On Escalation

To most people, whether or not a ruler or country “uses” nuclear weapons is a simple choice between either dropping them on the enemy or not doing so. For “experts,” though, things are much more complicated (after all making them so, or making them appear to be so, is the way they earn their daily bread). So today I am going to assume the mantle of an expert and explain some of the things “using” such a weapons might mean.

  1. Making verbal threats. Almost eight decades have passed since the first nuclear weapon was dropped on Hiroshima (without any kind of warning, nota bene). Since then there have been plenty of occasions when countries, statesmen and politicians threatened to use the nukes at their disposal: Eisenhower in 1953 in connection with the Koran War, Khrushchev in 1956 in connection with the Suez Crisis, Kennedy in 1962 in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis, Nixon in 1973 in connection with the Arab-Israeli War of that year, India and Pakistan in 1998 in connection with the Kargil War, and so on right down to Putin today. Some of the threats have been overt and rather brutal, others more or less veiled. Some were delivered directly, others with the help of a third party.
  2. To put some muscle behind the threat, weapons may be moved out of storage and put on display. Normally everything pertaining to nukes is kept highly secret. Here and there, though, countries have allowed their nuclear warheads, or replicas of them, to be shown, photographed, and celebrated for what they might do to opponents. In particular Russia, China and North Korea like to parade their intercontinental ballistic missiles. True monsters they are, any one of which can demolish almost any city on earth within, say, less than an hour of the order being given. Some such displays are accompanied by verbal threats, others not. At times the sequence is reversed in the sense that display precedes threats rather than the other way around.
  3. Raising the state of alarm. Again contrary to what most people think, putting nuclear weapons to use, in other words commanding and controlling them, is by no means simply a matter of pushing the proverbial button. First, those in charge of the weapons must make sure they are always ready to be launched at a moment’s notice. Second, they must make sure the weapons are not launched by accident, or by unauthorized personnel, or by an authorized person either deliberately disobeying orders or going out of his or her mind. The two requirements, speed (lest the weapons are targeted and destroyed before they can be launched) and reliability contradict each other; making the problem of nuclear command and control as difficult as any we humans have to face. Raising the state of alarm will cut through some parts of the problem—though just how, and to what extent, is rightly kept one of the most guarded secrets of all.
  4. Going a step further, weapons and delivery vehicles may be tested. Pace any number of computer models and exercises, ultimately the only way to make sure one’s nuclear weapons will work is to test them. Such tests, of course, may also be used in an attempt to influence the enemy’s behavior—as was notoriously the case when India and Pakistan both tested a number of weapons back in 1998. Some tests may be conducted in or over some outlying part of one’s own country as American, Soviet, British, French, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani and North Korea ones all were. Others may take place over some part of the vast no-man’s world that constitutes the earth’s oceans; for example, the Israeli-South African bomb said to have been detonated over the Indian Ocean back in 1979. It is also possible to send some of one’s missiles hurtling over enemy country, as North Korea has often done in respect to Japan.

Each of the above mentioned methods represents a different way of (hopefully) “using” one’s nuclear weapons in order to influence the enemy’s behavior without bringing about Armageddon. Historically all have been implemented quite often, some even as a matter of routine. The problem is that, since no country or leader has ever admitted giving way to a nuclear threat, it is hard to say how effective such threats were.

There are, however, additional ways states might put their nuclear weapons to use.

  1. Launching a limited nuclear strike at some less important enemy target such as outlying, more or less unpopulated, spaces or else a ship at sea. All in the hope of scaring the opponents to the point where he’ll give way to one’s demand, but without risking a nuclear response.
  2. Launching a limited nuclear strike at the enemy’s nuclear or, in case he does not have them, conventional forces. Targets might consist of early warning installations, anti-aircraft and missile defenses, troop-concentrations, communication centers, depots, etc.
  3. Launching a limited nuclear strike at the enemy’s industrial infrastructure.
  4. Launching a nuclear strike at all of the targets mentioned in bullets 5 to 7.
  5. Launching a full scale nuclear strike at the enemy’s main demographic centers.

One well known nuclear strategist, Herman Kahn, in his 1962 book distinguished among no fewer than forty different stages on the “escalation ladder.” In practice, there are two reasons why the ladder is largely theoretical. First, the various stages are likely to be hard to keep apart. Second, even if the side using the weapons does keep them apart in his own mind, the other is highly unlikely to share his views. In particular, a strike that one side sees as relatively harmless may very well be perceived by the other as a mortal blow or something close to it, thus bringing about the very retaliation he seeks to avoid.

As far as publicly available sources allow the rest of us to judge, up to the present Putin has limited himself to the first of these nine stages. That is less–considerably less–than some others have done before him. Still day by day his chances of winning” this war seem to dwindle. So the question is, will he stop there?

Nuclear Games

Fission and fusion. Warheads and delivery vehicles. First strikes and second strikes. Counterforce and countervalue. Shots across the blow and mutually assured destruction. For decades on end these and any number of similarly mysterious terms have been circling the planet, reflecting the efforts of statesmen, politicians, defense officials, soldiers, academics and journalists to understand what nuclear weapons are all about, by whom and how they might be used, and what the consequences of their use might be. Some of the discussions are public, a great many others classified. Some are committed to paper, but a great many others take the form of wargames in which teams of highly qualified analysts, supported by as much computing power as it takes, try to answer these and similar question for their superiors’ benefit—superiors who, judging by the little that has been published on their reactions, may not even be aware that the wargames are taking place, let alone taken an interest in them.

