the US, the Russian or the Chinese, is the more serious one. And act accordingly.

Comment: See the above two comments.

Mend relations with the EU. Trump’s attitude to Europe had been to treat it with contempt. As, for example, when the US tried to make it more difficult to complete Nord Stream, the pipe-system that will provide its allies with Russian natural gas while bypassing the Ukraine. As a result, the US is now at odds with all three of the world’s remaining greatest remaining powers. With all respect, Joe, this is too much. It reminds me of the time around 1890 when the Brits, then the world’s strongest power, spoke of “splendid isolation.” Also, of 1945 when Japan was waging war on the US, and Britain, and China, and finally the Soviet Union, simultaneously.

Comment: Judging by appearances, Biden does not dislike the Europeans as much as Trump did. Furthermore, the outbreak of the Ukrainian war has changed everything. Coming face to face with Russia, the US and Europe need each other more than ever, with the result that, so far, their alliance has held up fairly well. But whether, especially in the face of Russian-imposed sanctions in the energy sector, it can continue to do so remains to be seen.

Israel and the Middle East. Though an Israeli, I am no admirer of Netanyahu and would like to see a two-state solution implemented. However, the one thing Israelis and Palestinians have in common is their decades-long determination to reject any deal the other side would accept. On the other hand, in bringing together Israelis and a number of Arab/Moslem countries your predecessor, and especially his son in law Kushnir, has performed admirably. This is one part of your predecessor’s policy that you can adopt without hesitation.

Comment: Bringing together Israelis and Palestinians is a hopeless task. Not so bringing about a lasting peace between Israel and some Arab countries, especially those of the Gulf. True, under the surface things have not always been as polite and as friendly as one might hope them to be. Still the improvement that has taken place is very great. Well done, Joe.

In case you are thinking of it, don’t send troops to Libya; let them kill each other to their heart’s contents. Ditto Syria. But renew and, above all, extend Obama’s nuclear agreement with Iran. As long as it stayed in force it was good for the US, for Iran, and for the rest of the Middle East.

If ever there was a wise decision it ws to refrain from sending troops to Libya where they were sure to come under two fires and, in the end, condemned to humiliation and defeat. As to Iran, in the face of all the difficulties facing you, you deserve praise for trying to reach agreement. So stay the course.

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Both at home and abroad, adopt a style that is less inflammatory less divisive, more balanced, than the one your predecessor used. See the pic at the head of this post.

Comment: After Trump, anyone would appear less inflammatory, less divisive, and more balanced. So, once again, stay the course. And congrats on what you have achieved so far. It makes me wish you were some years younger.