Tag Archives: Ukraine

How Much is Enough?

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How Much is Enough was the title of a 1971 volume published by the RAND (Research and Development) Corporation, an American think-tank with close ties to the United States Air Force which provided the funding. The authors, A. C. Enthoven and K. V. Smith, were both veterans of the Pentagon where they had worked for President Johnson’s Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. Both were experts on systems analysis. At that time it was a fairly new and exciting discipline that sought to subject as many problems as possible to mathematical analysis; including not just military problems but such as comprised health services, education, transportation and the like..

Some of the most important problems, taking up a considerable part of the book, concerned what people called the nuclear strategic balance between the US and the USSR. What, precisely were the objectives of building up America’s nuclear arsenal? How many nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles would be needed to deter the USSR from launching an attack? Supposing deterrence failed and nuclear war broke out, what did victory mean and how to ensure it went to America? Should there be one kind of missile/bomber aircraft or a mix of several different ones? If the latter, then how many of each kind? How to best use them, and against what targets? How many, if any, should be kept in reserve? What was the best way to render them invulnerable to a Soviet attack? And so on and so on.

Today in NATO’s capitals—Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, and to some extent less important ones too—somewhat similar questions are being asked. With this difference that, as far as the public record is concerned, the issue is not nuclear weapons but how many conventional ones, specifically tanks, to send to Ukraine’s aid. Where and how to employ them, and so forth. It goes without saying that the discussions are highly classified. Still it is possible to draw up a list of some of the most important questions that, in one combination or another, will have to be resolved before a decision is make.

  1. The nature of the mission. Is it to be defensive—just enabling Zelensky and his men to hold out until something gives—or offensive—liberating the Donbas and the Crimea? Suppose the latter is the case and these objectives are attained but the Russians still keep on fighting—as they did in 1812 and, in different ways, both in 1917-18 and 1941—what then? Note that, as a general rule, fighting on the defensive is easier and requires fewer forces than going on the offensive does.
  2. Losses. How many tanks are the various NATO countries prepared to lose, and in what time frame?
  3. Availability and production. Not only are at least some tanks going to be lost, but they are expensive beasts. A brand-new Leopard II costs about 15 million Euro. As a result, no country has an unlimited supply of the most modern tanks in particular. How many tanks can the NATO countries send into the field without putting their own security at too great a risk? How many can be sent now? How many in the future? How long will producing and fielding new ones take?
  4. Substitution. Suppose NATO country A sends some tanks to fight in Ukraine. Will the rest make up for the deficit?
  5. As the Russian invaders have discovered to their cost, and contrary to their image as kings of the battlefield, tanks are vulnerable. To other tanks. To certain kinds of anti-tank weapons. To drones, especially such as are used to attack them from above rather than from the front where tanks carry their thickest armor. Such being the case, tanks rarely operate on their own but are regularly escorted by other forces, primarily artillery, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft defenses, and engineers. How many of those can be sent now? How many in the future? How long will producing and fielding them take? How long will training Ukrainian troops in operating the tanks take?
  6. How many tanks can be supported and kept supplied? Bear in mind that tanks and their supporting forces require huge amounts of supplies. Depending on the terrain as well as the kind of operation, a modern battle tank such as the Leopard II will easily consume 3.4 L/km on road and 5.3 L/km off it. Plus ammunition, plus spare parts. Plus, in case they fight on the defense, various engineering materials. Plus all kinds of other supplies (food, water, medical supplies) which, though small in weight, are must arrive at the right place at the right time. To aggravate the problem, tanks rarely remain at the same place for long, forcing the logistic tails to follow them.
  7. What are the Russians likely to do in response? Open a new front by dragging Belarus into the war? Start at least some operations in NATO territory? Mobilize even more troops? Resort to tactical nuclear weapons?
  8. Finally, politics. Building a model of what a nuclear exchange might be like, Enthoven and Smith all but ignored politics. Indeed their tacit (but far from unreasonable) assumption was that, in that case, there would be no politics. However, the war in Ukraine is not a one-time spasm. If only for that reason, NATO planners cannot ignore them. How much political capital are the various countries, both leaders and populations, prepared to spend in assisting Ukraine? For how long?

In the long run it is this question that is likely to be the most important of all.

Guest Article: The Greatest Danger

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By

William S. Lind*

An article in the December 9, 2022 Wall Street Journal brought some rare good strategic news about the war in Ukraine.  It seems that a few of Ukraine’s allies understand that a complete Russian defeat could bring about the dissolution of the Russian state, and that this represents the worst possible outcome.

The Journal article, “Ukraine Minister Urges Bold Support from Western Allies,” reports that:

Ukraine’s foreign minister called on the country’s allies not to fear a possible breakup of the Russian state as a consequence of the war. . .

Though Kyiv’s Western allies are united over the goal of preventing a Ukrainian defeat, not all embrace the objective of a full-blown Ukrainian military victory. . . 

Some of these allies worry that such an outcome could destabilize the nuclear-armed Russian state, potentially leading to its fragmentation and wide-scale unrest, with unpredictable global consequences.

The Journal article does not identify the states that are expressing this concern, but hurrah for them.  They are daring to inject a note of realism into a policy world dominated by Washington’s neo-Wilsonianism, which has already led to the destruction of several states, including Iraq, Syria, and Libya.  These (undoubtedly European) governments expressing their concern about a potential Russian break-up seem to have grasped the central fact of the 21st century strategy, namely that a state collapse is a greater danger than state bad behavior.  Europe would be facing fewer problems today if Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya were all functioning states ruled by tyrants.