Still at bottom the issues are very simple. Seven months after their failure to subdue Ukraine by means of a short and decisive coup de main, Putin and his staff seem to be running out of options. They can try and occupy the enemy’s most important cities, i.e Kiev, Kharkov, and perhaps Odessa. However, judging by what happened in the Donbas such an attempt will almost certainly involve them in prolonged, brutal and very bloody urban warfare for which their troops seem to be unprepared and in which victory is by no means assured. They can subject these and other cities to an even more intensive bombardment than has been the case so far, but such a move is unlikely to bring about a quick surrender on the enemy’s part. They can take the offensive in other parts of Ukraine, but given that country’s size and the sparsity of its population many if not most of those efforts are likely to hit little but empty air. Finally, following a strategic switch that has been under way since May, they can renounce the offense in favor of the defense and, by so doing, give up any thought of victory at all.

Even assuming Russia can successfully overcome its current shortage of military manpower, none of the options appear very attractive.  This is a fact of which Putin must be aware and which, at some point, may drive him to despair. Enter nuclear weapons. Here the all-important, indeed decisive, factor is that Ukraine does not have them. Perhaps the more the pity; judging by everything that has happened and not happened since 1945, in that case there is an excellent possibility that the war would never have broken out in the first place.

Next, suppose Putin wants to use his nuclear weapons. However, in that case it is not at all clear what he would do with them. The Ukrainian armed forces, made wise by the invasion, are fighting in too dispersed and mobile a manner to present attractive targets. For the Russians to ignore that fact will only lead to the Ukrainians switching to guerrilla and terrorism, a process that is already well under way. Destroying Ukraine’s vital infrastructure—dams, power plants, airports, and the like—will only make the burden of one day occupying and administering the country all the greater; besides, as evens in the Donbas show, such destruction can be achieved almost equally well by conventional means. Admittedly bombing cities out of existence, as Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, is an option. However, exercising it will end up by creating similar and even greater problems for the Russians to deal with. The more so because of the radioactivity that will surely result. So I consider Putin’s words on the topic idle threats. They are relevant only in case Zelensky and NATO mount a large-scale military offensive, complete with intensive air bombardment, into Russian territory—something that is unlikely to happen.

On the other hand, now that the US and NATO seems to be winning the war, they have no interest in nuclear weapons either. The noises they are making, some overt, others covert, are meant primarily if not exclusively to remind Putin of the terrible consequences that will follow if he goes too far. What “too far” might mean, and what the response might be, is deliberately being left obscure. Precisely how NATOs warnings link up with the factors mentioned in the previous paragraph is also not clear.

The conclusion from this is that no one wants, or should want, to see nuclear weapons used in action. That does not, repeat not, mean that the world is safe and that the weapons in question, complete with their PALs (positive action links, mechanisms explicitly designed to prevent any but authorized personnel, normally heads of state), will always remain in the places they are stored. The situation in Ukraine is unstable and constantly changing. Most of us cannot even imagine the stress to which the most important actors are subject. Under such circumstances words, especially words deliberately used to conceal the exact circumstances under which the weapons may be used, are easily misunderstood. War being a tit-for-tat business, the greatest danger is that of escalation. Meaning the likelihood that, once a single weapon is set off, all will be.

As Clausewtiz says, most barriers only exist in men’s minds. That is why, once they are breached, rebuilding them may be difficult if not impossible.

Guest Article: Playing with Nuclear War

by

Bill Lind

As of this writing (September 12), Ukraine’s counter offensives appear to be succeeding.  The widely telegraphed offensive in the south is making some progress.  But it looks as if its primary role was deception, where it has already succeeded because Russia responded by drawing down its forces in eastern Ukraine, opening the door for the main Ukrainian counteroffensive.  That is moving forward at Blitzkrieg pace, to the point where Russian units are disintegrating.  All this is, of course, wonderful news for Ukraine and for anyone who wants to see David beat Goliath.

But interests must be matters of cold calculation, not warm emotions.  Foreign policy is more than consulting Sant’s list of who is naughty or nice.  Yes, the Russians have been beasts and their invasion of Ukraine has been criminal.  But Ukraine’s victories are not good news for America’s most vital interest.

What is that most vital interest?  Avoiding nuclear war.

Throughout the Cold War, everyone in Washington understood this.  Party did not matter, liberal or conservative was of no consequence.  The whole foreign and defense policy establishment knew we and the Soviets were walking on eggs.  The slightest mis-step could mean nuclear catastrophe.  We came close on occasion; the closest was probably during the Cuban missile crisis, when the skipper of a Soviet submarine was about to fire a nuclear torpedo at an American destroyer.  His politruk stopped him.  As the representative of the Party, he knew Moscow did not want nuclear war any more than Washington did.

But it seems all the adults in the room died and a bunch of drunk teenagers now have their fingers on the button.  Russia has hinted from the outset of its invasion of Ukraine that the nuclear option is available.  If the Russian army is beginning to disintegrate, I suspect that option is or soon will be on the table.

What would it mean?  My guess is one or more nuclear strikes in western Ukraine, aimed at the supply lines bringing in American and European weapons.  Initially, I don’t think they would attack NATO territory.  But the winds blow east to west in Europe, and the fallout could be considered a weapon on its own.

This is, of course, madness in Moscow.  President Putin regrets the break-up of the Soviet Union; some old Party hands should remind him that no Soviet leader would ever have started a nuclear war.  Had one moved to do so, he would immediately have been recognized as a Trotskyite and toppled.