As I have written many times, state collapse is the greatest danger we face and it is spreading.  We may be witnessing it in Iran.  I too would be happy to see the fall of Iran’s Islamic theocracy and the return of the young Shah, who’s father it might be remembered, was overthrown because he tried to modernize his country. But if the result of the ayatollah’s demise is a collapse of the Iranian state, which is a fairly fragile state because much of the population is non-Persian, then we are better off with the theocrats.

China, too, is facing unprecedented disorder, largely because of misgovernment by Xi Jinping.  He botched the coronavirus problem (which probably started in a military lab in Wuhan that was tasked with developing biological weapons), collapsed the Chinese real estate market which is where most middle-class Chinese stashed their savings, and then rewarded himself with an unconstitutional third term.  A more effective assault of the legitimacy of Communist Party rule is difficult to imagine.  But as Washington delights in China’s problems, it forgets that China’s history is one of internal disunion, civil wars, and prolonged periods of warring states.  Mix that with nuclear weapons and, as with Russia, it should be clear that stabilizing the Chinese state is a primary strategic objective.  Of course, all the Wilsonians do is bleat more pathetically about “democracy” and “human rights.”

That is unrealism Washington may pay for heavily.  If Russia or China break up into stateless regions, the world economy will tank the way it did in the 1930s, or worse.  America will not escape a second Great Depression.  If Washington’s folly results in nuclear weapons hitting American cities, the Blob (the foreign policy establishment) will find itself out of work if not hanging from lampposts.  

America is deeply riven over irreconcilable cultural differences, to the point where all that holds it together is a seeming prosperity – seeming because it is built on ever-increasing levels of private and public debt.  When the inevitable debt/financial crisis hits, that alone may endanger the American union.  Add a weakening or vanishing of states around the globe and the 21st century could end up a repeat of the 14th century.  

Let us hope those European states worrying about the potential break-up of the Russian Federation don’t lose their nerve.

Addendum:  The recent “coup attempt” in Germany will go down in history as the “Clown Putsch.”  Not only did the idiots behind it think a couple dozen men could overthrow the German state, they imagined they could put Prince Henry of Reuss on the Imperial German Throne.  Every legitimist, monarchist and Reichsburger knows that the throne belongs to the head of the House of Hohenzollern and no one else.  When Germany again becomes a monarchy, it will be through constitutional means and it will reflect a broad consensus among the German people that they want a Kaiser.

*   This article has been posted on 22 December 2022 at TraditionalRight

Between Scylla and Charybdis

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Almost a year after Putin launched his so-called special military operation against Ukraine, the war in that country has clearly turned into a struggle of attrition. Historically speaking, such struggles are by no means rare. Clausewitz, indeed, argued that any offensive that fails to break the enemy’s will and reach its objective within a reasonable time will end up as a war of attrition. In particular, two struggles are worth mentioning in this context. One was waged by Germany, Britain and France on the Western Front and lasted from late 1914 to the end of 1918. The other was waged by Iran and Iraq and lasted from September 1980 to August 1988.  With these and some other armed conflicts in mind, let us examine the courses Putin still has open to him.

First, he may simply allow the war to go on just as it has over the last few months. True, the ongoing hostilities as well as Western-imposed sanctions have not been without some, perhaps considerable, negative effect on the Russian economy. On the other hand, those in the West who hoped to use economic pressure to win the war relatively quickly and painlessly have been proved wrong. In part, this is due to Russia’s own enormous resources, especially energy, raw materials, and, as the Germans learnt in World War II, its sheer size; “don’t’ march on Moscow,” a maxim attributed to British Field-Marshal Bernhard Montgomery, is as relevant today as it was in the days of Sweden’s Karl XII and Napoleon. Putin may well hope that, simply by allowing the war to continue for as long as it may take, he will end by breaking Ukraine’s will and/or split up the coalition that is currently arrayed against him.

Second, he may mobilize additional forces, equip them with whatever weapons he still has in reserve or is able to produce, train them, and use them to launch more battlefield offensives. This is what both the Allies in World War I and the Iranians during their war against Iraq did.  In the first case it worked, though only after four years of ferocious struggle and only at a horrendous cost that left both France and Britain drained of manpower and treasure. In the second it did not work at all; masses of young Iranians, many of them wearing Korean-manufactured golden plastic keys to expedite them on their journey to paradise, proved no match for the firepower, provided by both East and West, the Iraqis were able to deploy.

Third, he may switch from trying to defeat his opponents’ armed forces in the field to attacking their rear. “To make a dessert and call it peace,” as the historian Tacitus, referring to Rome’s conquest of Britain, put it twenty centuries ago. At the moment this seems to be Putin’s preferred option. Compliments of Iran, his drones have been attacking Ukrainian cities and more may very well be on the way. On the other hand, whether such attracts can really be carried to the point where the Ukrainians’ will to fight begins to crack is doubtful. Starting in 1963 and ending in 1973, three times as many bombs (by weight) were dropped on Vietnam as on Germany and Japan combined during World War II. Yet when the smoke cleared it was the US which withdrew and North Vietnam and the Viet-Cong which triumphed.

Fourth, bring in Belarus. Right from the beginning of armed conflict, belligerents of all times and places have always done their best to gain allies. Right from the beginning of the present war, Putin’s most important objective in this respect has been to get Belarussian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to assist him as much as possible. As a look at the map will confirm, such intervention may open a third, northern front against Ukraine in addition to the two, one in the east and one in the south, that already exist. Putin’s recent meeting with Belarussian dictator Lukashenko may be a big step in that direction. On the other hand, it may be a case of Lukashenko doing his best to stay out of the war without provoking Putin too much. He has been playing a dangerous game—so far, as far as anyone can see, with considerable success.

In one form or another, all four of these strategies are as old as history and may be employed both separately and together. What comes next, though, takes us into a really different world. To the best of my knowledge, no one has ever defined “tactical” nuclear weapons as opposed to “strategic” ones. The former are said to be small and suitable for “battlefield” use, military bases and airfields presumably included. The latter are sufficiently powerful for use against cities and their civilian populations. In truth, the distinctions are almost meaningless. Depending on geography, terrain, the extent to which the enemy’s forces are concentrated or dispersed, and many other factors “battlefield use” may mean anything between no casualties and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of them. What one side sees as a limited strike intended mainly to shock and impress the other may perceive as a deadly one that threatens his very existence. Even if retaliation in any specific war may be avoided, a country that uses nuclear weapons can expect them to be used against it; if not sooner, then certainly later when necessity compels and opportunity presents itself.

Next, the use of strategic nuclear weapons. From conventional weapons to tactical nuclear ones it is a huge step; from tactical nuclear to strategic nuclear, a much smaller one. Though no longer as large as they used to be when the Cold War ended thirty years ago, nuclear arsenals in the hands of both the US and Russia (soon to be followed by China in this respect) are sufficiently powerful to easily destroy the world several times over. That is why Putin, as long as he stays sane amidst the pressures to which he is subjected, will almost certainly decide not to use either them or the smaller tactical ones that lead to them.

Finally, conclude peace. Almost from the beginning of the war, Putin has had the option of halting his offensive, withdrawing his forces, and making peace. Such a move, indeed anything resembling it, would certainly bring about his fall as well as that of his clique. With only a slightly smaller degree of certainty it would also cause his country to fall to pieces—with consequences for Eurasia that are beyond his author’s imagination. That is why, at the moment, it seems the least likely possibility of all.

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis, Putin is.

Back to Basics

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The war between Russia and Ukraine has now been going on for ten months. With neither side close to victory or defeat, there is a good chance—mark my words—that it will go on for another ten, perhaps even more. Even if serious negotiations get under way, they will not necessarily end the shooting all at once. Such being the case, instead of adopting the usual method of listing all the changes that the war has brought, I want to try and put together a list of the things that it did not and almost certainly will not change.

Suggestions, welcome.

General

Contrary to the expectations of some, notably the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his 1989 essay, “The End of History,” war remains, and will remain, as important a part of global history as it has ever been.

There is no sign that the causes of war, be they divine anger with one or more of the belligerents (Isaiah), or the nature of man (Genesis) , or economic (envy and greed), or the absence of a legal system that can rule over sovereign entities, or simply the personal ambitions of certain rulers, have changed one iota.

War is a social phenomenon rooted in the societies that wage it. As a result, each society wages it in its own way. As society changes, so does war. To win a war, the first thing you need is to gain an understanding of what kind of war it is and what is all about (Prussian general and military critic Carl von Clausewitz).

The nature of war, namely a violent duel between two or more belligerents in which each side is largely free to do as he pleases to the other, has not changed one bit.

War remains what it has always been, the province of deprivation, suffering, pain and death. Also, and perhaps worst of all, bereavement; also of friction, confusion, and uncertainty. Often the more robust side, the one psychologically and physiologically better able to engage with these factors and keep going, will win.

In war everything is simple, but the simplest things are complex (Clausewitz).

Victory means breaking the enemy’s will (Clausewitz); defeat, to have one’s will broken.

All war is based on deception (the ancient, perhaps legendary, Chinese commander and sage Sun Tzu). The first casualty is always the truth.

“It is good war is so terrible, or else we would like it too much” (Confederate general Robert E. Lee; seconded, in 1914, by then First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill). War is the greatest fun a man can have with his pants on (anonymous).

“War is sweet for those who are not familiar with it” (Erasmus of Rotterdam).

“No one has ever benefitted from a long war” (Sun Tzu).

Preparation and Training

The best school of war is war.

“By learning to obey, he learnt to command” (Plutarch on Roman military commander Titus Quintus Flaminius).

 “Their maneuvers are bloodless battles, their battles bloody maneuvers” (Jewish historian Josephus Flavius on the Roman legions).

“I notice that the enemy always has three courses open to him, and that he usually chooses the fourth” (Helmut Moltke to his staff).

Strategic-Operational

As the belligerents exchange blow for blow in an attempt to knock out the enemy, war has an inherent tendency to escalate and run out of control.

God tends to be on the side of the larger battalions (Napoleon, who for German readers does not need an introduction). But not always.

“The best way to run a conflict is by negotiation. If you are too dumb to negotiate, use dirty tricks. If you cannot use dirty tricks, resort to maneuver; if you cannot maneuver, fight a battle; if you cannot fight a battle, lay siege” (Sun Tzu).

An army marches on its stomach (Napoleon).

The greater the distance between front and rear, the harder and more expensive it is to keep the army supplied (Sun Tzu).

War is an imitative activity that makes the belligerents resemble each other. The longer the war, the more alike they become.

Everything else equal, the defense is superior to the offense. First, because it does not face constantly extending lines of communication; second, because anything that does not happen favors it. The longer the war lasts, the more likely it is that the attack will turn into a defense.

Morale and Organization

“War is a physical and mental contest by means of the former” (Clausewitz).

In war the moral is to the physical as three to one (Napoleon).

It is with colored ribbons that men are led (Napoleon).

On organization: One Mameluke was a match for three Frenchmen. A hundred Frenchmen were a match for three hundred Mamelukes (Napoleon).

“Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four men who are less brave but trust each other will attack resolutely“ (19-century French military writer Ardant du Picq),

One bad commander is better than two good ones.

Technology and War

Depending on the way they are used, most distinctions between “offensive” and “defensive” weapons are meaningless.

Starting with the club and ending with the Internet, technology has done many things to war. However, it has done almost nothing to reduce, let alone eliminate, the distinctions between land, sea and air (and space) warfare. Nor between theory and practice, offense and defense, concentration and dispersal, a knock-out blow and attrition. And so on.