Unfortunately, the situation in Washington is as bad or worse.  Some circles there are planning to respond with American nuclear strikes if Russia uses nukes in Ukraine.  But what could our targets be?  If we target Russian-held regions of Ukraine such as Donbas, we create the bizarre situation where Moscow and Washington are both nuking Ukraine.  The latter will find out what it was like to be Germany during the Thirty Years War, the place where everyone from Swedes to Spaniards fought it out.  Some German towns still have not recovered.

It does not stop there.  These same circles (hint: there’s a “neo” in their name) know this, plan to hit targets on Russian territory and are calmly discussing the fact that we might lose some east coast cities.  The U.S. military has reportedly been directed to develop contingency plans for such a situation.

Playing with nuclear war goes beyond folly.  It is insanity, plain and simple, straight out of Dr. Strangelove.

If there are any adults left in Moscow or Washington, they need to kick the teenagers out of the room, consider their interests rationally and sit down and talk.  Let us imagine the man we need, old Bismark, returns as the Ghost of Crises past (I think Turkish President Erdogan might serve as his avatar).  Here’s a draft agreement:

Russia has a legitimate interest in Ukraine, namely that it does not constitute a threat to Russia.  That means Ukraine will not be allowed to join NATO, although it may join the EU.  If Ukraine succeeds in retaking Donbas, it returns to Ukraine, but as a special autonomous region with some degree of self-government and a general amnesty.  If Russia can hold it, it stays Russian.

Russia keeps Crimea, because it has historically been Russian.  Like the Donbas, the Russian corridor connecting Russia proper to Crimea stays with whoever holds it when the fighting stops.

In return for Russia getting Crimea, Ukraine gets East Prussia (now called the “Kaliningrad Oblast”) and a new, broad-gauge, heavy-haul railway connecting Konigsberg to Ukraine, giving Ukraine two seas through which it can export its agricultural products.

Finally, Russia joins an international consortium to rebuild Ukraine, with Russia allowed to concentrate its efforts in towns and cities where the population is heavily Russian.

In all this, there is one point Washington must keep in mind above all others: the United States has no vital interests at stake in Ukraine.  That is why it is insanity for us to be contemplating nuclear war.  For what?  How do we benefit?

The thought that, having avoided nuclear war with the Soviet Union for all those years, we are now planning for a nuclear war with a non-Communist Russia is beyond rational comprehension.

 

Will Russia Win?

Like almost all other Westerners, at the time the Russian-Ukrainian War broke out in February 2022 I was convinced that the Russians would fail to reach their objectives and lose the war. Putting the details aside, this prediction was based on the following main three pillars.

First, the numerous failures, after 1945, of modern, state-run armed forces to cope with uprisings, insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, asymmetrical warfare, and any number of similar forms of armed conflict. Think of Malaysia—yes, Malaysia, so often falsely claimed by the British as a victory. Think of Algeria, think of Vietnam, think of Iraq, think of dozens of similar conflicts throughout Asia and Africa. Almost without exception, it was the occupiers who lost and the occupied who won.

Second, the size of Ukraine’s territory and population made me and others think that Russia had tried to bite off more than it could swallow. The outcome would be a prolonged, very bloody and very destructive, conflict that would be decided not so much on the battlefield but by demoralization both among Russia’s troops and among its civilian population. As, indeed, happened in 1981-1988 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, only to get involved in a lengthy counter-insurgency campaign that ended not just in military defeat on the ground but in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This line of reasoning was supported by the extreme difficulty the Russians faced before they finally succeeded in bringing Chechnya, a much smaller country, to heel.

Third, plain wishful thinking—something I shared with most Western observers. Including heads of state, ministers, armed forces, intelligence services, and the media.

Since then four very eventful months have passed. As they went on, the following factors have forced me to take another look at the situation.

First, the Ukrainians are not fighting a guerrilla war. Instead, as the list of weapons they have asked the West to provide them with shows, they have been trying to wage a conventional one: tank against tank, artillery barrel against artillery barrel, and aircraft against aircraft. All, apparently, in the hope of not only halting the Russian forces but of expelling them. Given that the Russians can fire ten rounds for every Ukrainian one, such a strategy can only be a sure recipe for defeat.

Second, a change in Russian tactics. Greatly underestimating their enemies, the Russians started the war by attempting a coup de main against the center of Ukrainian power at Kiev. When this failed it took them some time to decide what to do next; they may even have replaced a few of their top ranking generals. But then they regrouped and switched to the systematic reduction of Ukrainians cities and towns. Much as, in 1939-40, Stalin and his generals did to Finland. As in both that war and World War II as a whole they resorted to what has traditionally been their most powerful weapons, i.e massed artillery. It now appears that the change enabled them to reduce their losses to levels that they can sustain for a long time. Perhaps longer than the Ukrainians who, by Zelensky’s own admission, are losing as many as 100-200 of their best fighters killed in action each day.

Third, Western military technology, especially anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank weapons, and drones may be excellent. However, limited numbers, the result of years and years of parsimony and the belief that war in Europe had become impossible, plus the need to retrain the relevant Ukrainian personnel, means that it has been slow to arrive in the places where it is most needed. Not to mention the fact that, whereas the Russians are fighting close to home, NATOs lines of communication stretch over hundreds of miles all the way from Ukraine’s borders with Poland, Slovakia and Romania in the west to the Donbas in the east. Almost all the terrain in between is flat, devoid of shelter, and thinly populated.  Meaning that it is ideal for the employment of airpower, precisely the field in which Russian superiority over Ukraine is most pronounced.