“Weapons, if only the right ones can be found, make up 90 percent of victory” (British General and military author J. F. C Fuller). Not true. Weapons can make a huge contribution to victory. However, their effects can be offset by superior doctrine, superior organization, superior command, superior training, and, above all, superior morale.

The longer a war lasts, the less important technological superiority tends to be.

Information and data are useful, in fact absolutely essential. But they are not enough. What is needed is lead and explosives. As well as, from time to time, cold steel to terrify the enemy.

On Nukes

War, even large scale war, between belligerents one of which is armed with nukes, remains quite possible. Whether the same applies to a situation when both sides has them remains to be seen. My guess? Probably not.

In so far as there is no defense, nuclear war is not war. It is mass murder.

“No one will ever dare use the damn things” (Field Marshal Bernhard Montgomery of Alamein on nukes).

The nice thing about nukes: If they are not used, no reason to worry. If they are used, no need to worry either.

Guerrilla and Terrorism

“The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we harass” (Mao Zedong).

The “forces of order,” as long as they do not win, lose; the guerrillas, as long as they do not lose, win.

Gender and War

“But for war, the world would sink into a swamp of feminism” Georg W. F. Hegel).

In war, women act mainly in two roles. First, as assistants and cheerleaders. Second, as targets and victims. Everything else is secondary. It would hardly be wrong to say that, without women in these roles, there would have been no war.

Finally –

No principles or doctrines, however good in themselves, well understood, and well applied, can win a war on their own. However, by freeing warriors from the need to think out everything afresh each time, they can provide a lot of help on the way to doing so.

Which Will It Be?

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The immediate threat to Ukraine having been lifted and with the war going on and on, history shows that one out of two opposed things are likely to happen.

First, the two sides may agree, either explicitly or tacitly, on a certain set of rules to govern their behavior. As by not employing certain weapons, notably in the West, poison. As by not combating certain classes of people (known, in the middle ages, as “innocents,”) and more or less leaving them alone. As by recognizing protected areas (often such as are considered holy, such as churches) where those innocents may find refuge. As by exchanging prisoners (often one of the first things they agree on). And as by recognizing the value of long-term assets (known, today, as “infrastructure”) such as fruit trees, cattle, canals, bridges, and the like.

Let me be clear: very few of these and other cases resulted from sheer goodness of heart on the part of the belligerents. In this as in other respects, what counts is calculation concerning each side’s interests. One of the most instructive instances of the way things worked occurred during the Dutch Revolt, alias the Dutch War of Independence, which started in 1568 and lasted, with one major interruption between 1609 and 1612, until 1648. Right at the beginning captured Dutch leaders, specifically two well-known noblemen (Egmont and Horne) were treated as rebels and executed by the Spanish commander in chief, the fearsome Duke of Alba. In 1576 the sack of Antwerp, known as the Spanish Fury, may have caused the death of no fewer than 17,000 of the city’s inhabitants. By 1625, things had got to the point where one of Alba’s successors, Ambrosio Spinola, not only accepted the surrender with honor of the important city of Breda but treated the defeated Dutch city commander, Justin Nassau, with extraordinary respect and dignity. Later the act of surrender was painted by one of the greatest artists of the age, Diego Velazaquez. Far from being an isolated case, it was based on a similar one by Rubens. Both contemporaries and subsequent critics agreed that it was fairly accurate. As one of them wrote, Velazquez’s masterpiece “demonstrates the glimpses of humanity that can be exposed as a result of the war and commends Spinola’s consideration for Nassau and the Dutch army.”  

Not by accident did the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius write his de Jure Belli ac Pacis, the most famous treatise ever on the topic, during the same year. There is, however, another possibility. Entering a war the troops, especially fresh ones with no experience of how frightful it really is, may be quite innocent. Innocent, they may find it hard to change their ordinary civilian behavior in favor of ruthlessly killing and destroying. For me personally, the nature of the problem was brought home by a conversation I had years ago with an Israeli battalion commander who took a critical part in the ferocious battles that kept the Golan Heights for Israel back in 1973. At first, he said, my men, most of them 20-21 years old and inexperienced, were so careful that they did not dare drive their tanks over the irrigation pipes that dotted the terrain. Very soon, though, all such considerations were flung aside. They did what had to be done and, at times, what did not need to be done. Including some things he, the battalion commander, did not want to talk about but which, many years later, still made him shudder.

To generalize on this, war is the province of intense, often maniacal, excitement. Not to mention hatred, suffering, pain, death, and mourning. Often the longer it lasts the more powerful these emotions; making the fighting harder and harder to control and carrying the danger turning it into an orgy of violence in which men no longer know what they are doing. The abovementioned Spanish Fury is one notable example of this. But there are plenty of others; just think of the terrible scene in book XXI of the Iliad where Achilles, having suffered the loss of his friend Patroclus, goes on a killing spree unequalled in the whole of literature. Such as, in the end, causes nature, in the form of the river Scamander, put an end to the slaughter by rising and trying to drown him.

At times the atrocities were planned. The Romans in particular developed sacking cities into a fine art. Putting up guards so as to prevent surprises, dividing the area into sections under strict command, and assigning troops to each one so as to ensure they did not start fighting each other over the booty. At times they were the result of the troops running out of hand, or so the responsible commanders, such as Titus during his destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70 CE (as related by Josephus) and Wallenstein at Magdeburg in 1635, later claimed. At times they helped the cause, at times they did the opposite. To return to the Spanish Fury, historians have often taken it for a turning point that persuaded both sides that they had no choice but to fight on. Remarkably the two processes, the one that leads to war being humanized to some extent and the one that leads in the other direction, may proceed simultaneously.

To return to the present, the brutality of the Russian-Ukrainian War does not need to be recounted. On the other hand, we have seen several attempts to exchange prisoners and keep on exporting grain from Odessa and other ports. As of 2 December 2022, over 12 million tons of grain and other foodstuffs had been exported via the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Above all, Ukrainian claims notwithstanding there has been neither a Russian attempt to destroy the huge nuclear complex at Zaporizhzhia nor a great rise in radiation in the surrounding countryside. If there has been “nuclear terror,” then it seems to have been very limited indeed.

So which will it be?  

But It Is All We Have

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In theory, wars should end when the defeated have no one left to fight and the victors can do whatever they likes. In practice, many if not most wars do not end in this way. As the end approaches and few doubts remain concerning the outcome, the loser will try and get the best terms he can; whereas the victor may be tempted to spare himself further effort, treasure and blood. Another possibility is for stalemate to prevail; causing both sides to have second thoughts about whether their goals can in fact be achieved and start to look for a way out.

In almost every case, the opening of negotiations will be marked by some kind of ceremony, great or small. Once they get under way they may be either direct or indirect. Direct negotiations mean a meeting, or more likely a series of meetings, between the representatives of both sides; indirect ones, meetings in which intermediaries play a prominent, sometimes decisive, role. During the Middle Ages conducting them was normally the task of the Church; shuttle diplomacy, made famous in 1973-74 by U.S Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as he flew between Jerusalem, Cairo and Damascus, is by no means a modern invention. A similar role is likely to be played by some neutral party or else by the United Nations. Negotiations may be limited to the actual belligerents, or else they may involve other parties as well. As happened, for example, during the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, which was attended by delegations from almost every European state, and also during the Conference of Versailles in 1919-20.

Contrary to what many people think, peace-negotiations and fighting are by no means exclusive. Instead, very often they take place simultaneously. An excellent example was the so-called Hundred Years War. Starting in 1337 and ending in 1453, in reality it consisted of a whole series of wars, some simultaneous, some consecutive, with pauses in between. Throughout the hundred-and sixteen years it lasted there was probably not one in which peace negotiations did not go on; if not between the principals, i.e the kings of both countries, then between some of their subordinates who, under the prevailing decentralized feudal system, often enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom to do as they saw fit. One issue on which agreement was sometimes sought was an exchange of prisoners—just as it is today following the fall of Kherson.

The peace-negotiations surrounding the Thirty Years War started in 1635 but only ended in 1648 (not counting the closely related war between France and Spain, which went on until 1657). Attempts to end the Vietnam War got under way in 1969 but took four years to complete; just deciding on the shape of the conference table in such a way as to satisfy all the participants (the U.S, South Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and North Vietnam) required months.

Applying the above generalities to the current conflict in Ukraine, what can we reasonably expect?  Point number one: most likely, negotiations will be indirect at first but direct later on. At present Zelensky is determined not to sit down with Putin’s representatives, let alone the man himself. But not sitting down with Putin does not necessarily mean that any kind of negotiation between Ukraine and Russia must be ruled out. Some kind of intermediary, most likely the UN or else a country, such as India, currently not involved in the conflict may be called in to provide its good services. Another possibility is that Putin will be remeoved by his own people and that his successors will prove more amenable to negotiations than he has been.

Point number two: very probably, given how numerous the NATO countries are and the fact that Putin has very few close allies, he will reject a peace congress and insist on one-on-one negotiations. Formally at any rate other countries will be excluded, though they may try to position themselves on the sidelines so as to gather what crumbs they can.

Point number three: almost certainly, the negotiations will take a long time to complete. At least months, more likely years. As they go on, the shooting may stop—or else it will continue, albeit intermittently and on a reduced scale. See, by way of an example of the way the two things can mix, the Vietnam War.

Point number four: seen from Moscow, victory—whatever that may mean—seems far away, perhaps even further than it did on the day its armies first launched their invasion nine months ago. On the Ukrainian side, even taking into account Zelensky’s recent victories, it does not look as if his proclaimed aim of ejecting the Russians from all of the territory they have taken since 2014 is at all realistic. It being impossible to settle the issue by force of arms, it is very likely that, in the end, some kind of compromise will be struck. One that, while granting Ukraine much of what it wants, will at any rate enable Putin to claim victory; for example, by means of a NATO declaration that Ukraine will not be allowed to join that organization.

Finally: this short article is based on nothing else but history. Often in the past history has proved itself a poor guide to the future. But it is all we have

War in Ukraine, Again

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Reader, Please note: This interview was originally done in German for a paper called, Junge Freiheit (Young Freedom). But much of what it has to say also applies to NATO as a whole.

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JF: What do you think about Russia’s supply system? Some Western media have been claiming that inside the Kremlin, there are hot debates concerning the desirability and necessity of general mobilization.

MvC: You must realize that practically everything you, I, and most Westerners—who know no Russian and have no access to the original sources in the original language–learn about the conflict must pass through a series of lenses first. They are, 1. Ukraine’s own intelligence services and propaganda apparatus; 2. The West’s intelligence services; and 3. The West’s news agencies. Personally I would not consider any of these as particularly reliable; in any war, the first casualty is always the truth.

JF: Seen from a German point of view, how important is this war?

MvC: Should Russia win this war and be left in possession of Ukraine, Putin and his eventual successors will pose a vital danger to the West. As, to use an analogy, Hitler did after his defeat of Poland in 1939. That is why I am all in favor of Germany delivering weapons to Ukraine. However, there are several conditions that must be met first. Number one, Germany’s own defenses must not be significantly weakened; no point in holding the extremities if the center folds.  Number two, to maximize cost-effectiveness and prevent duplication the deliveries should be coordinated with the rest of NATO. Third, it is a question, not just of delivering weapons but of sending those that Ukraine needs most.

JF: Considering what we are told about the war, which systems would be most useful for Kiev?