Fourth, strict censorship is making the impact of Western economic sanctions on Russia’s population hard to asses. If there is any grumbling, it is being energetically suppressed. Meanwhile, a look at the macroeconomics seems to show that Russia is coping much better than many Westerners expected. Gold reserves have been inching up, enabling Putin to link his currency to gold—the first country to do so since Switzerland went in the opposite direction back in 1999. The Ruble, which early in the war came close to collapse, is back to a seven-year high against the dollar, trend upward. Given the fall in imports as well as the tremendous rise in energy prices, more money is flowing into Russia’s coffers than ever before. Most of that money comes from selling energy, foodstuffs and raw materials to countries such as China and India. China in turn is now the world’s number one industrial power; once its current troubles with COVID-19 are over, it should be well able to provide Russia with almost any kind of industrial product it needs, and do so for a long time to come.

Fifth, the economic impact of the war on the West has been much greater than anyone thought. Saving Ukraine form Russian’s clutches is not like doing the same with Afghanistan. On both sides of the Atlantic inflation is higher than it has been at any time since 1980. Especially in regard to energy, which Russia is refusing to provide Europe with, it is giving rise not just to confusion but to some real hardship. Should it continue, as it almost certainly will, it will give rise to growing popular discontent with the war and demands that their countries’ involvement in it be reduced or brought to an end.  Even if that end means abandoning Ukraine and allowing Putin to have his way with it.

Last not least, beginning with the Enlightenment the West has long preened itself on being a fortress where liberty, law and justice prevail. Now the repeated, highly publicized, requisitioning of the property of so-called oligarchs is beginning to make some people wonder. First, no one knows what an “oligarch” is. Second, the fact that some “oligarchs” have been in more or less close touch with Putin over the years does not automatically turn them into criminals. Third, supposing they are criminals, it is not at all clear why they were left alone for so long and only began to be targeted after the war broke out. Could it be that, in combating the oligarchs, the West is undermining the justice of its cause?

To be sure, we are not there yet. But as growing number of statements that the war is going to be a long one show, it is now primarily a question of who can draw the deepest breath and hold out the longest. And when it comes to that, Russia’s prospects of coming out on top and obtaining a favorable settlement are not at all bad.

The Other Side of the Coin

As many readers of this blog know, NATO and the US have been pressing Switzerland to abandon its long-standing policy of neutrality and join them in supporting the good, blameless, democratic Ukrainians against the big bad Russians. Conversely many Swiss media, reluctant to see their country embark on that road, has been bristling with stories that, being less than complimentary to Ukraine, are not always easy to find in English-language sources. Based on an article in Weltwoche, a moderately right-wing Swiss weekly, the following are summaries of a few such stories.

  1. In the West, the terms “Russia” and “oligarchs” are regarded as almost synonymous. In fact, though, Ukraine’s Zelensky is quite as dependent on filthy rich, not always nice and kind, backers as his rival Putin is. In return, no sooner had he come to power in April 2019 than he started pushing through a comprehensive program aimed at privatizing state-owned land. 40 million hectares of it, no less. Continuing policies originally put in place when Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, this reform was accompanied by others: including cuts in social services, changes in labor law aimed at favoring employers at workers’ expense, and more. The result? In 1991 its per capita income was slightly than to that of Russia. Over the next thirty years it dropped to just one third of that figure. No wonder that, by the time the war broke out in February 2022, public support for Zelensky had dropped by two thirds.
  2. Again in the West, the terms “Russia“ and “corruption” are regarded as almost synonymous. In fact, however, there is little to choose between Russian corruption and that which prevails in Kiev. According to one source quoted by Weltwoche, back in 2015 Ukraine was the most corrupt country in Europe. Six years later Transparency International, a Berlin-based organization, ranked it 122nd in the world, just barely ahead of Russia. Corruption, so Weltwoche, is endemic: in ministries, in the bureaucracy, in the public services, in parliament, in the police, and—surprise surprise–even in the High Court specifically charged with combating it. Zelensky himself is said to have received millions from questionable backers in- and out of the country; some of the money was registered on his wife’s name, and some of it was deposited offshore. Among those implicated was Hunter, the son of U.S President Joe Biden. Presumably it was these contributions which, among other things, enabled Zelensky to spend some of his vacations not in the Carpathians or on the shores of the Black Sea—both of them prime vacation areas, by the way–but in the kind of Western resorts that charge tens of thousands of dollars per night.
  3. When Putin proclaimed that one of his objectives was to “de-Nazify” Ukraine, Western media were quick to point out that Zelensky himself is Jewish or, at any rate, has Jewish roots. That is true, but two points seem worth making. First, those Jewish roots are rather remote and, inside Ukraine, are rarely mentioned. Second, as may be clearly seen from the tattoos they carry on their faces, trunks, shoulders and arms, many of Zelensky’s most determined supporters identify with the Nazis, Hitler and the SS specifically included. At least one, chief of the so-called National Corps (and one time member of parliament) Andryi Bilestsky, has gone so far as to declare a crusade against the Jew-directed efforts of “sub-human” peoples to do away with the white races.  Indeed Ukrainian right-wing organizations are not unlike America’s militias. Except that they are much better organized, armed, and trained; and except that, rather than being marginal to the country’s political life, they form the indispensable mainstay of Zelensky’s regime.
  4. Even before the beginning of the war, Zelensky’s own regime was showing signs of becoming increasingly authoritarian. Opposition politicians, accused of cooperating with the enemy, have been intimidated, kidnapped and, occasion, shot at. Opposition media have been closed, opposition parties prohibited.
  5. Arrests, kangaroo courts, and even torture have become widespread. It is true that Ukrainian troops did not abuse the civilian population quite as much as Russian ones did (not operating on Russian territory, they simply did not have the opportunity). The abuses that did take place, though, were bad enough; as, for example, when Ukrainian militiamen, acting in broad daylight, seized known left-wingers, stripped them, and beat them up. While the West has focused on the Russian maltreatment of Ukrainian (and a few foreign) prisoners of war, it has ignored cases when Ukrainian troops opened fire on Russian prisoners.