MvC: Basically they are of three kinds. First, anti-aircraft defenses. Second, those that will enable the Ukrainians to identify and locate Russian targets, especially supply convoys, depots, etc., way behind the front. Third, those that will enable those targets to be hit and destroyed from a distance.

JF: The Americans and the Brits are sending many weapons to Ukraine. What has been the impact of those weapons so far?

MvC: Clearly they are very important indeed. Had it not been for them, the only strategy left to the Ukrainians would have been to allow the Russians to overrun their county as they themselves resorted to guerrilla and terrorism. Presumably the outcome would have been Russian reprisals and even greater death and destruction than is actually the case.

JF: People often speak of the drones Turkey has been providing Ukraine with. How important are they, really? Are we talking about an effective system, or is it just a question of reinforcing Ukrainian morale by delivering a blow here, a blow there?

MvC: It seems to be a very good system with many advanced capabilities. That is why, according to the media, the chief of Ukraine’s air force Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk, has called it “life-giving”. The popularity of the drone in Ukraine led to a song, “Bayraktar” being written about the drone while throwing insults at the Russian army and the invasion. Yet none of this means that it is some kind of silver bullet that will quickly win the war—several have been shot down.

JF: Recently we have seen the Ukrainians using very simple technologies such as pickup-mounted rockets. Operated by crews of four or five, they seem to be causing the Russians lots of trouble. Obviously war is assuming new faces. What else can we expect?

MvC: Almost any war, provided only it lasts long enough, will lead to one of two outcomes (or both). On one hand, it will accelerate the development and deployment of new weapons and weapon systems. On the other, it will cause old systems to be dragged out of the magazines, refurbished, and re-employed. Think of 1940. As the very time when the British, to combat the German submarines, were developing the world’s first shortwave radar they also leased fifty World War I-vintage destroyers from the U.S.

JF: It seems that the most recent Russian weapons, such as hypersonic cruise missiles and the T-14 tank are not going on active operations. Why is that?

MvC: The hyper fast weapon has been tested several times and seems to work.  Possibly the reason why it has not been used more often is because its range, about 2,000 kilometers, is way beyond that is needed in this particular conflict.

The T-14 appears to have experienced some technical problems which delayed its deployment. Serial production only began around the time the war broke out.

JF: Do you think Kiev will able to go on the offensive again? As by reconquering occupied territory and holding it against the Russians?

MvC: War is a dynamic business. Even during the years of stalemate in 1915-18 both sides on the Western Front—not to mention the Eastern one–were occasionally able to make limited gains. But will the Ukrainians retake all or most of the land they have lost? I doubt it.

JF: During our last interview, held early in the war, you warned against underestimating the Russians. Are you still of this opinion? In your view, how far is the Kremlin prepared to go?

MvC: In any war, underestimating the enemy is the greatest error of all. History is full of the cadavers of those who did so.

JF: Will they go all the way to the Crimea??

MvC: What do you mean? The Russians already occupy both the peninsula itself and the corridor leading to it. Albeit that their control of the latter is somewhat shaky.

On Escalation

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To most people, whether or not a ruler or country “uses” nuclear weapons is a simple choice between either dropping them on the enemy or not doing so. For “experts,” though, things are much more complicated (after all making them so, or making them appear to be so, is the way they earn their daily bread). So today I am going to assume the mantle of an expert and explain some of the things “using” such a weapons might mean.

  1. Making verbal threats. Almost eight decades have passed since the first nuclear weapon was dropped on Hiroshima (without any kind of warning, nota bene). Since then there have been plenty of occasions when countries, statesmen and politicians threatened to use the nukes at their disposal: Eisenhower in 1953 in connection with the Koran War, Khrushchev in 1956 in connection with the Suez Crisis, Kennedy in 1962 in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis, Nixon in 1973 in connection with the Arab-Israeli War of that year, India and Pakistan in 1998 in connection with the Kargil War, and so on right down to Putin today. Some of the threats have been overt and rather brutal, others more or less veiled. Some were delivered directly, others with the help of a third party.
  2. To put some muscle behind the threat, weapons may be moved out of storage and put on display. Normally everything pertaining to nukes is kept highly secret. Here and there, though, countries have allowed their nuclear warheads, or replicas of them, to be shown, photographed, and celebrated for what they might do to opponents. In particular Russia, China and North Korea like to parade their intercontinental ballistic missiles. True monsters they are, any one of which can demolish almost any city on earth within, say, less than an hour of the order being given. Some such displays are accompanied by verbal threats, others not. At times the sequence is reversed in the sense that display precedes threats rather than the other way around.
  3. Raising the state of alarm. Again contrary to what most people think, putting nuclear weapons to use, in other words commanding and controlling them, is by no means simply a matter of pushing the proverbial button. First, those in charge of the weapons must make sure they are always ready to be launched at a moment’s notice. Second, they must make sure the weapons are not launched by accident, or by unauthorized personnel, or by an authorized person either deliberately disobeying orders or going out of his or her mind. The two requirements, speed (lest the weapons are targeted and destroyed before they can be launched) and reliability contradict each other; making the problem of nuclear command and control as difficult as any we humans have to face. Raising the state of alarm will cut through some parts of the problem—though just how, and to what extent, is rightly kept one of the most guarded secrets of all.
  4. Going a step further, weapons and delivery vehicles may be tested. Pace any number of computer models and exercises, ultimately the only way to make sure one’s nuclear weapons will work is to test them. Such tests, of course, may also be used in an attempt to influence the enemy’s behavior—as was notoriously the case when India and Pakistan both tested a number of weapons back in 1998. Some tests may be conducted in or over some outlying part of one’s own country as American, Soviet, British, French, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani and North Korea ones all were. Others may take place over some part of the vast no-man’s world that constitutes the earth’s oceans; for example, the Israeli-South African bomb said to have been detonated over the Indian Ocean back in 1979. It is also possible to send some of one’s missiles hurtling over enemy country, as North Korea has often done in respect to Japan.