The Weltwoche article that served me as the basis for this post takes up four pages of dense German. I got them down to just eight hundred words, the normal length of an Op-Ed. By no means do I wish to imply that Russia is right and Ukraine, wrong. Only, perhaps, that both sides are not as different as they are usually made out to be—and that, as time goes on, they are steadily becoming less so.

Truth to Say, Qui lo Sa?

Now that the initial momentum has been spent and replaced by attrition (on both sides), it is possible to speculate about the outcome of the war everyone has been talking about for the last few months.

So here we go.

Outcome No 1. The Ukrainians, supported by the West, succeed in pushing the Russians out and accomplishing their stated objective, which is to reassert their territorial integrity. Whereupon peace talks get under way and everyone goes home happily enough; this is the way eighteenth century “cabinet wars” used to end. Unfortunately, given the Russians’ shorter lines of communication as well as their superior firepower, this outcome is the most unlikely of all.

Outcome No 2. A variant of this outcome is the possibility that internal developments in Russia will lead to a change of policy. Some of Putin’s collaborators, disappointed with the lack of progress and worried about the long-range prospects of their country (and themselves, of course) mount a coup. Or else the combination of reluctant troops with popular discontent forces them to change course. Speculation about this scenario, particularly the one that sees Putin being forced out of office by illness, has ben rife for months.

Outcome No. 3. As both sides keep sending in reinforcements, stalemate ensues. This, in fact, is the situation at present  As time goes on, the populations of more than one NATO country begin to realize the full cost, economic and social and political, of supporting Ukraine. Dissenting voices begin to be heard and cannot be silenced. Making their way from the bottom upward, they cause part of the leadership to wonder how long this can go on. As discontent spreads Kiev’s own allies start putting it under pressure. By way or doing so they may even start reducing or delaying aid. Think of the American retreats from Vietnam (where they abandoned  their South Vietnamese allies), Iraq (where, back in 1991, they did the same to the Shiites), Afghanistan (where they simply left) and Iraq again. Deprived of Western support, the Ukrainians are forced to make the best peace they can.

Outcome No 4. Reorganizing and bringing their full resources to bear, the Russians renew their offensive. No more attempts to end the war with a singe mighty strike. Proceeding systematically and using artillery in order to reduce their own casualties, they attack one city after another to force it to surrender or, if that does not work, reduce it to rubble. Ukraine cracks under the pressure. The government is forced to flee. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare get under way and are suppressed, albeit at the cost of almost unimaginable death, suffering and destruction. As used to be said of the Romans, they made a desert and called it peace.

Outcome No. 5. Terrorism and guerrilla get under way. However, thanks largely to Ukraine’s large size and long borders with NATO countries, they cannot be suppressed any more than they could  in any number of post-1945 wars.  Long-term chaos ensues and may spread to neighboring countries.

Not only may any of these happen, but they may do so in an endless number of combinations and variations. Truth to say, qui lo sa?

The Iron Dice Keep Rolling

A question about the Ukrainian War that many Westerners have been asking—and that must have been haunting those hard-faced men in the Kremlin ever since they started their offensive on 24 February—is what they, the hard-faced men, have been doing wrong. Also, what the Ukrainians, waging war under the remarkable leadership of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, have been doing right. Focusing, as far as possible, on the military sphere as opposed to the political and economic ones, and recognizing that the time for a comprehensive analysis of the war has not yet arrived, the following represent some preliminary answers. Such as may also be useful to other militaries which are watching events and trying to draw lessons from them.

What the Russians have been doing wrong

First, the Russians have greatly underestimated the Ukrainians’ determination and willingness to fight. How this could have happened is anything but clear. Perhaps it was born out of previous Russian successes in Georgia (2008), the Crimea (2014) and Nagorno-Karabakh (2020). Or else they may have fallen victim to their own propaganda about Russians and Ukrainians having been one people for so long that the latter would not fight the former in earnest.

Second, and possibly because of the above, the Russians did not mobilize sufficient forces. The above apart, they may also have feared domestic problems in case they went too far in this respect. However that may be, contrary to the prevailing impression in terms of the number of available maneuver battalions the Ukrainians were not at all inferior to the Russians. Fighting on interior lines as they did, in places they may even have been superior.  Conversely, sheer lack of numbers seems to have played a major role in the Russian failure to capture, first Kiev and then Kharkov. To make things worse, most of the Russian ground forces consist of short service, insufficiently motivated and trained, conscripts.

Third, it would seem that the Russian General Staff was unable to decide what the most important objective (Schwerpunkt) of their offensive was going to be. As a result they tried to advance in no fewer than four different directions at once—from the north on Kiev, from the east on the Donbas, and from the Crimea both east and west. Later they even added another thrust, i.e the one on Kharkov. Had the Russians enjoyed a considerable numerical superiority, such a strategy might have been feasible; as I just said, however, of such a superiority there could be no question. As a result, out of the five offensives three, i.e the one against Kiev, the one against Kharkov, and the one reaching west towards Odessa had to be abandoned. Only the one against the Donbas really made progress—but only very slowly, and only at high cost. 

Fourth, the Russians chose the wrong season for launching their offensive: first snow, making movement difficult, then thaw, then mud. There is no question that, militarily speaking, it would have been better to wait another few weeks; why Putin did not do so is unknown.

Fifth, given the scale of preparations and the time it took to make them there was no question of the Russians enjoying the benefit of surprise. Conversely, the Ukrainians had all the time in the world to get ready.

Sixth, as the enormous traffic jam on the roads leading south from Russia to Kiev showed, logistic planning was totally inadequate. The outcome seems to have been on- and off shortages of fuel and ammunition (which, in any modern war, form the bulk of the troops’ requirements) and even food.

Seventh, contrary to expectations the Russians did not make extensive use of their superior air force. First, the attempt to end the war by means of a coup de main directed against a major Ukrainian airport on the outskirts of Kiev ended in failure. Subsequent air operations, all kinds of missiles included, appear to be scattered and ineffective. True, Ukraine’s armament industry has been destroyed. But Russian airpower does not seem to have availed them much against mobile Ukrainian forces in the field.

Finally, a “cyberwar Pearl Harbor,” as it has sometimes been called, did not materialize. To be sure, there has been a great many attacks some of which knocked out websites, disrupted communications, and the like. However, large scale anarchy, let alone paralysis, did not result. Whether that is because of insufficient preparation or because the other side was ready is not clear.

What the Ukrainians have been doing right

First, though both sides have relied on semi-regular militias (including, in the Russian case, mercenaries) to do part of their fighting, this form of military organization has played a greater part on the Ukrainian side than on the Russian one. Not only does this fact help explain the way the latter’s numerical superiority has been largely obviated, but it provided the Ukrainians with a certain kind of flexibility. Enjoying a large degree of autonomy as they do, the militias could not be neutralized simply by striking at central Ukrainian headquarters.

Second, whereas the invaders must generate their own intelligence, the Ukrainians can receive theirs from almost every man, woman and child in the country. The fact that, though the weapons used on both sides are often almost identical, the Russians have chosen to mark theirs with large letters Z helps.

Third, the Ukrainians have been making unexpectedly good use of modern weapons, especially the drones needed for in-depth reconnaissance behind the front. And including also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles generously provided by the West.

Fourth, on the whole they have not tried to stop the Russians by waging large sale warfare, army against army, in the open. Instead they defended the cities where winning requires the kind of numerical superiority the Russians do not have.

Finally, while the destruction inflicted on many of Ukraine’s cities has been terrible, wherever possible the Ukrainian military did not fight to the last man and the last bullet. Instead, it regularly left room for their forces’ more or less orderly retreat. Mariupol, where they allowed themselves to be put under siege, is the exception, not the rule. One which, in the future, they would be wise to repeat.

In summary

In summary the Russians, by underestimating the opponent and giving up on surprise, have committed the worst of all military sins. By contrast, the Ukrainians have exploited the Russian mistakes right up to the hilt.

However, two points are worth making. First, the available information is slanted, unreliable and, above all, extremely fragmentary. Nowhere is that more the case than in the number of dead and injured on both sides; as the saying goes, in any war the first casualty is always the truth. Second, this war is by no means over yet. The signs are that the iron dice will keep rolling for a long time, and how they will ultimately land is anyone’s guess.

What Putin Wants

First, a disclaimer. President Putin has neither been whispering in my ear nor appearing in my dreams. Nor did his advisers, senior or junior, civilian or military, official or unofficial. Nor, on the other hand, do I necessarily trust any of the usual sources mentioned by Western media. Meaning, their own countries’ intelligence services, the reports of their journalists and cameramen on the ground, tales told by Ukrainian soldiers, tales told by local Ukrainians, tales allegedly originating in Russian POWs, and so on. All these different sources, and many others besides, have their limits. Many also have an ax to grind: either to deny Russian atrocities or to emphasize them as much as possible.  It is as people say. In war, any war without exception, the first casualty is the truth.

That said, and taking into account not merely Putin’s utterances but some knowledge of Russian history—as gained, among other things, by researching and writing my just-published book, I, Stalin—it seems to me that, in invading Ukraine, Putin and his advisers may be credited with a number of objectives. Here they are listed in what I think is an order of ascending importance.

First, wresting the Donbas away from Ukraine and establishing full control over it. As Lenin himself pointed out during his last years, the Donbas by virtue of its vast reserves of coal and iron ore has long had the potential to turn into a first-class industrial zone. To put those reserves to use, all that was needed was organization—Bolshevik organization.  Under Stalin, and starting with the adoption in 1928 of the First Five Year Plan, the wheels began to turn. Except during World War II, when the Germans occupied the region and razed it almost to the last brick and last metal pipe, they have kept turning right down to the beginning of the present conflict. Of all Putin’s objectives, this is the most likely to be achieved.

Second, establishing a land-bridge between Russia and the Black Sea. Long ago, it was Prussia’s Frederick the Great who said that a province to which one had access by land was worth ten times as much as one to which no terrestrial link existed. Russia’s difficulties in reaching a year-round, ice-free port are a matter of historical record. Occupying the corridor between Mariupol and the Crimea will go a considerable way towards solving the problem. It will also greatly complicate any future Ukrainian attempt to regain the Crimea, which back in 2014 the Russians annexed. I consider it just possible that Putin will achieve this objective.