Each of the above mentioned methods represents a different way of (hopefully) “using” one’s nuclear weapons in order to influence the enemy’s behavior without bringing about Armageddon. Historically all have been implemented quite often, some even as a matter of routine. The problem is that, since no country or leader has ever admitted giving way to a nuclear threat, it is hard to say how effective such threats were.

There are, however, additional ways states might put their nuclear weapons to use.

  1. Launching a limited nuclear strike at some less important enemy target such as outlying, more or less unpopulated, spaces or else a ship at sea. All in the hope of scaring the opponents to the point where he’ll give way to one’s demand, but without risking a nuclear response.
  2. Launching a limited nuclear strike at the enemy’s nuclear or, in case he does not have them, conventional forces. Targets might consist of early warning installations, anti-aircraft and missile defenses, troop-concentrations, communication centers, depots, etc.
  3. Launching a limited nuclear strike at the enemy’s industrial infrastructure.
  4. Launching a nuclear strike at all of the targets mentioned in bullets 5 to 7.
  5. Launching a full scale nuclear strike at the enemy’s main demographic centers.

One well known nuclear strategist, Herman Kahn, in his 1962 book distinguished among no fewer than forty different stages on the “escalation ladder.” In practice, there are two reasons why the ladder is largely theoretical. First, the various stages are likely to be hard to keep apart. Second, even if the side using the weapons does keep them apart in his own mind, the other is highly unlikely to share his views. In particular, a strike that one side sees as relatively harmless may very well be perceived by the other as a mortal blow or something close to it, thus bringing about the very retaliation he seeks to avoid.

As far as publicly available sources allow the rest of us to judge, up to the present Putin has limited himself to the first of these nine stages. That is less–considerably less–than some others have done before him. Still day by day his chances of winning” this war seem to dwindle. So the question is, will he stop there?

Nuclear Games

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Fission and fusion. Warheads and delivery vehicles. First strikes and second strikes. Counterforce and countervalue. Shots across the blow and mutually assured destruction. For decades on end these and any number of similarly mysterious terms have been circling the planet, reflecting the efforts of statesmen, politicians, defense officials, soldiers, academics and journalists to understand what nuclear weapons are all about, by whom and how they might be used, and what the consequences of their use might be. Some of the discussions are public, a great many others classified. Some are committed to paper, but a great many others take the form of wargames in which teams of highly qualified analysts, supported by as much computing power as it takes, try to answer these and similar question for their superiors’ benefit—superiors who, judging by the little that has been published on their reactions, may not even be aware that the wargames are taking place, let alone taken an interest in them.

Still at bottom the issues are very simple. Seven months after their failure to subdue Ukraine by means of a short and decisive coup de main, Putin and his staff seem to be running out of options. They can try and occupy the enemy’s most important cities, i.e Kiev, Kharkov, and perhaps Odessa. However, judging by what happened in the Donbas such an attempt will almost certainly involve them in prolonged, brutal and very bloody urban warfare for which their troops seem to be unprepared and in which victory is by no means assured. They can subject these and other cities to an even more intensive bombardment than has been the case so far, but such a move is unlikely to bring about a quick surrender on the enemy’s part. They can take the offensive in other parts of Ukraine, but given that country’s size and the sparsity of its population many if not most of those efforts are likely to hit little but empty air. Finally, following a strategic switch that has been under way since May, they can renounce the offense in favor of the defense and, by so doing, give up any thought of victory at all.

Even assuming Russia can successfully overcome its current shortage of military manpower, none of the options appear very attractive.  This is a fact of which Putin must be aware and which, at some point, may drive him to despair. Enter nuclear weapons. Here the all-important, indeed decisive, factor is that Ukraine does not have them. Perhaps the more the pity; judging by everything that has happened and not happened since 1945, in that case there is an excellent possibility that the war would never have broken out in the first place.

Next, suppose Putin wants to use his nuclear weapons. However, in that case it is not at all clear what he would do with them. The Ukrainian armed forces, made wise by the invasion, are fighting in too dispersed and mobile a manner to present attractive targets. For the Russians to ignore that fact will only lead to the Ukrainians switching to guerrilla and terrorism, a process that is already well under way. Destroying Ukraine’s vital infrastructure—dams, power plants, airports, and the like—will only make the burden of one day occupying and administering the country all the greater; besides, as evens in the Donbas show, such destruction can be achieved almost equally well by conventional means. Admittedly bombing cities out of existence, as Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, is an option. However, exercising it will end up by creating similar and even greater problems for the Russians to deal with. The more so because of the radioactivity that will surely result. So I consider Putin’s words on the topic idle threats. They are relevant only in case Zelensky and NATO mount a large-scale military offensive, complete with intensive air bombardment, into Russian territory—something that is unlikely to happen.

On the other hand, now that the US and NATO seems to be winning the war, they have no interest in nuclear weapons either. The noises they are making, some overt, others covert, are meant primarily if not exclusively to remind Putin of the terrible consequences that will follow if he goes too far. What “too far” might mean, and what the response might be, is deliberately being left obscure. Precisely how NATOs warnings link up with the factors mentioned in the previous paragraph is also not clear.

The conclusion from this is that no one wants, or should want, to see nuclear weapons used in action. That does not, repeat not, mean that the world is safe and that the weapons in question, complete with their PALs (positive action links, mechanisms explicitly designed to prevent any but authorized personnel, normally heads of state), will always remain in the places they are stored. The situation in Ukraine is unstable and constantly changing. Most of us cannot even imagine the stress to which the most important actors are subject. Under such circumstances words, especially words deliberately used to conceal the exact circumstances under which the weapons may be used, are easily misunderstood. War being a tit-for-tat business, the greatest danger is that of escalation. Meaning the likelihood that, once a single weapon is set off, all will be.