Third, on the way to achieving these objectives, making sure that any future Ukrainian regime will always serve Russian interests first and foremost. Presumably this would mean a. Some kind of collaborationist government in Kiev; and b. Setting up military bases within the country so as to better control it if necessary. Briefly, something similar to the system the Soviets used between 1945 and 1989 in order to govern their East European vassals. As things look at present, this objective almost certainly will not be achieved.

Fourth, never forget that Russia without Ukraine is a country; Russia with Ukraine is an empire. As Putin has said many times, his objective is to reverse the “catastrophe” of 1989-1991 when the Soviet Union, lost its security zone to the west as well as vast other territories. Nor is this a trivial matter. During the Cold War the distance from the River Elbe, which marked the border between East and West, and Moscow was around 2,000 kilometers. With the former East Germany, the Baltic Countries, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Moldavia all having escaped Moscow’s control, that distance was cut by half; should the Ukraine too become part of NATO,  it will be down to about 850. Now a security zone 850 kilometers wide may seem plenty to most non-Russians. Certainly it does so to an Israeli who grew up in a country only 16 kilometers wide at its narrowest point. But perhaps the Russians, who twice during the twentieth century saw their country invaded and who suffered tens millions of dead as a result, may be forgiven for thinking differently. Certainly Putin is not the only one to think in such terms. Surfing the Net, just recently I came across an alleged American plan to occupy Mars as a necessary step towards protecting the U.S against a combined Russo-Chinese attack launched from the moon. Or was it the other way around? Anyhow. This objective, too, almost certainly will not be achieved.

Fifth, securing for Russia the kind of respect to which, by virtue of its size and power and development and cultural achievements, it feels it is entitled. The West’s chronic underestimation of, and contempt for, Russia, which it perceives as a backward country lacking both good government and many of the amenities of civilized life is also a matter of historical record. Starting some three hundred years ago, the Russian intelligentsia—roughly translatable as that part of the population which has some education and is interested in ideas beyond those directly tied to people’s own daily worries—have been aware of it and resented it. This objective, too, will not be achieved; if anything, to the contrary.

Sixth, as a direct result of all these, securing for Putin personally what he sees as his rightful position as the heir of Alexander Nevsky, Ivan the Dread (not the Terrible, I am told), Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Stalin. Nevsky, for beating back the Estonians, Swedes, Danes, and the Teutonic Order. Ivan, for defeating the Livonians and the Tatars as well as effectively founding the Russian State with its center in “The Third Rome,” as Moscow is sometimes called. Peter, for beating back the Swedes and the Persians as well as his heroic efforts to pull up a recalcitrant Russia and modernize it. Catherine, for annexing the Ukraine (it was under her rule that Russian power first reached the Black Sea) as well as the lion’s share of Poland. Stalin, because it was under his regime that Russia/the Soviet Union reached the peak of its power, making the rest of the world tremble in front of it. Of all Putin’s objectives, this one is the least likely to be achieved.

A final point. Seen through Western eyes, these and all other Russian rulers were autocrats of the worst kind whose most important instruments of (miss) rule were the knout, the labor camp, and the hangman’s noose.  But that is not how Putin himself sees things. According to him, Russians do not need either liberalism or democracy. The reason being that, unlike Westerners, they trust their leaders.

So, he claims, it has been in the past. And so, no doubt, he hopes it will be in the future.

Guest Article – The Ghost of 1914

By

Bill Lind*

World War I ended with a global pandemic.  Has the next world war begun with one?  I pray not, but no historian can look upon the war in Ukraine and not see the ghost of 1914 rising wraithlike from it – a ghost which, I fear, bears a striking resemblance to Conrad.  When was Przemsyl last in the news?

When we think back to World War I, to its origins, its course and its consequences, the parallels are frightening.  The first is that, in 1914, no one expected war or wanted war – at least a general European war.  Kaiser Wilhelm II certainly did not.  On the contrary: as soon as he realized, too late, where events were leading, he made desperate efforts to head them off.  He ordered a cable sent to Vienna telling Austria to take Belgrade and then stop, but the German Foreign Office did not send it.  Tsar Nicholas only approved the order for mobilization with great reluctance; his war and Foreign Ministers acted before he could change his mind.  The Kaiser even halted his army on the Belgian frontier when the British Foreign Secretary hinted Britain might stay out – but then Grey pushed the British cabinet in.

Are events today again running away from those who seek de-escalation?  Russia expected a quick victory (like everyone in 1914), but now finds herself bogged down in a stalemate with no clear exit.  As wars go on, they tend to spread.  The West is upping the ante in the help it is extending to Ukraine.  At what point does Russia start hitting Western weapons shipments while they are still on NATO’s soil?  How long can China remain on the fence when Russia is her principal ally?  If Russia uses chemical weapons in urban combat, does the U.S. wrongly declare them “Weapons of Mass Destruction” and thereby open the nuclear Pandora’s box?  There are a lot of ways for this conflict to get bigger, fast.

The parallels do not end with the merely military.  In 1914, the world had a global economy.  Only in the last decade did the value of global trade reach 1914 levels, as a percentage of the global economy.  But even before Russia invaded Ukraine, America’s use of economic sanctions as weapons was swiftly undermining Globalism, as did the Coronapanic and its effects on global supply chains.  Now, every country is striving to “re-shore” whatever it can, in a security-driven race towards autarky.

World War I ended with the destruction of three great, Christian, conservative empires, the Russian, the German, and the Austro-Hungarian, with ongoing consequences for Christendom.  What states may fail as a result of the war in Ukraine and its potential expansion?  Then, the old empires reformed as republics.  But now, we live in a time when the state is in decline and non-state entities are rising.  Fourth Generation War theory says that a defeated Russia might break up still further, as the Soviet Union did, to become a vast stateless region with lots of nukes and delivery systems floating around.

What then, Russophobes, which is to say the Blob, the neocons, and the neo-libs?  You destroyed states such as Iraq, Syria, and Libya and have not been able to put them back together.  What is your plan for a stateless region running from the Polish border to the Pacific Ocean?

The political establishments in Washington and the EU would be wise to remember that World War I brought a wholesale collapse of establishments.  The monarchies in Russia, Austria, and Germany were swept away, replaced in the first by Bolshevism and the latter two by socialism.  Shortly after the war, in 1922, the Italian political establishment was replaced by Fascism, and in 1933 in Germany by National Socialism.  Do the cultural Marxist elites that now rule in Washington and most European capitals think they are likely to survive a cataclysm they created? (I promise them their replacements will come from the right, not the left.)

If those establishments want to survive, they need now to bend every effort to de-escalate the war in Ukraine, to build a golden bridge Russia can withdraw over without humiliation, one where the Kremlin can claim some sort of victory (i.e., Ukraine will never join NATO and Crimea is recognized as Russian) and all Western sanctions are quickly removed.  The U.S., the E.U., and Russia then join to rebuild Ukraine.

In 1914, the post-1815 European order sleepwalked itself into a world war that swept it from the board.  In 2022, the post-1945 world order is on the verge of doing the same.

 

* William S. Lind is a long-time American defense analyst and social critic. This article has been previously published in Traditional.Right.

The Guessing Game

There are two cardinal reasons why President Putin has almost certainly lost the war he launched over a month ago. Both are as old as history, and both were set forth by Clausewitz around 1830. First, a military operation, large or small, is much like pouring water from a bucket (the metaphor is mine, not Clausewitz’s); the further away from its point of origin it flows, the more momentum it loses and the more vulnerable it becomes to counterattacks directed both against the spearheads and against the attacker’s lines of communication. Just think of Napoleon in 1812. Having invaded Russia with 600,000 men, by the time he reached Moscow he only had 100,000 left; all the rest had either perished by battle, disease and fatigue or been left in the rear to garrison key positions there. 100,000 troops were not nearly enough to force a decision, let alone hold the country down. And so all it remained for him was to retreat.

The second and even more fundamental reason is that time works against the attacker. Why? Because, under most circumstances, conquering and appropriating is harder, and requires greater force, than holding and preserving. An offense that does not attain its objective—from the attacker’s point of view, that would mean a better peace—within a reasonable amount of time is certain to turn into a defense. Think of Hannibal in 218-17 BCE, think of Hitler in 1941-42. Again this applies to any military operation, large or small, old or new.

So far, Putin’s war has proceeded in four stages. First, a combination of geography and numerical superiority enabled his forces to operate on external lines and invade Ukraine from four different directions (northwest, north, east and south) at once. Second, enjoying both numerical and technological superiority, and some logistic problems notwithstanding, those troops pushed the Ukrainians aside and reached the outskirts of the most important Ukrainian cities such as Kharkov, Kiev, Kherson, and Mariupol (important because of its command of the Sea of Azov as well as the road from the Donbas to the Crimea) and put them under siege. Third, especially at Kherson and Mariupol, they tried their hand at urban warfare. Only to find, as countless others before them have also done, that such warfare tends to be very bloody and very destructive. The difficulty of obtaining intelligence, the excellent shelter cities provide to those who defend them, and the way rubbish-filled streets canalize and hamper the attacker’s movements all contribute to this result; between them they cause cites to swallow up armies the way sponges take up water.

Fourth, and rather predictably, the Russians switched from attempts to capture Ukrainian cities to subjecting them to artillery bombardment. Just as, some twenty years ago, they did in Grozny. In Kherson and Mariupol the tactic worked, at any rate up to a point. However, Kiev and Kharkov are much larger than either of those. Besides, Ukraine itself is a large country with many urban areas, large and small. Not even the Russian army, famed for its reliance on artillery, has enough guns to take them on all at once; whereas doing so one by one will require enormous amounts of time which, for the abovementioned reasons, Putin simply does not have.

Fifth, the offensive having exhausted itself, stalemate will set in if, indeed, it had not done so already. Stalemate having set in politics, which right from the beginning played a very important role, will start playing an even more important one. All sides will have a strong interest in ending the war. Hence attempts will be made to do so on terms all of them —Russia, Ukraine, NATO—will find more or less acceptable or at least capable of being presented as such.

Just what the final settlement will look like is impossible to say; most probably, though, it will include the following elements. First, there can be no question of doing away with Ukraine as an independent country and nation. Second, there will be no subservient government in Kiev as there is in Minsk. Third, Russia will make no important territorial gains beyond those made in 2014 and even its ability to hold on to those is in some doubt. Fourth, Ukraine will not officially join NATO, let alone have NATO forces stationed on its territory; but other, more limited, forms of cooperation between the two entities will certainly be established and maintained. Fifth, Putin may, but not necessarily will, lose his post.

Finally, never forget that war, though it makes use of all kinds of physical assets such as numbers of troops, weapons, equipment, roads, communications, topographical and geographical obstacles, and so on, is a human drama above all. As such it is critically affected by every kind of human, often incalculable, drives and emotions; which, collectively, shape the fighting power of both sides. Taking all this into account, it becomes only too clear that anything that can be said about the way future campaigns will develop is no more than what Clausewitz calls a calculus of probabilities.

So it has been, and so it will remain