As Clausewtiz says, most barriers only exist in men’s minds. That is why, once they are breached, rebuilding them may be difficult if not impossible.

Will Russia Win?

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Like almost all other Westerners, at the time the Russian-Ukrainian War broke out in February 2022 I was convinced that the Russians would fail to reach their objectives and lose the war. Putting the details aside, this prediction was based on the following main three pillars.

First, the numerous failures, after 1945, of modern, state-run armed forces to cope with uprisings, insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, asymmetrical warfare, and any number of similar forms of armed conflict. Think of Malaysia—yes, Malaysia, so often falsely claimed by the British as a victory. Think of Algeria, think of Vietnam, think of Iraq, think of dozens of similar conflicts throughout Asia and Africa. Almost without exception, it was the occupiers who lost and the occupied who won.

Second, the size of Ukraine’s territory and population made me and others think that Russia had tried to bite off more than it could swallow. The outcome would be a prolonged, very bloody and very destructive, conflict that would be decided not so much on the battlefield but by demoralization both among Russia’s troops and among its civilian population. As, indeed, happened in 1981-1988 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, only to get involved in a lengthy counter-insurgency campaign that ended not just in military defeat on the ground but in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This line of reasoning was supported by the extreme difficulty the Russians faced before they finally succeeded in bringing Chechnya, a much smaller country, to heel.

Third, plain wishful thinking—something I shared with most Western observers. Including heads of state, ministers, armed forces, intelligence services, and the media.

Since then four very eventful months have passed. As they went on, the following factors have forced me to take another look at the situation.

First, the Ukrainians are not fighting a guerrilla war. Instead, as the list of weapons they have asked the West to provide them with shows, they have been trying to wage a conventional one: tank against tank, artillery barrel against artillery barrel, and aircraft against aircraft. All, apparently, in the hope of not only halting the Russian forces but of expelling them. Given that the Russians can fire ten rounds for every Ukrainian one, such a strategy can only be a sure recipe for defeat.

Second, a change in Russian tactics. Greatly underestimating their enemies, the Russians started the war by attempting a coup de main against the center of Ukrainian power at Kiev. When this failed it took them some time to decide what to do next; they may even have replaced a few of their top ranking generals. But then they regrouped and switched to the systematic reduction of Ukrainians cities and towns. Much as, in 1939-40, Stalin and his generals did to Finland. As in both that war and World War II as a whole they resorted to what has traditionally been their most powerful weapons, i.e massed artillery. It now appears that the change enabled them to reduce their losses to levels that they can sustain for a long time. Perhaps longer than the Ukrainians who, by Zelensky’s own admission, are losing as many as 100-200 of their best fighters killed in action each day.

Third, Western military technology, especially anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank weapons, and drones may be excellent. However, limited numbers, the result of years and years of parsimony and the belief that war in Europe had become impossible, plus the need to retrain the relevant Ukrainian personnel, means that it has been slow to arrive in the places where it is most needed. Not to mention the fact that, whereas the Russians are fighting close to home, NATOs lines of communication stretch over hundreds of miles all the way from Ukraine’s borders with Poland, Slovakia and Romania in the west to the Donbas in the east. Almost all the terrain in between is flat, devoid of shelter, and thinly populated.  Meaning that it is ideal for the employment of airpower, precisely the field in which Russian superiority over Ukraine is most pronounced.

Fourth, strict censorship is making the impact of Western economic sanctions on Russia’s population hard to asses. If there is any grumbling, it is being energetically suppressed. Meanwhile, a look at the macroeconomics seems to show that Russia is coping much better than many Westerners expected. Gold reserves have been inching up, enabling Putin to link his currency to gold—the first country to do so since Switzerland went in the opposite direction back in 1999. The Ruble, which early in the war came close to collapse, is back to a seven-year high against the dollar, trend upward. Given the fall in imports as well as the tremendous rise in energy prices, more money is flowing into Russia’s coffers than ever before. Most of that money comes from selling energy, foodstuffs and raw materials to countries such as China and India. China in turn is now the world’s number one industrial power; once its current troubles with COVID-19 are over, it should be well able to provide Russia with almost any kind of industrial product it needs, and do so for a long time to come.

Fifth, the economic impact of the war on the West has been much greater than anyone thought. Saving Ukraine form Russian’s clutches is not like doing the same with Afghanistan. On both sides of the Atlantic inflation is higher than it has been at any time since 1980. Especially in regard to energy, which Russia is refusing to provide Europe with, it is giving rise not just to confusion but to some real hardship. Should it continue, as it almost certainly will, it will give rise to growing popular discontent with the war and demands that their countries’ involvement in it be reduced or brought to an end.  Even if that end means abandoning Ukraine and allowing Putin to have his way with it.

Last not least, beginning with the Enlightenment the West has long preened itself on being a fortress where liberty, law and justice prevail. Now the repeated, highly publicized, requisitioning of the property of so-called oligarchs is beginning to make some people wonder. First, no one knows what an “oligarch” is. Second, the fact that some “oligarchs” have been in more or less close touch with Putin over the years does not automatically turn them into criminals. Third, supposing they are criminals, it is not at all clear why they were left alone for so long and only began to be targeted after the war broke out. Could it be that, in combating the oligarchs, the West is undermining the justice of its cause?

To be sure, we are not there yet. But as growing number of statements that the war is going to be a long one show, it is now primarily a question of who can draw the deepest breath and hold out the longest. And when it comes to that, Russia’s prospects of coming out on top and obtaining a favorable settlement are not at all bad.